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This thesis examines the expansion of private maritime security provision, 
its regulation and implications for national and global security. The main 
research question addressed is: How are private maritime security 
companies (PMSCs) regulated in the context of the contemporary trend 
towards international security privatisation? However, further questions 
stem from this: Is the complex framework of the PMSCs’ business model 
adequately regulated? To what extent could the existing practices and 
regulatory framework affect international security in governance and 
policy, strategic, social and commercial terms?  
 
Qualitative research methods were used, strongly supported by empirical 
data collection – available due to extensive professional experience and 
personal engagement of the author with the private maritime security 
industry. Using a case study of PMSCs’ operations off Somalia from 2005-
2013, and a plethora of selected data from primary sources and semi-
structured interviews, the paper argues that there is need for more 
effective regulation of PMSCs and the establishment of international 
standards.  
 
Following an analysis of the current conceptual framework of private 
security, focussing particularly on maritime security, in the context of 
contemporary academic literature and professional practice, the paper 
provides a detailed theoretical justification for the selection of the 
methodology used. After broadening and deepening the analysis of the 
privatisation of security ashore, the concerns raised are then transferred 
to the maritime domain. The situation becomes even more complicated in 
the high seas due to inconsistencies between flag states’ regulations, the 
unregulated vastness of the oceans and the reluctance of any 
international body (such as the IMO) to undertake the essential task of 
regulating PMSCs. Building on this, an analytical framework that enables 
the integration of maritime security and contemporary piracy into the 
contemporary paradigm of global security is developed. An historical 
overview of piracy then demonstrates that modern piracy is an ancient 
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phenomenon with contemporary local characteristics. The maritime 
crime’s causal factors remain more or less the same throughout human 
history and, the paper argues, PMSCs serve as a short term response to 
address the symptoms rather than the root causes. Given that PMSCs 
have so far been used primarily as measures against Somali piracy, 
activities in this specific region provide an appropriate case study. The 
development of a typology of piracy offers a deeper understanding of the 
regional distinctiveness of the phenomenon, which is essential to acquiring 
a holistic picture of the operational environment in which PMSCs are 
deployed.   
 
The above considerations are used as a basis for analysing the 
complexities of the PMSCs’ business model, in legal, operational and 
ethical terms. The questionable practices involved in these are not fully 
regulated by national states. Hence, their contract and deployment raise 
ethical, legal and operational concerns. In the penultimate chapter, these 
are further assessed in terms of the extent to which the existing 
regulatory framework and PMSCs’ practices affect international security in 
governance and policy, strategic, social and commercial terms. The 
research indicates that states are increasingly outsourcing the monopoly 
they have exercised in security provision - a trend that has also expanded 
the private sector’s activities and business at sea. However, the lack of 
international laws and the consequent unstandardized plethora of flag 
states’ regulations has meant that the burgeoning private security 
services are dependent on the global market to regulate themselves. 
States’ reluctance and/or inability to regulate these companies has 
allowed controversial practices to persist and the lack of an international 
body responsible for their regulation and vetting on a worldwide basis has 
inevitable consequences in terms of global security. 
 
The overall outcome of this thesis is an elucidation of the potential 
implications of the privatisation of maritime security - both positive and 
negative. Most significantly, it suggests this could present a significant 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
In December 2008, the European Union (EU) launched its first ever joint 
Maritime Operation1 within the European Common Security and Defence 
Policy (ESDP). Hereafter, “Operation Atalanta” was the EU’s counter-
piracy operation off the coast of Somalia in accordance with the relevant 
United Nations Security Council resolution and “as a response to the rising 
levels of piracy and armed robbery off the Horn of Africa in the Western 
Indian Ocean” (EEAS 2012). The first operational commander of the joint 
Naval Force was a Greek Commodore, which added a mythic parameter to 
the whole operation. This was reinforced by the fact that, at this time, the 
Secretary General of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) was 
also Greek.2  
Serving at that time as Commander in the Hellenic Navy, I was assigned 
as Lecturer at the Hellenic Supreme Joint War College; that day I 
announced with pride at the plenary – which consisted of 200 
students/senior officers from the three branches (Army, Navy and Air 
Force) of the Hellenic Armed Forces - that our frigate would carry our flag 
in the Indian Ocean and she would contribute to the international effort to 
combat piracy off the coast of Somalia.  
I was already thoroughly involved in studying and researching maritime 
security as a response to contemporary security challenges and had 
actively participated in international conferences and publications relevant 
to this specific domain. As a result, in June 2011, I was selected and 
kindly invited to become the First Chairman of the International 
Association of Maritime Security Professionals (IAMSP). Given the broader 
perspective, professional experience and active engagement that this post 
could offer my study and research, I accepted the voluntary and 
honourable post with great pleasure and enthusiasm.  
                                                          
1 See EU NAVFOR Somalia, available from http://eunavfor.eu/mission/  
2 As stated by the IMO, ‘Mr Efthimios E. Mitropoulos was elected Secretary-General of the 
Organization by the ninetieth session of the IMO Council on 18 June 2003 for an initial four-year 
period beginning 1 January, 2004.  On 9 November 2006 at the ninety-seventh session of the IMO 
Council, Mr Mitropoulos' mandate was renewed for a further four years until 31 December 2011.’  
Available from http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=85  
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Less than one year later, in March 2012, the Hellenic Government officially 
announced the withdrawal of the frigate from the EU naval force deployed 
in the piracy high risk area (HRA). Furthermore, given that the severe 
economic situation of my country was already having a serious impact, it 
was clear that the re-deployment of any Hellenic asset in the region was 
very unlikely to be authorised. In my naval hat, this could have been a 
surprising and disappointing decision; beyond my embarrassment as an 
officer, Hellas is traditionally a maritime nation and the sea is inseparable 
from its local culture, history, society and its existence per se. 
At an international level, this was clearly a drawback for my country’s 
profile and prestige in terms of its applied naval diplomacy and its 
contribution to international security and global trade by its participation 
in securing the openness of sea lanes and the ‘freedom of the seas’. 
During more than sixteen years seagoing service, I had participated in 
numerous operations, ranging from the war in former Yugoslavia and the 
traditional naval tasks of safeguarding national territorial waters to 
regional maritime territorial disputes and crises with Turkey which 
escalated up to the level of conflict. I also performed non-traditional 
tasks, such as search and rescue operations for irregular migrants and 
humans trafficked by sea, suppression of smuggling using high speed 
boats, humanitarian operations such as the evacuation of civilians from 
the Chinese embassy during the collapse of the Albanian regime. Hence, I 
could not overlook the operational dimension of the Navy’s withdrawal and 
denial of adaptation to the contemporary security environment. In the 
present case, this entailed international cooperation in anti-piracy 
operations, use of force, international legitimisation and mandate, 
ethical/social approval for the protection of national interests and the 
protection of seafarers and shipping (both national and foreign) on a 
worldwide basis - all within the framework of strict and specific rules of 
engagement.           
Yet, switching to my IAMSP chairman’s hat, this withdrawal was a 
confirmation of my previous research findings and my knowledge of 
private maritime security companies (PMSCs) and their services. So, 
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instead of disappointing, the answer was quite profound. In the context of 
the global trend towards privatisation of security, my country had adopted 
the cost-effective practice of offering an alternative form of security 
provision to the vast Hellenic-owned merchant fleet. This was intended to 
enable shipping companies to address their security needs by contracting 
PMSCs (which comprised a flourishing business sector in the depressed 
Hellenic economy) and so pay for their own security.  
In the same period, the economic crisis in Hellas was escalating. Military 
personnel were severely affected by salary reductions and the scheduled 
cost-saving measures from the government for the near future led many 
colleagues to exercise their right to resignation and look for better 
financial conditions and rewards in other professions. My colleagues from 
the ‘Navy Seals’3 had a particular advantage: their service in the Special 
Forces gave them bonus pension arrangements. Moreover, their training 
was an ideal background for a new job search and career in the rapidly 
growing industry of private maritime security. One of my retired 
colleagues was already contracted by a PMSC to provide training in armed 
or unarmed security for teams deployed on board merchant vessels during 
their transit through high risk areas in the Indian Ocean. He also 
frequently acted as a sub-contractor in such transits since the financial 
gains were far greater than his salary in the Navy and he was familiar with 
the level of risk due to his previous service. On an everyday basis, he ran 
a cafeteria in Thessaloniki and every time he returned from a transit we 
discussed his experiences in detail. He even proposed that I undertake 
transit deployments myself, although I had had nothing to do with ‘Special 
Forces’ training, nor a similar background. However, speaking on 
condition of anonymity, he highlighted the ease with which a person could 
be employed by a PMSC due to the huge demand; he suggested that 
although, as a senior officer of the Navy, I would have an advantage 
compared to other subcontractors who had never been on board a ship 
before, they would still be considered employable.4 Of course, the overall 
adventure and the promise of a remarkable reward were not enough to 
                                                          
3 The term refers to Navies’ Special Forces teams, trained among others for boarding, irregular 
warfare at sea and contemporary maritime security operations in general.  
4 This chance conversation was purely anecdotal and is not one of the semi-structured interviews 
listed in the bibliography. 
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tempt me to undertake a single transit through a high risk area, where at 
that time piracy was thriving and successful hijackings were perhaps at 
their all-time highs. And, possibly even more importantly, at that time no 
international standards specifically relating to PMSCs had been 
established. (Both currently available standards were developed and 
published in December 2012/ January 2013). This constitutes clear 
evidence that all the PMSCs established around the world had been 
operating without any international regulatory framework in place for 
many years (at least since 2003). This lack of regulation and established 
professional standards was confirmed at the highest possible level, when 
the Chair of the UN Security Council Committee for Somalia and Eritrea, 
H.S. Puri, addressed the President of the UN Security Council in early July 
2012, stressing that: 
The unmonitored and largely unregulated activities of private 
maritime security companies off the coast of Somalia, offering 
armed protection to ships and crews traversing the high-risk area, 
may represent a potential new channel for the flow of arms and 
ammunition into Somalia and the region […] Private maritime 
security companies are currently holding approximately 7,000 
weapons in circulation, which are either owned or leased […] The 
absence of control and inspection of armed activities inevitably 
creates opportunities for illegality and abuse, and increases the 
risk that the maritime security industry will be exploited by 
unscrupulous and criminal actors, eventually coming to represent a 
threat to regional peace and security, rather than part of the 
solution’ (UNSC 2012:24).       
Another group of four colleagues resigned from the Navy Seals. They, 
then, decided to found their own PMSC in Athens and to register it in 
Cyprus to avoid the increase in taxes enforced in Hellas due to the 
economic situation. In light of my experience both as a researcher and 
IAMSP chairman, they asked me to provide consultancy services for the 
development of their profile in the global market; including recruitment, 
weapons procurement and organisation of the company’s structure. My 
interaction with them in terms of consulting remained limited due to my 
occupation in the Supreme Joint War College, as already explained. 
However, their offer provided me with the opportunity to gain a 
comprehensive insight into the internal functionality and culture of PMSCs 
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at the company’s level, supplementing my academic research and the 
chairmanship experience at the international association’s level.                
Through this, I identified the main themes and research questions of this 
thesis. In particular, the following significant issues triggered my research 
interests: the extremely limited academic research, the overlooked 
maritime domain, the foreseen metamorphosis of international security, 
the participation of non-state actors in force projection and the 
outsourcing of security provision to the private sector.  
At the outset of this project, I based my understanding of the issues 
involved on the framework developed in my preliminary research. This 
ensured that all the evidence, which stemmed both from official 
documents such as the UNSC (2012) resolution and empirical data from 
my personal interaction with PMSCs, contributed to the genesis of my 
main research question: How are private maritime security companies 
regulated in the context of the international security privatisation trend? 
This main question raised even more research questions:  What is the 
contemporary conceptual framework of private security, and particularly 
maritime security, in the context of contemporary academic literature and 
professional practice? What constitutes an appropriate analytical 
framework of maritime security’s integration into the contemporary 
paradigm of global security? Is the complex framework of the PMSCs’ 
business model regulated (in legal, operational and ethical terms)? And 
perhaps most significantly: To what extent could the existing regulatory 
framework and PMSCs’ practices affect international security in 
governance and policy, strategic, social and commercial terms?    
To address the above research questions, this thesis used the following 
qualitative research methods: document analysis, a case study and semi-
structured interviews, all strongly supported by empirical data collection. 
This latter was available due to the author’s extensive professional 
experience and personal engagement with the private maritime security 
industry. Through these methods the subject was researched in depth and 
established the evidence necessary to support the initial findings that 
there is a substantial need for more effective regulation of PMSCs and the 
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institution of international standards. It is worth noting that the qualitative 
research of this domain in general, and of the ‘air-tight’ maritime security 
industry in particular, both in Hellas and the UK, would have been 
impossible for an outsider. This partially explains the reason for the 
relatively limited existing literature and research undertaken in this 
specific field. In fact, I was denied an official interview by colleagues I had 
known for many years and served with in the Hellenic Navy. The reason 
given was that they did not want to reveal the hints and secrets of the 
sector, although they knew that it was for academic purposes, anonymous 
and, perhaps more importantly, that I already knew most of those hints 
and secrets already, due to my IAMSP experience.  
The following section provides an outline of the thesis and a brief 
summary of the next chapters. These are the outcome of the research 
undertaken, including restricted and confidential discussions with 
interviewees and difficult/conditional access to primary sources.   
 
1.1 Outline of the Thesis  
The focus of this research was the privatisation of maritime security and 
its implications for international security. My intention was neither to 
advocate that PMSCs are a panacea for addressing security challenges nor 
to condemn their existence, contracts, deployment and use as an 
anathema to the international community. It would have been a 
unrealistic attempt and futile effort anyway since the global industry 
already counts 708 registered private security companies (PSCs) in the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers5 (ICoC) (as of 
September 2013). Instead, I used the case study of the operations of 
PMSC’s off Somalia from 2005 – 2013 to research into PMSCs and their 
role as protagonists in contemporary maritime security. The aim of my 
research was to conduct an analytical investigation into the regulation of 
private maritime security companies in the context of the contemporary 
trend towards increased international security privatisation. Contingent on 
this is an understanding of the extent to which this privatisation trend 
                                                          
5 See http://www.icoc-psp.org/ [accessed 21 September 2013]  
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affects international security in general and maritime security in 
particular. Through this, my secondary aim was to further the academic 
debate relating to the conceptualisation of security privatisation.  
To achieve this, and address all the research questions, the following 
objectives were set out:  
 To analyse the existing conceptual framework of private security,  
particularly maritime security, in the context of contemporary academic 
literature and professional practice. 
 To develop an analytical framework for the integration of maritime 
security and contemporary piracy in particular, into the contemporary 
paradigm of global security. 
 To analyse the complex framework of the PMSCs’ business model, 
in legal, operational and ethical terms. 
 To assess the extent to which the existing regulatory framework 
and PMSCs’ practices affect international security in governance and 
policy, strategic, social and commercial terms. 
 
To this end, Chapter Two provides a literature review, examining various 
contemporary theories and approaches that reflect the theoretical 
framework of international security. Although these theories and 
approaches differentiate themselves from other schools of thought and 
the major debates are still on-going, their synthesis and various 
combinations in part reflect the context of privatisation of maritime 
security in the international security environment. The state has a key 
role in all of these, although several approaches acknowledge the 
increasing influence and participation of non-state actors in international 
security. However, none conceptualise the private sector as a security 
provider that replaces the state, even partially. Thus, no existing 
theoretical approach analyses and sets the privatisation of maritime 
security trend in perspective. The existing literature is relatively limited, 
especially that focusing on the maritime domain. Therefore, the 
contribution of my research to the existing literature could be 
characterised as original, as well as contributing towards filling the 
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identified gap in research on privatisation of security in the maritime 
domain. Furthermore, in this chapter, the conceptual framework of 
privatisation of maritime security was established, hence providing a basis 
for the investigation of the PMSCs’ regulatory framework - and the 
fulfilment of the first objective of the thesis.    
Chapter Three includes the methodology, planning and details about the 
strategy used in the research, methods of data collection from both 
primary and secondary sources, the analysis method used and finally the 
limitations that the research encountered. 
The first part of the chapter sets out the research aims and objectives, 
based on the research questions given above, and the methodology used 
to meet these. The selected qualitative research strategy is described, 
including semi-structured interviews as the primary data collection 
method used. All the participants requested to retain their anonymity, 
both as individuals and companies, and they were assured that this would 
be respected in all ways. Robust empirical data collection provided support 
for the evidence provided by these interviews stemming from my personal 
experience from activities, personal contacts and networks, and perhaps 
most significantly, my chairmanship (and currently Vice Presidency) at the 
IAMSP. This facilitated the commentary, data analysis and evaluation as 
well as providing a valuable source of information, professional insight and 
familiarisation with international practices in the security provision 
industry. However, much of the information gathered had to be treated as 
confidential for commercial reasons.  
For these and similar reasons, I focused my research mostly on Hellenic 
and British PMSCs. My nationality and residency, Hellenic and British, 
respectively, definitely played a vital role in this choice, as well as in the 
selection of interviewees and completion of the research. But another 
crucial point – and perhaps little known - is that UK and Hellenic PMSCs 
together count approximately seventy per cent of PMSCs registered 
worldwide. Thus, this provides a sufficient sample and allows 
generalizable conclusions to be drawn.         
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An analysis of the post-Cold War era trend towards the privatisation of 
security is provided in Chapter Four, aiming at further broadening and 
deepening the findings of the literature review, as well as transferring the 
land based conceptual framework to the maritime domain. The broad 
debates stemming from the use of such entities in functions hitherto 
perceived as exclusively the states’ obligations and jurisdictions are 
explored in this context. Similarly, the dilemmas emerging from the 
states’ ability to regulate them within the free market’s environment are 
stressed respectively. The debate broadens even further due to the 
development of the trend in the maritime domain. This involves the major 
issues associated with the different legislations of flag, port and coastal 
states. Their self-regulation within the industry, their credibility and use of 
force all highlight the characteristics of private maritime security. Finally, 
an inductive analysis of the causal factors and consequences of this trend 
is provided, which is explored and analysed in greater depth in the final 
chapter of my thesis.    
Chapter Five introduces the analytical framework of ‘maritime security’, 
thus addressing the aims of the second objective. To this end, it provides 
definitions adopted by the major actors in the international community, as 
well as indicating the identified contemporary threats challenging 
maritime security at the global level. Despite the broad spectrum of 
maritime security challenges, the attention of the international community 
is focused on modern piracy due to the direct implications for economic, 
energy and food security, and the cost in human life. Therefore, in this 
chapter, an historical overview of the phenomenon is used so as to put 
piracy at sea into the maritime security perspective and framework. It 
demonstrates both the ancient character of the maritime crime as well the 
diachronic character of the causal factors of its genesis, sustainability and 
suppression, and the responses to these. 
Subsequently, Chapter Six is dedicated to the detailed research and 
presentation of contemporary maritime piracy. Since the vast majority of 
PMSCs’ contracts and deployment are focused on providing security 
against this crime in the Horn of Africa, this region was selected as a case 
study to aid the analysis of their regulatory framework. After providing the 
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definitions of piracy and armed robbery at sea – adopted from the 
international community and indicating the conventions in force – its root 
causes and causal factors are analysed. Specifically researching the case 
study of Somalia, these causes and factors reflect the continuity of the 
history and the perpetuation of the phenomenon in the Horn of Africa. 
Finally, the chapter provides an overall assessment of the international 
response to contemporary Somali piracy, both at the state and 
commercial sector’s levels. This evaluation contributes to the development 
of an analytical framework for the integration of both maritime security 
and contemporary piracy into the contemporary paradigm of global 
security. 
Chapter Seven focuses on the fulfilment of the next identified objective: to 
analyse the complex framework of the PMSCs’ business model, in legal, 
operational and ethical terms. It provides an in-depth analysis of the main 
actors’ regulatory framework and applied practices. Whilst challenging the 
states’ monopoly in terms of maritime security provision, these private 
maritime service providers emerged as the most popular and effectively 
applied anti-piracy measure and were broadly recognised as such. This 
chapter gives a detailed description of the methods and practices used 
regarding their recruitment, evaluation and training procedures, their 
international certification and regulation process in force, their 
controversial approaches in buying, hiring and safekeeping weapons and, 
even more importantly, in using them for projecting force. Finally, the 
chapter provides an analysis of the significant issues relating to their 
regulation at international level. This includes the use and carrying of 
weapons on board commercial vessels and the debateable process of 
assessing their quality and performance within the free market - which 
actually controls the whole provision of private security by default due to 
the reluctance of the states to actively control the outsourcing. These are 
examined in parallel with the ethical concerns stemming from their 
deployment.   
Chapter Eight uses the previous chapter’s findings to assess the extent to 
which the existing regulatory framework and PMSCs’ practices affect 
international security in governance and policy, strategic, social and 
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commercial terms; and so contributes to the fulfilment of the final 
objective. It discusses the implications of the privatisation of security in 
the maritime domain, following the analogous paradigm of the land-based 
practice. The blurred distinction between state and private security 
becomes obvious and even murkier through the deployment of ‘private 
navies’, the deployment of military detachments for protecting commercial 
ships, the foundation of private intelligence companies, while the 
indicative case study of Greece demonstrates that the state relies 
increasingly on private initiatives for ensuring the maritime security 
provision. The nexus between economics and security is confirmed in the 
contemporary environment as critical for developing the relationship 
between state and private security, as well as the fragmentation of states’ 
monopoly in terms of security provision. Furthermore, the implications in 
international security are discussed in a broader framework. In this 
respect, political, social (including career/employment issues), financial, 
legal, military and strategic perspectives and aspects are all potentially 
affected to a lesser or greater extent, while of course technology 
advancements create more concerns and implications for the international 
security arena.  
Finally, Chapter Nine reiterates the main points that emerge from this 
research, evaluating the achievement of the research aims and objectives, 
as well as acknowledging some of the limitations related to this particular 
piece of research. Additionally to the major outcomes of this research, this 
chapter also details recommendations for mechanisms and requirements 
for the international community to establish and have in place, in order to 
regulate effectively the already flourishing industry, so as to avoid losing 
control at the international level in terms of use of force and security 




Chapter Two: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The concept of security has undergone a noticeable metamorphosis 
throughout recent years. Traditionally, security has been seen as “the field 
where states threaten each other, challenge each other’s sovereignty, try 
to impose their will on each other, defend their independence” (Waever 
1995:50). In terms of realist strategic studies, the concept of security is 
predicated on a definition of the state as, “the referent object, the use of 
force as the central concern, external threats as the primary ones, the 
politics of security as engagement with radical dangers” (Buzan and 
Hansen 2009:21).  
During the Cold War era, threats were mainly associated with military 
capabilities and arose primarily from states in the international system 
with aggressive intentions of dominating other states. Consequently, the 
study of international security was synonymous with military strategy and 
statecraft. National security was the military’s field of responsibility; major 
threats came from rival states through interstate warfare, and sometimes 
from intrastate civil war (Hart 2011:3). 
Power was understood as “the sum of military, economic, technological, 
diplomatic, and other capabilities at the disposal of the state” (Cavelty 
2008:5). The unequal and changing distribution of capabilities defined the 
relative power of states, which in turn determined the balance of power 
between them and so influenced their behaviour within the international 
system. These evident parameters of threat gave “a sense of certainty 
through calculability” (Cavelty 2008:5). Threats were known and 
measurable, and responses to them took place through the development 
of security policies by political actors who objectively assessed the 
increase of a threat or risk in order to take action (Walt 1991). 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the effects of globalisation 
undermined the clarity of purpose and coherence of these traditional 
understandings of security and brought a variety of ‘new’, often non-
military, threats onto the security agendas of many states. However, the 
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label ‘new’ is not fully justified because many of the new threats, such as 
ethnic conflicts, social or economic inequalities, terrorism and piracy, 
already existed. Nevertheless, current threats are distinguishable from 
those associated with the Cold War by the element of uncertainty inherent 
in them: “uncertainty as to ‘when, who, how, why, and where’, which is 
unprecedented” (Cavelty 2008:5). This uncertainty derives from the fact 
that the main threats on the new agenda are generated by non-state 
actors who possess and use non-military or asymmetric means. This 
makes it very difficult to determine their capabilities and link these to 
their intentions. 
A characteristic body of literature began to develop after 1945 with a 
particular focus on the concept of security, which at this time was 
examined from a critical and widening perspective. This opened the way 
for a broader study of the concept of security after the Cold War. This 
literature has the characteristic distinction that, 
it took security rather than defence or war as its key concept, a 
conceptual shift which opened up the study of a broader set of 
political issues, including the importance of societal cohesion and the 
relationship between military and non-military threats and 
vulnerabilities (Buzan and Hansen 2009:1). 
The current chapter examines contemporary security theories and 
approaches that reflect the theoretical framework of international security. 
Their review presents a variety of theoretical approaches to security, 
simultaneously highlighting the limited nature of existing literature 
concerned with the conceptualisation of maritime security within their 
sphere. Equally, despite the existence (albeit limited) of the literature and 
research dedicated to the phenomenon of private security provision 
ashore, the contemporary trend towards privatisation of maritime security 
is overlooked to a great extent.    
Finally, through the in-depth research of the debates between academics 
and various relevant schools of thought, this chapter highlights the notion 
that the synthesis of these security paradigms can only partially reflect 
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the contemporary security environment. The reason for this is that the 
theoretical approaches analysing and setting the privatisation of security 
trend in perspective are relatively limited. Thus, the contribution of this 
research to the existing literature could be characterised as original and 
as attempting to fill this identified gap. 
 
2.2 International Security Theories and Approaches 
 2.2.1 Realism 
The roots of realism can be found back in ancient Greece, when 
Thucydides (460-395 B.C.), in his epic book The Peloponnesian War,6 
attempted to interpret the city-states’ behaviour in the ‘international 
system’, their competition for dominance the causes of war and the nature 
of power. Realism has a central place in the debates within international 
relations theories and, until the 20th century, it was to a great extent the 
dominant concept of international security. 
Definitely, throughout the centuries, it became a broad family of theories 
and arguments rather than a single, well-defined one. However, there are 
key elements shared by most of these theoretical approaches as described 
in this section.  
Realists emphasise that the international system is anarchic, in terms of 
lack of a central international authority, capable of enforcing agreements 
and preventing the use of force. In this system, states are the 
protagonists and key actors and their interactions are characterised by 
competition and war. Hence, power is the defining feature of their 
relations. Since they have to rely on their own capabilities to survive, 
those who achieve greater levels of power (including wealth, population, 
technology, etc.) can build more powerful military forces and prevail in 
the international anarchic system. These are also the criteria used for 
assessing each other, and which overlook the variations that exist within 
the states, such as regime type, leadership, ideology. In this framework 
they are perceived as unitary actors, and their strategic interactions do 
                                                          
6 Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War (Loeb Classical Library, 1989) 
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not stem from leaders, governing institutions, interest groups or 
populations, but from states per se, as a whole, an inclusive entity. 
Furthermore, they are considered to be rational actors - acting in a 
predictable way and making decisions focused on the achievement and 
promotion of their national interests. In making these strategic decisions, 
they take into consideration other states’ capabilities, policies and 
reactions, hence sustaining the competitive nature of the international 
system (Glaser 2010:16-17). Realism focuses on high politics – war, 
peace, the military and national security – as the central concerns of a 
state, that is, the ‘sovereign political entity’. This is substantiated by the 
facts that the state answers to no higher political authority and that only 
the state engages in war or peace. These core political values ensure a 
state’s continuing existence. This adherence to high politics tends to 
differentiate realism from other theories of international relations. Non-
state actors are frequently acknowledged by realists but these issues take 
precedence over lower politics, such as trade. Since they assume the state 
to be principal actor, realists work with the most authoritative, therefore, 
the most relevant units of analysis within this framework (Viotti 1997). 
In the 1970s, the ‘update’ for traditional realist thought emerged in 
contemporary international relations. In this context, the term neorealism 
emerged as defined mostly through the work of Kenneth Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics (1979) (Elman 2007:15,Lamy 2008:124). Waltz 
attempted to give more scientific validity to the existing classical realist 
theory through the formulation of ‘law-like statements’ about international 
relations (Waltz 2000). In order to achieve this, he excluded from his 
approach some of the concerns found in the classical realist writings of 
Morgenthau, including the moral dilemmas of foreign policy and the ethics 
of statecraft. For example, Morgenthau argues that states’ pursuit of 
power is rooted in human nature, which is characterised by an essential 
and universal lust for power, as an end in itself that knows no limits.  
However, he cites that state greed can also reflect a wide range of other 
sources, such as a state’s desire to increase its wealth and prosperity, 
and/or to spread its political ideology or religion (Glaser 2010:29).   
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Instead, Waltz focused on the ‘structure’ of the international system 
emphasizing its importance and the role it plays as the primary 
determinant of state behaviour (Waltz 2000). He also examined the 
consequences of structure for international relations (Jackson and 
Sørensen 2007:45).  Neorealism also portrays the international system as 
a “brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of 
each other, and therefore have little reason to trust each other” 
(Mearsheimer 1995:9).  
The main difference between Waltz’s defensive realism and Mearsheimer’s 
offensive realism is the amount of power states feel they need, in order to 
guarantee their survival. For Waltz, power is a useful means to the end, 
which is security. Thus, states should try to accumulate only ‘an 
appropriate amount of it’ and, instead of becoming power maximisers, 
they should be security maximisers. As he asserts, “power maximization 
often proves to be dysfunctional because it triggers a counter-balancing 
coalition of states” (2008:98-99).  
In more recent studies, the terms offensive and defensive realism are also 
used when the current versions of realism or neorealism are discussed, 
particularly in the area of security studies (Jervis 1999:11-20, Lamy 
2008:126, Elman 2007).  
Advocates of a broader perspective of security criticise the realist theory 
as adopting, in Nissenbaum (2005:65) words, “an overly narrow view of 
national security, focusing on protection of physical borders and strategic 
assets against military attacks by foreign states”. These commentators 
claim that security means a lot more than just confronting military threats 
within national borders. 
 2.2.2 Liberalism   
The liberalist approach can be traced back to the Enlightenment and is 
associated with the philosophers John Locke and Emmanuel Kant. It 
reached a high point in international politics under the leadership of 
Woodrow Wilson after the end of the First World War and it blossomed 
after the end of the Cold War, following the dissolution of the East-West 
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conflict (Morgan 2010:35). Much of the pluralist or liberal perspective 
centres on the importance of non-state actors, such as political 
organizations and multinational corporations, that may be independent of 
the state in their own right. Other actors, such as terrorist groups, must 
also be considered, as they attempt to formulate or influence foreign 
policy (Viotti 1997). The pluralist image offers greater complexity than the 
relatively simple image of states as unitary actors interacting with one 
another (Viotti and Kauppi 1999:6). 
Neoliberalism is the second most influential approach, after realism, that 
focuses on the role international institutions play in the distribution of 
wealth and power in the world and in international politics (Powell 
1994:313). Contemporary international relations are influenced by four 
varieties of liberalism: commercial, republican, sociological, and liberal 
institutionalism (Baldwin 1993:4, Lamy 2008:131). These can be 
differentiated as follows. 
Commercial liberalism claims that states can achieve peace and prosperity 
through free trade since it links states together, making them 
economically interdependent to the extent that none would risk 
jeopardising such beneficial relationship through conflict. Republican 
liberalism asserts the idea that because liberal democracies share 
common values, they will not go to war against each other. Sociological 
liberalism focuses on the power of people, including intra-state 
organisations and groups, sharing similar ideas with groups in other 
states. It elaborates the idea that peaceful cooperation can be achieved 
through the spread of common views and values. Finally, liberal 
institutionalism is based on the fact that, through a liberalist approach, 
international institutions can promote cooperation amongst states 
(Baldwin 1993:4, Jackson and Sørensen 2007:43-44). 
Neoliberalism, and especially its brand of neoliberal institutionalism, 
presents for many scholars “the most convincing challenge” to neorealist 
thinking. It has its roots in the theoretical work of the 1950s and 1960s, 
which was later functionally integrated with the literature of the 1970s 
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and 1980s in more complex interdependence and transnational studies 
(Lamy 2008:133). 
Neoliberalism claims that the high degree of interdependence in today’s 
world motivates states to cooperate. In order to secure this cooperation 
and reap its fruits successfully, states often set up international 
institutions to overcome a plethora of collective-action problems, many of 
which are based on transaction costs (Martin 2007). 
The establishment of institutions is understood to promote cooperation 
across international boundaries, through the provision of information and 
the reduction of costs. Institutions are either formal international 
organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or European 
Union (EU) or Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). They may also be the product of less formal sets of agreements, 
also called regimes, which “deal with common activities or issues, such as 
agreements about shipping, aviation, communication or the environment” 
(Jackson and Sørensen 2007:44). 
Neoliberals, like neorealists, assume that states are rational actors that 
seek to maximize absolute gains through cooperation. Moreover, they 
assume that rational behaviour leads states to appreciate cooperative 
behaviour. However, they also claim that “states are less concerned with 
gains or advantages achieved by other states in cooperative 
arrangements” (Lamy 2008:132). The greatest impediment to successful 
cooperation is the fear of cheating, or the actual cheating, as well as, non-
compliance with the agreed rules. To overcome the constraining effects of 
anarchy, states transfer their loyalty to international institutions that “are 
capable of developing sufficient political resources to enable them to 
engage in supranational enforcement” (Sanders 1996:443). 
Last but not least, after analysing neoliberalism through the lens of 
ideology, policy and governmentality, Larner (2000:12) argues that the 
most influential post-structuralist theorisation of neoliberalism is that 
associated with governmentality. The literature relating to this makes a 
useful distinction between government and governance, arguing that, 
while neoliberalism may mean less government, it does not follow that 
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there is less governance. On one hand, neo-liberalism problematizes the 
state and is concerned to specify its limits through the invocation of 
individual choice. However, on the other hand, it involves forms of 
governance that encourage both institutions and individuals to conform to 
the norms of the market. To capture and highlight this point, Larner uses 
the term "market governance".  
Neoliberals believe that states with common interests try to maximize 
their absolute gains. This means that “each side focuses on maximizing its 
own profit, and cares little about how much the other side gains or losses 
in the deal” (Mearsheimer 1995:12). They focus their approach on political 
economy and the political environment and on issues related to human 
security, human rights and the good life; that is, on what is generally 
called the low politics arena (Lamy 2008:134, Jervis 1999:45). The 
neoliberal argument does not directly address the question of whether 
institutions can create peace, but rather they focus on the goal of 
expanding cooperation in cases where state interests are not 
fundamentally opposed. 
2.2.3 Constructivism 
Constructivism has become an increasingly prominent theoretical 
approach to international relations since its emergence in this field in the 
1980s. Drawing on a combination of sociological approaches and critical 
theory, constructivists argue that the world is constituted socially through 
intersubjective interaction; that agents and structures are mutually 
constituted; and that ideational factors such as norms, identity and ideas 
generally are central to the constitution and dynamics of world politics. 
Thus, it is less a theory of international relations or security, than a 
broader social theory which informs how we might approach the study of 
security.  
Arguably, the central shared assumption of constructivist approaches to 
security is that security is a social construction. Constructivists in general 
avoid universal and abstract analytical definitions of security, but the form 
this commitment takes is different for different scholars. At its most 
obvious, Ted Hopf (1998) points to the impossibility of making universal 
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or abstract claims about the source of threat in world politics; rather state 
political leaders designate other states as ‘friend’ or ‘enemy’ – and 
approach them as such – on the basis of conceptions of identity. 
Acknowledging the relevance of identity to security in constructivist 
approaches leads to a more fundamental shared assumption. Moreover, 
non-material or ideational factors in general are central to the 
construction and practices of security in world politics. Aside from identity, 
the most prominent ideational dimension of world politics addressed by 
constructivists is the role of norms. Norms may be defined as shared 
expectations about appropriate or legitimate behaviour by actors with a 
particular identity. Most commonly, this notion is applied to dominant 
ideas about what constitutes appropriate behaviour for the key members 
of international society, that is, the states (McDonald 2008:59-62). 
For conventional constructivists, the central concern in outlining the 
relationship between security and identity is to point to how national 
identity (and associated historical experience or cultural context) helps 
determine the nature of a state’s interests and therefore the way it will 
‘act’ in global politics. Hence, identity is something to be discovered or 
unearthed through analysis. This view is consistent with a commitment to 
a positivist epistemology: the belief that analysts can potentially hold a 
mirror to a world ‘out there’. Within this framework, identities are defined 
as relatively stable or sedimented, enabling the analyst to explore ‘why’ 
states act the way they do in ways that suggest a causal relationship 
between identity and interests. The work of Peter Katzenstein (1996) and 
Alexander Wendt (1999) is emblematic of this approach: both have 
suggested the possibility of working within the epistemological and 
methodological frameworks of traditional international relations theory, 
and both ultimately position constructivism as an ideational supplement to 
materialist approaches within the discipline. 
For critical constructivists, the central concern in exploring the relationship 
between security and identity is to outline how narratives of national 
identity (and, for example, representations of history) become dominant 
in a particular context. These, in turn, help set the limits for legitimate or 
feasible political action. Here, identity is inherently unstable, contingent 
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and a site of constant competition. Representations of security and threat 
can be central in this regard, serving to define who ‘we’ are and who are 
the ‘other/s’, from whom ‘we’ need protection. The study of identity, then, 
becomes the study of different representations that compete with others 
to provide realistic accounts of who a particular group is and how that 
group should act. For critical constructivists, analysts attempting to define 
a nation-state’s ‘national identity’ risk engaging in this power–political 
struggle by privileging some narratives of identity and marginalizing 
others. Such a position is consistent with a post-positivist epistemology, in 
which it becomes impossible for the analyst to stand outside the world 
s/he is attempting to define or describe. The concern here is less with 
‘why’ states act the way they do than with ‘how possible’ questions: that 
is, those associated with “how meanings are produced and attached to 
various social subjects/objects, thus constituting particular interpretive 
dispositions which create certain possibilities and preclude others” (Doty 
1993:298). Key theorists working in this strand of constructivism include 
Jutta Weldes (1996), Karin Fierke (1998) and Michael Barnett (1999).  
As Dannreuther (2007:40-43) highlights, the core idea of constructivism 
is the rejection of an unproblematised objective external reality and the 
need to recognise the world as a social construction, mutually constituted 
through shared meanings and intersubjective understandings. One of the 
elements that made a constructivist approach attractive is the way that it 
supports a shift away from identifying the state with security, which has 
particularly influenced the human security and critical security 
approaches. That said, it is not surprising that constructivism has lent 
insights into a number of security issues, such as NATO’s survival and 
enlargement, why neutral states have not yet joined it, and why human 
rights have become a central concern in security policies of states and 
international organisations (IOs) (Agius 2010:66). 
2.2.4 Human Security 
On June 1st 1941, when USA were on the threshold of the Second World 
War (WWII), Franklin D. Roosevelt addressed the Congress in an effort to 
abolish the States’ isolationism, convince public opinion of the need to 
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support the European allied forces, and demonstrate the gravity of the 
situation and the threat to global security.7 In his speech, still famous as 
the “Four freedoms speech”, he identified four essential human freedoms 
that the world should be founded upon: the freedom of speech and of 
expression, the freedom of religion, the freedom of want and the freedom 
from fear (Roosevelt 1941: 7-8).        
More than 50 years later, the 1994 UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) 
influential report claimed that the focus on the Cold War in state security 
“had obscured and ignored the far more urgent security needs of the 
millions for whom security symbolised protection from the threat of 
disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression 
and environmental hazards” (Dannreuther 2007:1). Thus, although violent 
conflicts still exist, mostly within states, in parallel there exists a plethora 
of other non-military threats that need attention. These include issues 
such as “the threat of environmental degradation, economic disparities 
and chronic poverty, diseases such as HIV/Aids, transnational crime, and 
international migration”(Dannreuther 2007:1).  
Hence, the concept of human security was developed from Roosevelt’s 
“four freedoms”, with a primary focus on the standards of everyday living, 
human dignity, freedom, equality, justice and safety from diachronic 
threats such as lack of food, medicine, poverty and the nefarious 
constraints that affect everyday life (UNDP 1994). This new concept of 
global security is directly interdependent with development. Although we 
are not as yet able to explain precisely how they interact, parameters of 
socioeconomic development such as inequality, low growth, 
unemployment and weak economic institutions increase the risks of 
violence (World Bank 2010:7).  
It is difficult to ascertain if security provision is a paradigm that fosters 
development, or vice versa. But no one can deny that lack of development 
and insecurity goes hand in hand (Kaldor 2007:182-197). Following from 
this contemporary perception of security, the ‘ethnic security dilemma’ 
                                                          
7 The whole story and the full text of the speech are available online from the Franklin D. Roosevelt 




emerged (distinguished from the traditional interstate security dilemmas). 
This involves modes of physical security; such as political, economic, 
social, cultural and environmental security (Wolff 2006:76), the right to 
claim democracy, equality in terms of citizenship opportunities, just public 
policy, non-discrimination and fair distribution of social and economic 
goods (Nagel 2005:127).  
2.2.5 Securitisation 
Many scholars argue that there are no new challenges to contemporary 
security but only constructed ones, along the lines of these non-military 
threats, which politicians frame in order to use them as a legitimising 
means to justify increasing government regulation and control, especially 
in recent decades (Bendrath 2003, Nissenbaum 2005, Bendrath et al. 
2007, Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009, Hart 2011). For successful framing, 
policy makers utilise the power of ‘speech acts’, by using political 
language to highlight and emphasise the need for emergency measures 
and actions that should be taken against the new issue, in order to 
eliminate the threats that emanate from it. In this way, they influence the 
political agenda by shifting its priorities accordingly (Waever 1995, Buzan 
et al. 1998, Cavelty 2008). 
The ‘Copenhagen School’ is the main representative of the ‘securitisation’ 
theory that provides a useful framework to analyse how an issue is 
brought into the security agenda (Buzan et al. 1998).  As expressed by 
advocates of this school of thought: “The process of securitisation is seen 
as a socially constructed, contextual speech act” (Cavelty 2008:8) “which 
constitutes a ‘referent object’, in this case the state, as threatened in its 
very existence, and therefore necessitates urgent action” (Hart 2011:1).  
In other words, if a specific issue is presented in such an elaborate way by 
political actors who claim special rights to use any available means 
necessary to confront it, and this claim is accepted in the political scene, 
then, this issue is successfully securitised. This fact also indicates how 
issues “are turned into security matters not necessarily because a real 
existential threat exists, but because an issue is successfully presented 
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and established by key actors in the political arena as constituting such a 
threat” (Buzan et al. 1998, Cavelty 2008:8). 
The Copenhagen School differs from the traditional approaches because it 
focuses on threats that are not necessarily military and uses referent 
objects other than the state. Moreover, its allegations are not about 
“actual threats, referent objects, and defensive manoeuvres, but about 
the successful portrayal of threats as security threats” (Nissenbaum 
2005:66). The key element of a securitization is the urgency with which a 
threat is presented. If a dire threat is not confronted immediately then it 
will result in the destruction of the referent object. As Buzan et al. assert, 
“if the problem is not handled now it will be too late, and we will not exist 
to remedy our failure” (Buzan et al. 1998:26). These threats are crucial 
for the existence of a group, or a valued entity, or ideology, or a way of 
life. For the state, especially, a securitised threat is one that endangers 
national sovereignty and political independence. It is important that the 
threat is presented to the public, and accepted by the public, as 
catastrophic for the very existence of the referent object (Nissenbaum 
2005:66).  
According to the Copenhagen School's approach, “[t]he invocation of 
security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force, but more 
generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take 
special powers, to handle existential threats” (Buzan et al. 1998:21, Hart 
2011:2). In practice, these special powers mean bypassing the rules of 
normal governance and being treated as elements of national security that 
do not have to comply with the restrictions of political procedure. Similar 
to times of national crisis, the appearance of securitized threats brings 
interruptions to normal ‘business-as-usual’ activities, which are accepted 
as necessary even in liberal democracies. Such interruptions include the 
lessening of civil liberties, as often imposed by governments acting in the 
name of ‘national security’, an increase in government secrecy along with 
deviations in the normal democratic conduct, and raised expenditures for 
security (Nissenbaum 2005:69-70). By repeated use, ‘the state of 




 2.2.6 International Political Sociology (IPS)  
International political sociology (IPS) is a term which emerged from the 
framework of post-structural approaches to security and has taken this 
area of study in new theoretical and empirical directions. Much of IPS 
research is associated with the ‘Paris School’ and its prominent figure, 
Didier Bigo. This fuses a concern with discourses of security and 
constructions of danger with a focus on security practices. This latter 
refers to issues such as the role of security professionals, the function of 
policing in general and the activities of private security companies, in 
particular. The work is mostly aligned with a sociologically-oriented 
approach, from which the term IPS was adopted (Peoples and Vaughan-
Williams 2010:69-70). In Bigo’s work, he examines the relationship 
between liberty and security, and argues that a new transversal field of 
globalised insecurity has emerged. Through this, the traditional separation 
between the internal and external has become even more blurred, mostly 
in terms of deconstruction rather than erosion of the boundaries (Bigo 
2008). 
In turn, this has given rise to a novel field of security relations - between 
security professionals, governmental and non-governmental institutions, 
the police, military and private companies - across an increasingly 
globalised terrain. This constitutes a ‘semantic continuum’ in which these 
security actors cultivate fear, unease and insecurity. Consequently, this 
field of insecurity opens up new possibilities in terms of the governance of 
populations in the West’s liberal regimes. Hence, Bigo’s security dilemma 
differentiates itself from realist thought by including in the anarchical 
international system, not only states, but all the actors who constitute the 
field of security relations. In light of this, he refers to the practices 





2.3 Contemporary States as Security Providers  
States are the main protagonists of world politics but they are not the 
only ones. The global system also includes a diverse range of political 
actors who interact with the states, trying to influence the political scene 
beyond state boundaries. The proliferation of non-state actors and their 
growing involvement in world affairs has led some analysts in the field of 
International Relations to question the ability of states to control their 
economies and to fulfil other traditional functions, such as national 
security. 
Jackson and Sorensen (2007:2) define the state as “a clear-cut and 
bordered territory, with a permanent population, under the jurisdiction of 
supreme government that is constitutionally independent of all foreign 
governments: a sovereign state”. According to the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council,8 a non-state actor is an “individual or entity, not acting 
under the lawful authority of any State” (Sial Sidhu 2006:3). Thus, the 
definition of ‘non-state actors’ includes international intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), 
multinational corporations (MNCs), international humanitarian 
organisations (IHOs), the scientific community, private individuals, the 
media and the Internet community (Bruderlein 2000:3). 
In this framework, Dannreuther (2007:27) argues that the contemporary 
security perspective – that focuses on North-South relations rather than 
East-West division - increasingly removes the state from its essentially 
repressive and unjustified monopoly of the use of force. Instead it 
transfers this authority to regional and international organisations such as 
the UN and the EU. The concept of fragile and failed states emerged from 
this deconstruction of the state. This new conceptualisation relates to a 
longer term failure to construct legitimate and responsive states, with 
obvious and inevitable implications for security provision. Kaplan (1994) 
argued that global population growth would have a similar effect through 
exacerbating the effects of disease, conflict, and civil instability arising 
from the disruption of the natural environment. These effects, he claimed, 
                                                          
8 UNSC Resolution 1540 of April 28, 2004 
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are already visible in parts of West Africa, and have led to unprecedented 
levels of erosion of nation states and the empowerment of private armies, 
security firms, and international drug cartels (Kaplan 1994).  
In a similar vein, Kaldor (2006) highlights the emergence of the ‘New 
Wars’, where the old forms of state-based conflict have given way to the 
prevalence of intra-state wars. He demonstrates how the private use of 
force in the form of militias, criminal organisations and private military 
companies undercut the state’s supposed monopoly of violence.  
Bellamy (1997) also stresses the multiplication of new actors at all levels 
in the international security arena. Beyond the traditional and the new 
nation states, he identifies multinational companies, drug cartels and a 
new generation of high-tech mercenaries among these. In relation to the 
latter, the availability of weapons and people trained to use them, as well 
as the dramatic reduction of armed forces’ personnel due to the end of the 
Cold War and the economic situation, are factors which encouraged the 
multiplication of these private security entities. Inevitably, any potential 
security vacuum can be filled by these new actors, contracted by those 
who have the financial capabilities and at lower cost compared to the 
traditional state armed forces (Bellamy 1997:130-2). 
Sorensen (2005) identifies the major characteristics in postmodern states, 
where big political, economic and other changes are taking place, but no 
one is quite sure where they are going to lead. In terms of economic 
changes, there is a transformation from national to globalised economies. 
This entails deep integration, cross-border production chains and networks 
organised by transnational corporations at regional and international 
levels (i.e. production outside home countries) and, consequently, an 
emerging globally integrated financial market. In terms of politics, 
governance is shifting from the various forms of national administration of 
strictly defined territorial realms, to an international, trans-governmental 
and transnational activity. This new form includes not only traditional 
governments and international organisations, but also NGOs and non-
state actors. The general trend reflects a move towards multilevel 
governance in several interlocked and overlapping arenas, and away from 
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the context of national government. Finally, post-modern states are 
transformed in terms of nationhood. In this respect, the nation is both a 
community of citizens, united through their political and social situation, 
and through economic rights/obligations, and a community of sentiment, 
involving linguistic, cultural and historical identity (Sorensen 2005:86). 
One of Buzan’s policy conclusions from the integrative perspective is that 
security cannot be achieved either by individuals or by the states acting 
solely on their own behalf. Instead of expecting individual actors to create 
security (as encouraged by neoliberal approaches) or, conversely, 
concentrating all power and responsibility for security at the states’ upper 
levels (such as in the totalitarian regimes), collective measures need to be 
implemented among the members of the system if they are to achieve 
security (Buzan 1991:378).  
At the international level, Buzan perceives international security strategy 
to depend on the adjustment of relations between states, either directly or 
by making changes in the systemic conditions that influence the way in 
which states make each other feel more secure. If such an option is 
adopted, it needs to focus on the sources and causes of threats, aiming at 
reducing or eliminating them by political action. Hence, it can address the 
security challenges at regional and system levels squarely. Through this, it 
can offer the prospect of a more cost-efficient security policy/option for 
the majority of less powerful states, (with insufficient resources to to 
pursue a comprehensive security strategy on their own,) not to be 
dependent on great powers to achieve security (Buzan 1991:331-334).   
Similarly, within the state per se, the scope and character of security is 
affected by many different sub-state actors. They range from the 
government and its various mechanisms, through the economic, political, 
and media organisations, to the individual citizens who form the 
amorphous ‘public opinion’. Many of them have interests in security and 
involve themselves at varying levels of the security policy making process. 
However, many have other kinds of interests as well and these can bias 
their security interest in a variety of ways, especially in relation to the 
cross-pressures affecting government bureaucracies and business 
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organisations. Focusing on the latter, and industrial/commercial 
organisations in particular, these might be closely attached to the 
government depending on whether the economy leans towards central 
planning or towards the market. This can cause significant differences in 
their other concerns, particularly in relation to matters such as profit. 
These organisations may have an interest in security policy either in terms 
of their production (e.g. military equipment) or in associated external 
interests - such as markets, investments, transportation routes or sources 
of supply that they wish to see under the aegis of security policy (Buzan 
1991:348-353). 
This common interest between governments and companies can result in 
at least two effects which might influence security policy. First, the desire 
to maintain sufficient national capacity combined with the companies’ 
desire to assure markets and make profits can lead to pressure either to 
consume more than is objectively required, or to export. Second, for 
government, technological advancement is seen in terms of continuously 
improving military equipment that will contribute to their effort to prevail 
in the international system, while companies wish to meet the market’s 
demands and be given a commercial edge in sales (Buzan 1991:353-354). 
 
2.4 Privatisation of Security and the Maritime Challenges   
 2.4.1 Privatisation of Security 
While classical liberalism focuses on citizens’ self-help and (constitutional) 
law in providing limitations to the coercive power of the state, 
neoliberalism assigns this role to the free market. It argues that the best 
means for preventing the abuse of state control of armed force is to 
establish a competition between the state and the market. The market 
then helps to divide coercive capabilities among multiple companies and 
between public and private agents and, thereby, prevents a centralisation 
of power that could endanger the rights and freedoms of the citizens. 
According to neoliberalism, the geographical fragmentation of authority 
facilitates the control of these actors by limiting their influence, and 
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promises greater responsiveness to the diverse interests of citizens who 
are living in different security environments. In addition, the ideal-type 
model of fragmented governance envisages the differentiation of security 
functions and their supply among multiple government agencies, and 
competing public and private actors. As with geographical fragmentation, 
neoliberalism believes that the centralisation of collective services within 
the state is the major danger to democratic control; financing, ownership 
and supply of security resources and functions are best dispersed in order 
to curtail the power of different actors (Krahmann 2010:36).  
In the transition to the post–Cold War world, the diminished political and 
financial will of Western governments to intervene in conflicts at the 
periphery of the modern world has left a security gap for private military 
companies (PMCs) to fill. The inability of the UN and other international 
organisations to contain these conflicts inevitably compounds the problem. 
The spillage of intolerance and terrorism into safe societies ignites 
disputes that require innovative private security solutions. The reinvention 
of state militaries as leaner and more technological machines fosters a 
demand for private sector input too. PMCs have clearly been responsive to 
supply and demand factors. However, it is important to bear in mind that 
their rise equally marks a profound change in the traditional state 
monopoly over legitimate violence. The roots of this transformation are 
partly found in neoliberalism and in the emergence of new modes of public 
management. Neoliberalism is intrinsically linked to capitalism and 
democracy. Ideologically, neoliberal policies have advocated economic and 
social freedom over authoritarianism and oppression. Operationally, they 
have encouraged privatisation and market competition. Facilitated by 
heavy privatisation throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, the shift of 
the global political economy toward neoliberalism was completed upon the 
demise of communism, which had dictated the opposite approach. 
“Privatisation” is a term that lends itself to broad usage and, as such, 
needs to be defined in specific fashion. The state is not privatising by 
selling off segments of its military infrastructure to parts of the private 
sector, although this practice has given birth to some defence 
corporations. However, we should not assume that governments are 
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reconstituting segments of their military or security forces into private 
firms, which thereafter become PMCs. Whilst these companies do typically 
employ former military and law enforcement personnel, it is more relevant 
to focus on the process whereby certain military and security-related 
tasks, previously state prerogatives, are being shifted onto the market 
and performed by legally established commercial firms, known as PMCs 
(Ortiz 2010:115-6). 
Moreover, neoliberalism contends that competition between the state and 
the market encourages the cost-efficient and effective provision of 
security functions, and that functional specialisation can take advantage of 
the dispersed resources and expertise required for contemporary security 
policymaking. Implicit in the liberal model of fragmented governance is a 
belief in the heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting nature of citizens’ 
security interests. Rather than subordinating them to the will of the 
general public, the liberal governance model seeks to ensure that citizens 
can pursue their individual interests as freely as possible. In so far as the 
political coordination of private security interests is necessary, this 
approach argues, this is best left to market forces or to voluntary 
cooperation among the citizens themselves. Owing to the liberal focus on 
individual interests and rights, the guiding norms of the governance model 
are the limitation of state sovereignty, individual self-government and 
‘marketisation’. Domestically, state sovereignty is limited by restricting 
the scope of the state and its intervention in the lives of its citizens. 
Internationally though, the governance model is more open to 
interventions and alternative authorities, such as international private 
regulatory bodies and private military companies. At the same time, the 
fragmented governance model prioritises citizens’ right to self-
determination, which is best provided for by the market. Political decisions 
are by definition a representation of collective interest. However, the 
market can respond to individual demands, hence in security terms this 
means the market can cater to the varying needs of private individuals, 
households and corporations. Security policy decision-making and 
implementation within governance arrangements are accordingly defined 
by the horizontal dispersion of authority among public and private 
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providers at different levels, ranging from national armed forces to 
transnational military companies. 
The liberal approach to governance advocates that direct state ownership 
of the defence industry, and command and control over the armed forces, 
is replaced by hands-off steering and the regulation of the private security 
market. Most crucially, security policies are implemented in a 
decentralised fashion. Typically, responsibility for the implementation of 
distinct policies is distributed among public and market actors and 
compliance with public norms is frequently self-enforced or voluntary 
(Krahmann 2010:37-41). 
Thus, neoliberalism promotes a form of networked governance and a shift 
towards organising resources (often belonging to others) rather than 
managing people and programs. In terms of security, this results in a shift 
from the vertical, hierarchical and state-centred structure of security 
provision towards a diverse and horizontal web of agentive, expert and 
independent actors ,forming a kind of ‘partnership’ with the traditional 
security enforcement state entities (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011:59-
61). 
Dunigan (2011:21) explores the pressures that the private security 
industry places on the state and the consequences of such pressures, 
particularly with reference to democratic states’ abilities to successfully 
and effectively fight wars of counterinsurgency. Furthermore, she provides 
particular insight into the modern state’s relation to society and the 
economy through the lens of the proliferation of private military and 
security companies in modern democracies.  
Building further on this concept, Avant (2008, 2005) argues that the 
increase in private security can be tied to supply and demand, as would 
be the case in the development of any market. In the 1990s, the supply 
factors came from both local (for example, the end of apartheid in South 
Africa) and international (that is, the end of the Cold War) phenomena 
that caused militaries to be downsized in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Military downsizing led to a flood of experienced personnel available for 
contracting. Concomitant with the increase in supply was an increase in 
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the demand for military skills on the private market – from Western states 
that had downsized their militaries, from countries seeking to upgrade and 
‘Westernise’ their militaries as a way of demonstrating credentials for 
entry into Western institutions, from rulers of weak or failed states no 
longer propped up by superpower patrons, and from non-state actors such 
as private firms, INGOs and groups of citizens in the territories of weak or 
failed states. 
The downsizing of these militaries took place in an ideological context 
where liberal capitalist ideas were in the ascendancy. Initially, prevailing 
ideas about the benefits of privatisation were associated with the powerful 
conservative coalitions in the USA and the UK in the 1980s. However, the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc, the ensuing privatisation of state-owned 
industries across Europe, and the endorsement of these principles by 
international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank led to privatisation being endorsed much more 
widely. The appeal of ideas related to this led people to see private 
alternatives as obvious and simultaneously encouraged the growth of 
private supply. 
The end of the Cold War also had important political repercussions which 
influenced the ‘market for force’. Just two years into what, in 1991, US 
President George H.W. Bush called the ‘New World Order’ (Bush 1991), a 
rash of smaller scale conflicts unleashed disorder and consequent 
demands for intervention. As the clamour for a Western response grew, 
just as Western militaries were shrinking, nascent PSCs provided a stop-
gap tool for meeting greater demands with smaller forces. The Cold War’s 
end had a different impact in the former Eastern bloc (where it led to 
defunct governance structures and forces, new opportunities and a 
sudden opening to global flows) and in the developing world (where it 
abruptly ended superpower patronage – revealing the enduring difficulties 
of these governments and their militaries – corruption, poor standards, 
poor management, ethnic rivalries and so on). In each instance, the 
potential for violence increased. Weak governments paved the way for 
ethnic mobilisation, transnational criminal activity, warlords, rebels and 
paramilitaries. The result ravaged civilians, enslaved children, destroyed 
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the environment, and otherwise disrupted order and violated accepted 
global norms. In some cases PSCs provided tools to shore up the 
capabilities of weak governments in the Eastern bloc and the developing 
world (e.g. Angola, Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone). But it was not 
just states that took advantage of the market for force; transnational 
firms in the extractive industry, in particular, are often likely to remain in 
dangerous areas if that is where the resources are. Unable to rely on weak 
states for security and often unwilling to leave, these actors have provided 
another pool of demand for non-state protection that PSCs have exploited. 
The reason why PSCs – and not multilateral armed responses, such as 
those provided by the UN – have thrived is because multilateral forces 
have been much harder to deploy and, often because of problematic 
mandates, are seen as less effective. 
Although it is frequently asserted that such companies exist in a legal 
vacuum, this claim is somewhat exaggerated. While no overarching 
international regulatory framework yet exists, pockets of applicable 
regulation can be found both in international law and international 
humanitarian law, and in the national legislation of certain key source 
states and contracting states. This patchwork quality remains 
unsatisfactory and has raised concerns about the legal accountability and 
supervision of private military and security companies, their employees, 
as well as those who engage their services. In terms of the situation in the 
US, given the assumption that outsourcing or privatising military and 
security functions to private contractors is already a well-entrenched 
dimension of US policy and practice, and that commercial firms are used 
extensively to support US forces and policy objectives abroad, several 
questions are raised: Why is there a perceived need for regulation of 
private security contractors; what are some current legal means of 
holding them to account and what obstacles have impeded the sector 
from being adequately regulated? (Caparini 2008:171).  
In a similar vein, MacLeod highlights the lack of enforcement mechanisms 
which should be in place, in order to ensure the regulation, accountability 
and transparency of private security providers. Taking into account the 
transnational nature of business in our era, she argues that neither 
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international nor national regulation alone is sufficient to address private 
security companies’ inappropriate behaviour. Hence, she suggests a 
hybrid approach for their regulation in a form of top-down/bottom-up 
procedures, multi-stakeholder in nature and victim-centred. Such an 
approach would take into account both international business and human 
rights initiatives and ensure the national implementation of international 
standards (MacLeod 2011:360-1).   
Thus, both material and ideational changes have placed private security 
options on the agenda. The reluctance of states to take on the variety of 
missions that people have felt there is a need to respond to, and the poor 
performance of multilateral institutions, have made the private alternative 
appear more workable and reinforced prevailing beliefs that private means 
cheaper and better (Avant 2008:448-9).  
 2.4.2 Maritime Security 
In the contemporary geopolitical environment, maritime security has 
emerged as one of the most significant elements of global and human 
security (Reveron and Mahoney-Norris 2011:129-157). Through this, it 
contributes to economic development from local to regional up to 
international levels. The sea-based trading system, developed mostly by 
littoral states, offers access to and distribution of energy resources, raw 
materials and all kind of products around the world. Hence, since almost 
80% of the global trade is transported in ships’ hulls, littoral states 
developed maritime infrastructure in order to establish these energy 
supply chains and links between them and the hinterland and ensure the 
secure flow of goods to the international markets (Sakhuja 2010:3-11). 
The globally accepted definition of maritime security was provided by the 
Secretary General of the United Nations in his 2008 report to the General 
Assembly, under the title “Oceans and the law of the sea” (UN General 
Assembly 2008). After making clear that there is no universally accepted 
definition, but that different versions and meanings are attributed to the 
term depending on the context and the user (UN General Assembly 
2008:15, par.38), he identified seven specific threats to maritime 
security: Piracy and armed robbery at sea; terrorist acts involving 
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shipping; offshore installations and other maritime interests; illicit 
trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destruction; illicit traffic in 
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; smuggling and trafficking of 
persons by sea; illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; and 
intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment (UN General 
Assembly 2008:17-33). The UN Secretary General also refers to the 
‘narrow conception’ of maritime security, which is conceptualised in state-
centric terms, such as threatening  territorial integrity with projections of 
naval power and use of force by naval assets. Yet, his report, as a whole, 
refers to a broadened human-centric approach that calls states towards a 
more collective maritime security and recognises that the new evolving 
threats go beyond the use of force and state boundaries, reflecting the 
human insecurity conditions ashore.  
Mugridge builds on credible evidence to suggest that in many states, 
maritime security lacks financial or political resources, sustainability, 
relevance or multi-agency coherence. The world’s oceans continue to offer 
both non-state terrorists and transnational criminals a relatively benign 
environment within which to operate. With NATO predominantly focused 
on Afghanistan, elements of these socially malignant groups ply the 
world’s oceans with near impunity. When such authoritative organisations 
as the RAND Corporation highlight the damaging impact of crime and 
terrorism on maritime security, it would be prudent to review international 
responses and re-evaluate strategy. Hence, Mugridge defines “Sea-
Blindness” as a socio-political failure to acknowledge or recognise the 
importance of the maritime domain to both society and economies. This 
alien condition transcends society from politicians to the working citizen, 
from private industry to political bodies. The future physical and economic 
security of many nations depends upon the freedom to use the world’s 
oceans and their ability to potentially influence worldwide political events 
by military means (Mugridge 2009:306). He finally concludes that the field 
of maritime security provides fertile ground for further research; 
particularly in terms of threat analysis of the irregular, non-state actors 
involved. His work anticipates that such research will inform the growing 
debate over international maritime susceptibility and recommend a new 
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approach to obviate many of the current impediments to an effective 
maritime security regime. Clearly, many national maritime security 
strategies require redirection towards international collaboration 
(Mugridge 2009:305-10). 
Thus, the literature devoted to this specific security challenge is limited 
and perhaps overlooked. The Lloyd's Handbook of Maritime Security 
(Herbert-Burns et al. 2009) is one of the few academic approaches to the 
issue. Yet, although it provides an overview of the new maritime security 
environment (Section 1; pp 3-86), its focus tends to be limited to piracy 
and maritime terrorism, while the rest of the threats are overlooked. This 
can be explained by the shipping industry’s perspective of the issue, which 
confirms to a great extent the UN Secretary General’s statement 
regarding the use of different definitions of maritime security depending 
on the user.  
A more comprehensive approach was adopted by Michael McNicholas 
(2008) who analyses and highlights the threats in the maritime domain 
from a security-oriented perspective. Although he addresses issues such 
as port security, drug smuggling, piracy and maritime terrorism, and also 
provides recommendations for mitigation strategies, illegal fishing and 
environmental issues have no place in his book. However, the book 
remains a remarkable effort and the basis for maritime security studies.  
Thai (2009) argues that one of the fundamental questions relevant to this 
field is how effective maritime security can be achieved in practice, e.g. 
satisfying security requirements while enhancing other business 
objectives, such as service quality or operational efficiency. In other 
words, it is important to identify and comprehend the critical success 
factors (CSFs) for the effective management of security in maritime 
transport. Hence, he attempts to identify critical factors of effective 
maritime security and empirically evaluate them. After identifying the gap 
in the academic literature, he concludes that a conceptual model of 
effective security management in maritime transport is essential and 
lacking. He proposes, therefore, an effective maritime security model 
which consists of 13 dimensions. Among others, these entail the following: 
38 
 
well-structured security policy; security risk assessment; risk-based 
security mitigation strategies and plans; communication and consultation 
with stakeholders; security monitoring and review; continuous security 
improvement; senior management commitment and leadership; employee 
empowerment; employee involvement; security training, security design 
and process control; holistic approaches; and incident handling and 
response (Thai 2009:147-8, 160).  
Given its strategic, political, economic and military significance, it can be 
readily argued that maritime security is inherently government business. 
However, though the responsibility lies firmly with governments and 
international bodies, the demand in some areas for physical protection 
and other aspects of security outstrip in-house resources. The main 
government services involved in maritime security (covering inland, 
territorial and international waters) are police, coastguards, customs and 
naval forces. Since the end of the Cold War, the trend in the West has 
been to reduce the size of these agencies significantly — particularly the 
navies. However the scale and scope of the challenges presented by a 
combination of terrorist activity, organised crime and piracy have meant 
that governments have been unable to meet the demand in some 
respects. Thus private security companies have developed a niche market 
of services for clients and governments. In most cases a private security 
company is able to provide a tailored security package more quickly than 
governments because they are less encumbered by bureaucracy (Kerr 
2010:16). 
However, if maritime security literature is limited, the private security 
dimension is even more lacking. To some extent this is justified due to the 
relatively new character of the phenomenon. But perhaps even more 
importantly, it is extremely hard for researchers to access primary sources 
if they are not themselves a part of the industry per se. In this 
framework, very few publications approach the issue of private maritime 
security and the response of the global market to contemporary 
waterborne security risks. Berube and Cullen (2012) provide a historical 
context for the private maritime security market and, specifically, they 
offer the context of private anti-piracy escorts in the two major hot spots 
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of modern piracy, the Malacca Strait in South East Asia and the Gulf of 
Aden. Furthermore, this remarkable source touches upon the private 
security services in the offshore oil industry. However, perhaps even more 
interestingly from my perspective, they highlight the response to the 
combination and interaction of piracy and illegal fishing, which is currently 
forming the expansion of the private maritime security market in the near 
future.  
Regulatory issues are also raising great concerns both to the international 
community and the global market per se. Hence, any serious attempt to 
tackle issues relating to maritime security would have to be international 
in nature and involve cooperation between different national bodies.  We 
must also recognise the distinctiveness of shipping as an international 
business, stressing that there is no law which would apply in the case of 
”a ship flying a flag of one country, carrying a cargo which is insured in 
another country between two different countries, crewed by a 
multinational crew and attacked on the high seas” (Marlow 2010:671-2). 
2.4.3. Typology and conceptual framework of private security 
A mercenary is defined in Article 47 to Protocol I of the Geneva 
Conventions (1977) as any person who: 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an 
armed conflict; 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the 
desire for private gain, and in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of 
a party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in 
excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks 
and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of 
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; 
and 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the 




The above definition for a mercenary includes a number of sometimes 
vague requirements that must ALL be met before an individual can be 
termed a mercenary. Clearly, the definition of mercenaries is quite 
restrictive and exclusive and it is extremely hard to find a mercenary that 
fits all these criteria. This is especially true since mercenaries have good 
reason not to wish to fit the definition – including avoiding the loss of 
human rights protection normally granted to combatants as well as, in 
some cases, risking the loss of citizenship in their home country (Brooks & 
Solomon 2000:1).  
On the other hand, there is broad agreement that this definition does help 
to distinguish mercenaries from PMCs, most of which are like any other 
private company (Kinsey 2006:9, Lilly 2002:2, Holmqvist 2005:4).  As 
Lilly states, PMCs “… do not take part in hostilities, are usually associated 
with particular armed forces, and are not solely motivated by profit 
because they are concerned with the maintenance of public security. If 
this is not the case, then legal provisions in international law banning 
mercenaries do seem to apply“(Lilly 2002:2). Furthermore, since the 
above are hardly acceptable definitions, it has been widely accepted that 
activities rather than the actors per se should be defined, given that it is 
also common for these to be merged into one another. 
The spectrum of provided services and the overall model of the 
privatisation of security is examined and analysed in detail in Chapter 
Four. However, at this stage, it is important to make the distinction 
between different types of companies and form a basis for a consistent 
terminology to be used hereafter. Different authors suggest a variety of 
ways of distinguishing between the various types of company, as 
discussed below, but broadly speaking, private security companies can be 
distinguished according to two main categories, based on the services 
provided. The first refers to the private military companies (PMCs).  These 
are legal entities and maintain corporate ties and Internet websites 
(Holmqvist 2005:4). As Beyani and Lilly state, they are   
registered corporate bodies with legal personalities that often provide 
military and security services of a different nature and for a different 
purpose to the activities of mercenaries. Private military companies 
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often employ mercenaries, but they differ in that they are often hired 
by governments, ostensibly to provide public security whereas, non-
state armed groups, aiming to undermine the constitutional order of 
states, generally hire mercenaries. (Beyani and Lilly 2001:16).  
Thus, PMCs are different to individual mercenaries. They are corporations. 
Moreover, many PMCs have roots in para-public defence industries; many 
employ highly qualified retired personnel from armed forces. The term, 
private military company, underlines the fact that PMCs are corporations 
similar to other corporations. Some of them operate as multinational 
businesses, are traded on stock markets, have headquarters in tax havens 
and operate professional advertising and public relations departments 
(Leander 2005:608). 
The second category refers to private security companies (PSCs) that, 
although they have almost the same command structure as PMCs, provide 
a very different range of services. They are  
predominantly concerned with crime prevention and public order 
concerns: they might provide private guard services for prisons, 
airports, installations, and private individuals.... There are those 
companies whose activities are borderline and have a bias towards 
more sophisticated security services, including training local police, 
securing transport and information routes. (Beyani and Lilly 
2001:18). 
 
Mandel (2002:94) puts both kinds of companies under the umbrella of 
private security providers, requiring that two criteria be satisfied: 
a. The ownership and control of the organisation providing the 
services are distinctly non-governmental. 
b. The nature of the services provided focuses on the provision of 
coercive security, including such elements as advice, logistical 
support, intelligence, or direct combat troops and related 
equipment.  
Singer (2002) identifies three types of companies; ‘type one’ provide 
implementation and command; ‘type two’ provide advice and training; 
and ‘type three’ provide military support. Although this service based 
distinction does make sense, the issue can become confused since the 
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same company could provide ‘type one’ services to one client and ‘type 
three’ to another (Avant 2005a:123). In a similar vein, Richards and 
Smith (2007:6) stress that the overlapping of activities make definitions 
elusive; still they perceive PMCs as offering traditional military services – 
including training and logistical support - while PSCs offer more protective 
services, such as traditional policing rather than soldiering roles. Brooks 
also differentiates between private military (PMC) and private security 
(PSC) companies. He defines the former as providing more active 
security, such as military training or offensive combat operations, 
generally to individual states or international organisations such as the 
UN, and the latter as passive security in high risk conflict environments 
(Brooks 2000:129).    
The above definitions of mercenaries, private military and security 
companies, and the distinctions between them, provide a theoretical basis 
to build on and from which to move to the core of this research: a study 
of the expansion of these entities into the maritime domain and the 
appearance of private maritime security companies (PMSCs) as anti-
piracy measures. However, there is no point in comparing PMSCs with 
mercenaries since they cannot be included under any of the  definition 
clauses of these: they do not engage in armed conflicts, do not take part 
in hostilities between warring parties, have no links with states’ armed 
forces and the overthrowing of foreign governments is entirely irrelevant 
to their list of provided services. 
 
 In its Circular 1405 (IMO 2011c:1), the IMO defines PMSCs as “[p]rivate 
contractors employed to provide security personnel, both armed and 
unarmed, on board for protection against piracy” and their armed 
employees as “Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel” (PCASP). 
Consequently, these definitions and abbreviations (IMO 2011c:1, IMO 
2012:1), are used throughout this thesis. 
 
At this point it is interesting to notice that, as Mandel (2002:23) 
highlights, governments primarily choose to utilise PMC/PSCs for political 
ends, regardless of the financial motivations of the companies. However, 
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although PMCs and PSCs are mainly contracted by states, the main driver 
for PMSCs to mushroom largely comes from the shipping and offshore 
energy industry. This conceptual framework is visualised in the Venn 
diagram presented in Figure 1. The green and red areas represent the 
PSCs and PMCs respectively, and their slight overlap is due to their similar 
command structure and business model, while their provided services 














The vast majority of their clients are governments; hence they mostly 
cover the upper area of the diagram, where states are the main driver. 
However, there are some cases where they are also contracted by private 
companies – most of which are involved with the extraction of resources 
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Figure 1: Privatisation of Security Conceptual Framework 
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in developing countries (Interview H 2012) - and/or organisations9 that 
retain facilities/headquarters in hostile environments (Vaux 2002:14). 
Consequently, a small part of their clientele is represented in the 
diagram’s lower area, where industry is the main driver.  
 
Things are quite different though for PMSCs; and their overlap with PMCs 
on the diagram reflects similarities only in terms of command structure 
and business model, including the fact that they both provide armed 
services. However, PMSCs do not engage in battle in the common 
understanding of the land-based approach nor do they conduct offensive 
operations, although they are entitled to use armed force for the security 
of the vessels or platforms they are contracted to protect. Hence, the vast 
majority of their clients traditionally come from industry (shipping and 
offshore oil and gas), so their main area of existence lies with the 
industry drivers. 
 
However, some PMSCs also offer consultancy and risk assessment 
services to some governmental agencies (Interview F 2012) so, in the 
diagram, there is a small area relating to limited amount that states drive 
their business. The full framework of the PMSCs’ environment is 
investigated in detail in Chapter Seven.          
 
2.5 The Privatisation gap in Academic Literature - Mapping the 
Private and Maritime Security Research Actors  
The above review of contemporary security approaches and paradigms 
leads us to several useful and indicative conclusions, directly related to 
the research questions. Furthermore, it presents private security and 
maritime security in the context of contemporary academic literature. In 
particular, it places professional practice and the integration of 
contemporary maritime security in the context of international security.  
                                                          
9 The International Committee of the Red Cross for example – which is one of the major opponents 
concerning the use of PSCs - is amongst the aid agencies and embassies that employed the PSC, 
Defence Systems Ltd., to provide security for its offices in Kinshasa, DR Congo. 
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The realist approach (Section 2.2.1) is to a great extent reflected in the 
international response to Somali piracy in the Indian Ocean at the state 
level. This involves a variety of issues: the rivalry between India and 
China for dominating the vital thoroughfares for international trade on the 
ocean; the tensions between Iran and the West and the former’s threats 
concerning blocking the straits of Hormuz (which control an enormous 
percentage of global oil exports). In respect to these, the phenomenon of 
piracy off Somalia has offered a great opportunity and justification for 
naval presence, naval diplomacy and force projection to all states sharing 
these geopolitical concerns in the period under research – all traditional 
elements of the realist approach.  
The most indicative case is perhaps the result of the re-emergence of 
China as a maritime power, reviving the Chinese experience of distant 
naval operations in the 15th century, which had subsequently fallen into 
abeyance. The Chinese eunuch, Admiral Zheng He, enforcing emperor’s 
Yong-le mandate between 1405 and 1424, launched seven10 expeditionary 
“voyages of friendship” in faraway lands. These were primarily intended to 
ensure recognition of Ming dominance and, consequently, achieve political 
and economic control all over the known maritime world. For each voyage, 
the dispatched fleet was comprised of 50-250 ships and between 27-
30,000 personnel; the applied strategy and the projected force of the 
deployed armadas, aimed at obtaining control of vital ports and shipping 
lanes, led to the adoption of the term ‘proto maritime colonialism’ (Wade 
2004:10-13, 18-19). 
More recently, with the justification of combating Somali piracy, China has 
offered escorts to vessels participating in the World Food Programme - as 
analysed in detail in Chapter Six (Section 6.4). These operations clearly 
exploit the opportunity to operate alongside the US and Indian ships and 
leaving no space for competitors to cover due to potential weaknesses.  
At the other end of the spectrum, international political sociology (Section 
2.2.6) reflects the rise in security relations across an increasingly 
globalised terrain between security professionals, governmental and non-
                                                          
10 An eighth mission in 1424 is usually overlooked 
46 
 
governmental institutions, the police, military and private companies. This 
offers an early context for the privatisation of the security trend. The 
starting point for this approach is that its understanding of the security 
dilemma differentiates itself from realist thought by including in the 
anarchical international system not only states, but all the actors who 
constitute the field of security relations.  
The neoliberal approach (Section 2.2.2) actually sets the basis, principles 
and conceptualisation of privatisation. Inevitably, security became one of 
the sectors to be included in the globalised market procedures. The core 
research of this thesis goes into further depth on this contemporary trend. 
The whole of Chapter Four is dedicated to this and provides a further 
detailed look at the privatisation concepts and principles that 
neoliberalism introduced, which in turn led to the controversial issues and 
practice of the private security industry.  Although the neoliberal model 
introduced the principles of privatisation in the framework of the global 
free market, it is generally agreed that the distinctive domain of security 
should be categorised and approached in a different way, separated from 
the practices of other businesses and commercial companies. Hence, 
another field that this study researches, is to what extend are states 
willing to maintain control and develop a regulatory framework over the 
private sector’s security provision services. Or do they prefer to outsource 
this authority to the free market as well, allowing the self-regulation of 
this critical sector.  
Similarly, constructivism (Section 2.2.3) – which supports the shift away 
from identifying the state with security - can offer a useful insight in the 
trend to privatise security, while simultaneously forming the fertile ground 
and theoretical basis for the concept of ‘human security’ to emerge. 
Human security (Section 2.2.4) is perhaps the only approach that can 
offer a longer term solution to maritime crime-torn countries. This concept 
is much debated and questioned to a great extent in terms of its realistic 
implementation and applicability. However, it does address the issues 
which are among the root causes and causal factors of piracy. These 
include such diverse aspects as state fragility, motivation of humans to 
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maritime crime due to poverty, social, economic insecurity, informal 
economic structures and lack of law enforcement infrastructure. The case 
study of Somalia, which is researched in depth in this thesis (Chapter 6), 
is the evidence that confirms this hypothesis. It has led many policy 
makers and strategy planners to identify that the long term solution to the 
crime lies ashore and within the enhancement of human security in the 
Horn of Africa.                  
Securitisation theory (Section 2.2.5) acts as a useful tool to analyse how 
maritime security in general, and piracy in particular, were brought into 
the security agenda and successfully ‘securitised’. It goes beyond 
traditional security matters or military threats and uses referent objects 
other than the state. In this context, piracy emerged as crucial threat; it 
was presented to the public, and accepted by the public as catastrophic 
for the global economy, trade, shipping and seafarers’ lives. As a result, it 
bypassed the rules of normal governance since it brought interruptions to 
normal ‘business-as-usual’ activities, and this was accepted on a 
worldwide basis with international implications.  
Perhaps the only common factor in all the reviewed theories and 
approaches is the state. No matter what exactly its role might be in the 
contemporary international security environment, it is identified by all 
approaches as the security provider, regulator, projector of violence, etc. 
Some of the analysed approaches or individual academic’s views include 
or foresee the private sector as an emerging or increasingly influential 
actor in international security. However, none of them actually 
conceptualise private entities as the security providers that replace the 
state per se in its hitherto fundamental obligations and primary 
characteristic. Hence, in the chapters that follow, this study aims to 
analyse this concept in the contemporary paradigm of global security. By 
focusing on developing an analytical framework for the integration of 
private security in general and maritime security in particular, it seeks to 




Although, as observed above, relevant academic research is relatively 
limited, there have been some notable projects in this field. Firstly, the 
University of Denver launched the ‘Private Security Monitor Project’11 
under the direction of Professor Deborah Avant. This operates in 
partnership with the Geneva-based Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces (DCAF). This project comprises independent research 
dedicated to promoting knowledge of and transparency in global private 
military and security services. Its web portal provides an annotated guide 
to regulation, data and analysis of private military and security services. 
Through this, it provides a one-stop source for public information on the 
worldwide use of these services and thus has become a resource for 
governments, policy-makers, activists, journalists, and researchers. In the 
future it will be collaborating with the UN Working Group to collect 
national regulations from around the world, and with the ‘Ved Nanda 
Center’ for International and Comparative Law at the University of 
Denver, to analyse national legislation. Yet, although the maritime domain 
is obviously part of this valuable database, it is still underdeveloped since 
the primary focus of the project is on land-based companies. 
In a similar vein, the European University Institute coordinated the PRIV-
WAR project12 (2008-2011), which assessed the impact of the increasing 
use of PMCs and PSCs in armed conflicts. The project aimed at providing 
recommendations to the European Union on the private companies’ 
regulatory framework with specific focus on compliance issues in regard to 
international humanitarian law and human rights law. Although the seven 
different partners involved made a significant contribution and effort to 
enable the completion of this remarkable project, there is no reference to 
the maritime domain and consequently no PMSC’s regulatory issues were 
examined.  
Similarly, the ‘Private Military and Security Research Group’ (PMSRG)13 
has been launched by King’s College, London. This group aims to promote 
the study of, and raise awareness around, privatisation in defence and 
                                                          
11 Available from http://psm.du.edu/index.html 
12 Available from http://www.eui.eu/DepartmentsAndCentres/AcademyEuropeanLaw/News/2011/04-
15-PRIV-WAR.aspx  




security policy and operations. It promotes a multi-disciplinary approach 
to the study of the field. This includes topics such as the role and activities 
of private military and security companies; ethics/morality, defence and 
security policy; humanitarian intervention; multi-level governance, 
security governance, international humanitarian law, civil military 
relations, security sector reform, privatisation in 'wider security' issues, 
and industrial policy. The PMSRG maintains relations with government, 
industry and academia and comprises a rich pool of knowledge and 
expertise on many aspects of security privatisation, including 
contemporary challenges for the private military and security industry. 
The PMSRG organizes the Annual Private Military and Security Conference 
which brings together actors from relevant government departments and 
the private military and security industry, as well as academia. Since 
2012, the PMSRG has issued a monthly newsletter, which is designed to 
act as useful source of information on the subject of military and security 
service privatisation for academic researchers in the field. 
Another relevant initiative is a web-page originally launched and run by Dr 
Christian Bueger (and currently academic staff in Cardiff University) under 
the title ‘Piracy Studies’,14 who started work on piracy in 2009. It is a 
resource for the study of contemporary maritime piracy, publishing 
commentaries based on academic research on piracy around the world 
and the legal, military, diplomatic, development and humanitarian 
responses to it. Through this it aims to facilitate collaboration among 
researchers from different disciplinary backgrounds and to link research 
and policy. It also acts as a key repository of academic literature on the 
subject, and at the same time, it intends to make academic research on 
piracy available to a wider audience. To this end, the page was created as 
a space for sharing academic resources related to the subject and to 
provide the opportunity of publishing short comments in blog format. Blog 
entries focus on recent developments, results of academic research, and 
reports on events related to academic piracy studies. The web-page is 
indeed a very positive step forward in terms of developing and promoting 
research in this domain. However, as its title clearly reflects, it has limited 
                                                          
14 Available from http://piracy-studies.org/  
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scope within the maritime security discipline since it is focused solely on 
piracy and it overlooks the broad range of other maritime security 
challenges, are analysed in the following chapters. 
Recently, several institutions have emerged which provide training and 
education courses for private security operators. However, since most of 
them are relatively new, only becoming available in 2012, there are few 










Chapter Three: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methodology used to examine the main 
research themes of this thesis; namely, the analytical investigation of 
PMSCs’ regulation in the context of the international security privatisation 
trend and the extent to which this trend affects international security in 
general and maritime security in particular. These companies are the 
protagonists in the broad debate regarding their services as security 
providers, which, arguably, have undermined the states' monopoly in the 
projection of authorised force. The study specifically involves in depth 
research and analysis of operations of private maritime security 
companies off Somalia between 2005 and 2013. Through an analysis of 
their role, recruitment, training, regulation, certification and overall 
practices, it uncovers the dynamics underlying their regulatory 
framework. It then uses this to explore the extent to which this trend 
towards privatisation will affect international security, especially maritime 
security. Through this, the paper aims to further the academic debate 
concerning the conceptualisation of maritime security privatisation, 
stemming from the employment, business structure and model of these 
companies. Thus, the findings offer a basis and framework for the 
assessment of the implications for international security as well as for 
future trends in the maritime security domain.   
The following sections give the details of the research methodology, the 
applied strategy, the data collection methods from both primary and 
secondary sources and the analytical method used. Finally an assessment 
of the limitations of the study is provided.   
 
3.2 Meeting Aims and Objectives 
Despite the significant implications and threats that maritime insecurity 
poses to global security and development, this specific domain has 
received very little attention from the academic research 
community. Moreover, whilst the practice of contracting PMSCs has been 
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applied to a great extent, even less research has been published on their 
role as a counter-piracy response. In particular, there have been very few 
studies of their work as security providers for merchant vessels transiting 
the high risk area off Somalia. 
Due to the sharp increase in maritime piracy incidents off Somalia, there 
has been a growing demand for armed guards on board ships. 
Consequently, more detailed statistics, incident reports and international 
action have emerged since 2005. Hence, the selected methodology, in 
terms of strategy, data collection from both secondary and primary 
sources and the research as a whole, focuses on the timeframe between 
2005 and 2013. 
In order to achieve the aims of the research, as defined in the introduction 
(Chapter One – Section 1.1), specific objectives had to be fulfilled. These 
were set out as follows: 
 To analyse the conceptual framework of private security, and 
particularly maritime security, in the context of contemporary 
academic literature and professional practice. 
 To develop an analytical framework for the integration of maritime 
security and contemporary piracy in particular, into the contemporary 
paradigm of global security. 
 To analyse the complex framework of the PMSCs’ business model, in 
legal, operational and ethical terms. 
 To assess the extent to which the existing regulatory framework and 
PMSCs’ practices affect international security in governance and 
policy, strategic, social and commercial terms. 
 
In the first part of my research I analysed the concepts of privatisation of 
security with a specific focus on maritime security. The conceptualisation 
of security in general has evolved and significantly transformed over the 
last century. As a consequence of this the international community has 
experienced a shift from the ‘state-centric’ approach (which had prevailed 
until the end of the Cold War), to a ‘human-centric’ concept that put more 
emphasis on human beings per se. Human rights, social and economic 
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justice, effective governance, poverty and development became 
fundamental principles of international security. With the active 
participation of civil society, these replaced the traditional realist state-
centric approach which referred solely to the antagonism between states 
in the international system, or in intra-state conflicts. However, this new 
approach motivated a debate among policy makers, researchers and 
analysts dealing with contemporary security challenges. This focussed on 
the ‘securitisation’ of all issues affecting human welfare and governance 
and linked them with the enhancement of global security. Yet, ‘human 
security’ and other concepts of ‘non-traditional security’ are already 
acknowledged in the research community as important contributions to 
broadening and deepening traditional state-centric approaches.  
Hence, in this framework, my initial aim was an analytical, comprehensive 
and detailed analysis of the current trend of privatisation of security. In an 
era where the state lost the monopoly of force projection, various types of 
private security and military companies emerged following the rules of the 
free market and the neoliberal model. These companies are contracted by 
states, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and 
wealthy individuals for a variety of purposes and tasks, as demonstrated 
by the conceptual framework presented in Section 2.4.3. In response to 
this, the legal, ethical and operational concerns stemming from this 
practice in the maritime domain are analysed, using secondary sources 
from the library (and e-library) of Coventry University and the ‘George C. 
Marshall European Center for Security Studies’ knowledge portal. More 
specifically, I used the research databases: ProQuest, EBSCOhost 
Academic search, Columbia International Affairs Online (CIAO), 
NetLibrary. I searched mostly for academic journal articles since the 
existing literature is relatively limited and more extensive work is 
unavailable. 
Additionally, I also looked for informed opinion from relevant web-sites, 
such as those of the United Nations and IRIN, NATO, EU etc. The database 
‘Private Security Monitor’, established by Denver University, provided 
access to information concerning the use and regulation of private military 
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and security services throughout the world. This was researched 
respectively for valuable relevant information.  
Maritime security is undoubtedly a significant component of global security 
although, as mentioned above, it has so far been overlooked, or at least 
under-researched, to a great extent. Therefore another objective of 
critical importance for this thesis was the identification and analysis of the 
variables that comprise ‘maritime security’ challenges and which can lead 
to various forms of insecurity. Moreover, detailing the significant 
implications of maritime insecurities to regional security and 
global development that impact both littoral and continental states is also 
a significant aim of this work. Hence, the in-depth analysis of maritime 
security which follows involves all the aspects interacting in the complex 
maritime environment. These are as follows:  
 The legal framework established by the international law of 
the sea with the distinctive character of contradicting national 
legislation in various cases and regions. This distinctiveness of 
maritime law creates a complex environment between the states’ 
sovereign rights and jurisdictions in all territorial waters, exclusive 
economic zones and high seas. Terms like ‘port’ and ‘flag’ states 
have to fulfil various obligations and different commitments, 
stressing simultaneously the vital need for robust governance and 
effective law enforcement agencies. Inevitably, broadly debatable 
issues emerge, such as the use of armed guards and PMSCs on 
board merchant vessels for their protection against pirate attacks 
during their transit from high risk areas (HRAs).    
 The organised crime activities, such as 
human/narcotics/weapons trafficking that are exploiting the oceans’ 
extensiveness in terms of distance, reach and policing for their illicit 
trade. The significance of port security and pre-existence of 
networks ashore in order to take further advantage of the ‘lucrative 
business’, demonstrates that sea-based activities are inseparable 
from the land-based aspects of human life and activities.     
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 The illegal/unreported/unregulated (IUU) fishing which, 
besides the obvious illicit exploitation of ocean resources, usually 
involves illicit trafficking acts. In some contexts, IUU fishing is also 
listed as one of the root causes of Somali piracy. This combination 
of illegal activities illustrates the interactions and 
interconnectedness of all the factors that consist and challenge 
maritime security. 
 Modern piracy that flourishes in international shipping’s 
choke points. This has tremendous effects in multiple dimensions 
and a huge cost is paid both in currency and human lives. The 
distinction between sea piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as 
their classification among organised crime or terrorist activities, is 
also explored with a view to ascertaining the optimum response to 
address it.        
After establishing this analytical framework and providing the theoretical 
background of both international and maritime security, the next objective 
was the analysis and evaluation of the applied counter-piracy response at 
the levels of international organisations, of states and of the private 
sector. The deployment of multinational flotillas at the former’s level 
constitutes a short term response with significant obstacles, operational 
limitations and difficulties and extremely high cost for the already 
economically depressed international community. On the other hand the 
‘best management practices’ (BMPs) drawn from the private sector level - 
including the deployment of armed guards on board vessels while 
transiting high risk areas – has proved to be more effective so far. 
However, these are currently under broad debate regarding regulation, 
use of force, and legal and ethical issues. Yet, both of these approaches 
address the symptoms and not the root causes of Somali piracy as a 
phenomenon rooted in land-based.   
The interconnectedness of all the above mentioned dimensions needs to 
be stressed and to be made explicit through detailed analysis in order to 
identify the root causes of this complex phenomenon which stifles the 
global economy and security. For this purpose, a separate chapter is 
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dedicated to Somali piracy, as it is mainly in this context that PMSCs have 
been contracted against this specific maritime crime. An historical 
overview of the phenomenon in Somalia, starting from its genesis in the 
1990s, which coincided with the outbreak of the civil war, up to 2011, 
provided the basis for identifying the root causes, as well as confirming 
the factors identified as causal for modern piracy. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the pirate groups’ operational model and objectives contributed 
to assessing the PMSCs’ role in counter-piracy operations in the chapters 
that follow. Hence, analogous secondary sources were used (such as 
books, related articles from academic journals), as well as proceedings 
from international conferences due to the relatively limited bibliography 
on the subject and its specialised nature. Additionally, specialised web-
sites on this topic provided useful data and information, such as Safety for 
Sea, the Maritime Security Review, and the Piracy Studies web-site, as 
well as international, regional and NGOs’ (such as the ‘Oceans Beyond 
Piracy’) reports on related issues. These latter include the UN’s various 
bodies and departments, NATO Shipping Alert Centre, the IMO, the 
International Chamber of Commerce, the Royal United Services Institute 
(RUSI). 
Finally, in Chapter Seven, an in depth comprehensive analysis of PMSCs is 
presented; thereby reaching the main core of the research. This entails 
their recruitment criteria and procedures, the required training, vetting 
and re-evaluation of sub-contractors, the regulatory framework and 
existing international standards, the free market principles that 
circumscribe their regulation (which includes the use of force), 
certification, and the ethical concerns stemming from their activities as 
private companies and non-state entities. The findings of this chapter are 
further used as evidence in an attempt to foresee the implications of the 
privatisation of security in international security; as well as future trends 
that are likely to be imposed in the maritime domain, in political, social, 
financial and strategic terms. In order to achieve this objective, I used 
both primary and secondary sources. The assessment as to the 
appropriate strategy that was used in the collection and analysis of 
relevant data was conducted as follows. 
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3.3 Strategy, Methods of Data Collection and Analysis 
Qualitative research can be understood as a research strategy that tends 
to focus on words rather than quantification in both the collection and 
analysis of data. Moreover, it puts emphasis on the generation rather than 
the testing of theories and on the ways in which individuals interpret their 
social world. Thus, it embodies a view of social reality as a constantly 
shifting emergent property of individuals’ creation (Bryman 2001:20).  
Furthermore, in terms of practical considerations, if a researcher is 
interested in a topic on which no (or virtually no) research has been done 
in the past, a quantitative strategy may be difficult to employ because 
there is little prior literature from which to draw leads and comparisons. 
Hence, a more exploratory stance may be preferable. Consequently, in the 
present context, qualitative research best serves the researcher’s needs, 
since it is typically associated with the generation rather than the testing 
of theory and so with a relatively unstructured approach to the research 
process (Bryman 2001:24). Another important dimension with regards to 
the selected topic is the nature of the people to be investigated. More 
specifically, if the researcher needs to engage with individuals or groups 
involved in questionable activities that include violence, it is unlikely that 
a social survey would gain the confidence of the subjects involved or 
achieve the necessary rapport (Patrick 1973).  
All the above criteria indicate the reasons and the academic justification 
for the researcher’s decision to select this strategy and apply qualitative 
methods for this research. It has already been ascertained in Chapter Two 
(Section 2.4) that there is relatively limited literature dedicated to the 
privatisation of security trend and even less (Section 2.4.2) to the 
privatisation of maritime security. Hence, the researcher had to develop a 
new approach to investigate the regulation of PMSCs rather than test an 
existing theory.  Since there is little prior literature to provide direction, 
and given that the specific groups (both as individuals and companies) are 
involved in potentially violent activities, a quantitative survey would not 
have enabled the necessary rapport.    
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Empirical research involves collecting data from the real world, as 
opposed to from other research activities, such as library research or 
theoretical writing. The term may be further restricted to first hand 
empirical research, where the researcher collects and analyses the data, 
or may be extended to include secondary research, meta-analysis or 
analysis of administrative data, all of which involve data that can be 
described as empirical (Gomm 2009:110-111).  
The term, empirical, refers to phenomena or observations that are 
experienced or assessed by the senses – touch, sight, hearing, smell or 
taste - the five major methods for assessing the world about us. Thus, 
empiricism contrasts with other approaches that do not rely on 
experimental methods for the collection and analysis of data. The 
empirically oriented scientist ‘goes into’ the social world and makes 
observations about how people live and behave. Hence, social science 
research methods are widely used because of their empirical approach. 
Research in general seeks to answer questions using standardised 
procedures so as to see if the answers hold true in a variety of settings, 
and whether other experimenters can replicate the results. This process is 
the goal and business of science and research methodology and 
consequently it is necessary to use the appropriate tools to accomplish 
this mission. Researchers need to develop the habit of using an empirical 
approach in reading and evaluating various research reports, in order to 
be able to: 
a. Have objective criteria for evaluation 
b. Have a point of view that continually probes, assesses and criticises 
available material 
c. Make judgements and decisions that would be most helpful on both 
a short and long term basis 
Hence, developing an empirical perspective helps those undertaking 
research to be more objective and less arbitrary, as well as increasing the 
probability that one obtains both a useful level of understanding and a 
sense of satisfaction (Adams and Schvaneveldt 1985:19-20). According to 
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Sanders and Pinhey (1983:9-10), empirical observations are at the core of 
scientific knowledge. Much of the empirical data gathered by social 
scientists reflect fragmented pieces of a larger social phenomenon, the 
whole being empirically available only when all the parts are gathered 
together. For example, we may not be able to observe social structures as 
a whole, but by making observations of individuals’ social situations – 
their jobs, incomes and backgrounds - we can empirically see the 
structure. Empirical data is different from knowledge based on 
unsubstantiated beliefs, mystical experiences and other kinds of 
knowledge that cannot in some way be seen by others. Hence, it allows 
for a systematic, organised process, by which new information is found, 
and theories are refined and retested. Links and connections are 
discovered and we begin to be able to make statements about causal 
relationships. These latter can then be understand as part of a conceptual 
framework and so allow the development of further explanations (Sanders 
and Pinhey 1983:13). 
As already discussed in Chapter One, the present researcher utilised his 
professional background and broad experience in the maritime domain as 
a navy officer in general and within the private maritime security industry, 
in particular. This enabled him to strongly support his selected qualitative 
research strategy in a number of ways. These included: evaluating and 
validating the collected data; providing empirical data from his 
participation on professional committees,15 especially significant for 
contributing to the comprehensiveness of the research; being able to 
comment on specific issues with confidence and from a professional 
perspective, without need for assumptions, risk of exaggeration or 
unfounded generalisations; analysing the collective data based on a deep 
knowledge of realities and practices in the ‘real world’ situation without 
bias in favour of or against the PMSCs.       
 
 
                                                          
15 Such as sitting on the committee of ASIS International, a professional organization for security 
professionals, during the development of the PSC4 standard as discussed in section 7.3.2 
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3.3.1 Selecting the Specific Strategy 
In this section of the research, the primary intention was the in depth 
investigation of PMSCs anti-piracy operations’ practices and regulations. 
The outcome indicates a conclusion stemming from the complexity of the 
real and everyday conditions in the targeted environment of both state 
and private security providers for shipping in high risk areas. Hence, the 
most appropriate strategy that could have been applied in order to 
investigate and analyse the processes and relationships within the 
international community, as well as the interaction and 
interconnectedness between state and non-state security providers, was 
the case study.  
By using this specific strategy, I had the opportunity to utilise the 
motivation it offers for using qualitative research methods. Such an 
approach also benefits from the inclusion of a variety of types of data, 
such as observations, documents from official meetings and conferences, 
as well as informal interviews with people involved in the research field.  
The case study’s characteristics provide critical advantages for this specific 
research question. These are depth of study, avoidance of generalisation, 
an holistic view in terms of functioning relationships and processes, and 
the investigation of the subject in its natural environment (Denscombe 
2007:37-38). Additionally, the fact that the research was seeking for 
answers in such a complex social phenomenon, with multiple stakeholders 
involving state and non-state actors, fosters the choice of the case study 
as the most appropriate strategy even more strongly (Yin 2003:2-14). 
3.3.2 Choosing the Case Study 
The selected case study of this research was PMSCs’ counter-piracy 
operations off Somalia. Mostly Hellenic and UK companies were selected, 
but the research was not strictly limited to these. Both countries are 
traditional maritime nations, in terms of international shipping hubs and of 
shipping companies and merchant fleets. Even more importantly, they are 
in the top three countries in terms of registered PMSCs, counting more 
than 70% of the overall operational PMSCs registered in the International 
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Code of Conduct for Private Security Contractors (ICoC). The objective 
was to identify the practices/principles that they follow in terms of 
recruitment, equipment and weapons procurement, training and 
evaluation of their operators, the quality assessment of their operations 
and the certification of their employees respectively. Through an 
understanding of this, the aim was to establish and delineate the need for 
regulating these companies. Their deployment is a common counter-
piracy practice from the shipping companies’ perspective with growing 
demand as a market. Hence the research analysed the above factors in 
order to assess the legal, ethical and operational factors of their action. 
The selected case study, as mentioned above, focussed on the PMSCs 
operating off Somalia, with a focus on the time period between 2005 and 
2013. The initial intention was to conduct research into PMSCs registered 
in, and operating mostly from, Hellas and the UK. However, PMSCs from 
other geographical regions were also interviewed (e.g. from USA, Canada, 
UAE) in order to achieve a more holistic approach and maintain the 
characteristics of a reliable, workable and comprehensive thesis. 
This expansion did not affect the conclusions of the whole research per se, 
since the findings indicated that all cases are very similar and highly 
related to each other. Thus, the similarities between operators with 
assignments/contracts in the same area of operations, of shipping 
companies’ demands, of the rules of the same market both in terms of 
competition and reputation and of Flag State legislations and globalised 
recruitment processes all suggest that safe conclusions can be drawn from 
the data used.  
The reason that the operations off Somalia within the defined timeframe 
were chosen as the case study is that the demand for their deployment 
was significantly - indeed incomparably – higher than elsewhere due to 
the extremely high frequency of piracy incidents reported and monitored 
in this region compared to any other place in the world. Moreover, due to 
the extremely violent character of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and the 
prohibition of arms on board merchant vessels by the Nigerian 
government while in its territorial waters, there are not (yet) many PMSCs 
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willing to be contracted as armed escorts in West Africa. Additionally, the 
Nigerian government does not allow foreign PMSCs to operate in the 
region, unless they subcontract Nigerian nationals to deliver their 
services. So, for all these reasons, there was more information available 
concerning PMSCs actions off Somalia. The information was also easier to 
access as described in detail in the data collection section below. 
3.3.3 Research Methods and Data Collection  
The reasons and multiple advantages that make using qualitative research 
methods extremely useful to this research have already been discussed in 
this Section 3.3. Besides data collection from secondary sources such as 
academic writing, reports, etc. as discussed in the literature review, I also 
broadly used the method of documents’ study and analysis. This method 
offers the advantage of being able to study a subject that is inaccessible; 
it requires little or no interaction with the pirates themselves and can also 
be used to explore a larger sample compared to other methods. Of equal 
importance is the fact that it provides high quality outcomes with 
relatively low cost (Bailey 1994:294-296). The limited potential access to 
criminal entities for study purposes (pirate groups, organised crime 
networks) due to security precautions means that the use of documents is 
extremely effective and applicable. Therefore, the study of reports and 
documents of key actors in the domain under research was employed as 
one of the main research methods. These actors include the International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO), the Allied Maritime Command in Northwood, 
London and various other law enforcement agencies and international 
associations, such as the Security Association for the Marine Industry 
(SAMI). Reports and documents from NGO’s leveraged in the 
humanitarian sector has also been of great importance, especially since 
their access is not restricted or classified for any purpose.  
Mass media outputs were also used in terms of exploring our particular 
theme, and incident reporting through these from all parties 
(governments, agencies, NGOs, crime perpetrators) was analysed 
accordingly. In order to avoid credibility and authenticity issues, all 
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reports and data used for further analysis were cross-checked with more 
than two different reporting agencies/authorities (Bryman 2001:377-379). 
Semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions were used to the 
greatest possible extent, engaging operators and managers of PMSCs at 
all levels: operational, managerial and executive. The advantages of this 
method are well known as it is a major primary source in social research. 
Among the most important, in this context, are the flexibility that semi-
structured interviews allow to both parties and the immediacy that stems 
from the direct ‘in-person’ contact (Bailey 1994:174, 189). Through this, 
this kind of interviews allows the interviewee to develop ideas and speak 
widely in relevance to the subjects raised by the researcher (Denscombe 
2007:176). The sample that was chosen for interview was the largest that 
was practically possible both in terms of individuals and companies. 
Although representatives of a total of seventeen private security 
companies consented to participate in the designed interviews and to 
contribute as primary sources in my research – as listed anonymously and 
encoded in the list of interviews and primary sources - the actual sample 
is significantly larger. Due to the empirical contribution stemming from my 
engagement with numerous companies and executives within the 
structure and activities of the IAMSP, a lot of background knowledge and 
experience is used within this research, significantly raising the number of 
the samples used. However, due to the restrictions of the ‘Non-Disclosure 
Agreement’ regarding the members registered with IAMSP, both as 
individuals or companies, the exact number cannot be identified but this 
limitation neither affects the extracted conclusions, nor the overall 
research. This again illustrates the value of the strong support that my 
empirical knowledge contributed to the selected qualitative research 
strategy. 
The interviewees were selected from professionals/individuals that have 
direct relationship with the areas under research. In particular, members 
of PMSCs who worked in operations thwarting piracy attacks or transiting 
high risk areas under this specific threat with many years’ experience in 
the field had critical information to provide. Also, personnel that 
participated in armed or unarmed escorts on board merchant vessels 
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during their transit of high risk waters had relevant experiences to share, 
whether they had ever been under attack or not. The fact that they are an 
intrinsic part of the broad debate among international shipping and 
insurance companies, legal bodies, state and non-state actors, as well as 
the peak of the lucrative business model enacted in the ‘war risk’ regions, 
encouraged the researcher to explore their experiences. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of the perspective and insight of the two leading associations – 
SAMI and IAMSP - with regards to the PMSCs’ regulatory framework 
provide a more comprehensive and holistic approach to this issue. Direct 
contact and discussion with SAMI’s CEO was a valuable primary source 
and my personal engagement with the IAMSP for more than three years 
also contributed to meeting the aim of this research.     
In order to study these groups in their physical environment, understand 
their operational and managerial structure and gain insight into their 
everyday working environment/premises/operational organisation, a field 
study was clearly the most appropriate observation method to be used 
(Bailey 1994:248-257).  Hence, almost all Hellenic and UK PMSCs were 
interviewed at their premises, in person, which was extremely helpful in 
revealing answers to my research objectives. Fortunately, the funding for 
such trips to study the Hellenic PMSCs was not problematic (and for the 
UK companies it was much easier in economic terms). Some of the 
Hellenic companies though were interviewed by Skype due to timing 
restrictions and work load from both sides when the interview needed to 
be carried out. Hence the personal contact was not affected or limited, 
except in the cases of two interviewees, who were based in Canada and 
Dubai respectively. The former preferred to provide the answers to my 
pre-defined questions directly in printed form and signed directly on the 
interview schedule, while the latter, answered half of them by Skype and 
the rest by e-mail due to time restrictions.  
All of the participants requested to remain anonymous, both as individuals 
and as companies. Their request has been fully respected throughout this 
research and they were assured of this before the interview, and 
accordingly accepted to provide the requested answers for my research. 
The same ethical practice was adopted and applied also to those who were 
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contacted in order to provide their professional insight on specific issues 
by e-mail or oral discussion. They consented to provide relevant data for 
my research, yet they requested and were assured of anonymity in their 
responses. 
Finally, highlighting again the significance of the empirical contribution of 
my personal experience to the validity of my qualitative research, a 
plethora of background data and knowledge was used in completing this 
research, due to my position as chairman and, currently, Vice President of 
the IAMSP. Additionally, my personal network and contacts with former 
colleagues/officers from the Hellenic Navy, who had become active 
members of the maritime security industry after resigning from the navy, 
was another vital issue for data collection and personal experience. 
Without these two advantages, I have to confess that it would have been 
extremely unlikely to complete this research successfully, partially due to 
the limited literature on the specific subject.  
3.3.4 Data Analysis 
The interpretation, analysis and representation of all the collected data, 
(spoken, written and visual) were based upon the four principles of 
qualitative data analysis (Denscombe 2007:287-288):  
a. Their analysis and drawn conclusions were firmly rooted in the data 
b. Their explanation emerged from their careful and thorough study 
c. Unwarranted preconceptions were avoided 
d. An iterative process was applied  
Although the researcher already had a background associated with the 
topic, if this influenced the objectivity of the research at all, it was to 
facilitate an unbiased analysis of the selected data. The knowledge gained 
through first-hand experience provided a comprehensive understanding of 
the situation and major actors that would not otherwise have been 
possible. Moreover, the repetitive process of comparing data by moving 
back and forth in a ‘loop-mode’ enabled the avoidance of generalisations 
and the development of valid conclusions. This process also enhanced the 
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credibility of the research, so the writing up of the findings and 
conclusions was supported by strong evidence and leads that emerged 
from the collected, interpreted and analysed data (Bryman 2001:267-
269). Hence, the method provides an appropriate means to addressing 
the major research questions and so fulfilling the aims and objectives as 
set out above. 
The semi-structured interviews were predesigned and primarily focused on 
data collection regarding the major questions and whole spectrum of 
PMSCs’ practices. The participant’s information leaflet and the detailed 
and precise interview schedule are attached as Appendices 1 and 2, 
respectively. These highlight the extent of the relevance and significance 
of the acquired information to the conclusions and findings of this 
research, as well as providing evidence of my compliance with the 
required ethical procedure.  
The findings, and their implications for the future, were then discussed in 
Chapters Seven and Eight. The content of these chapters comes largely 
from the analysis and final synthesis of the data collected from the 
interviews, using the researcher’s unbiased empirical experience to 
facilitate evaluation and validation.  
 
3.4 Potential Limitations of the Research 
Following the common practice in social research, there were concerns 
about potential limitations which might have emerged during the process 
of my research, in particular regarding my initial methodological planning. 
These limitations usually refer to objectivity issues in terms of communal 
and conceptual influences; proper samples for extracting safe conclusions 
and collecting reliable data; and the inability to predict whether the 
‘targeted’ group will continue to behave in the same way in the future as 
when the data were collected, etc. (Shipman 1997:145-157). 
In the case of the proposed research there were no objectivity issues to 
be challenged due to communal influences. Although the investigator is 
ethnically related to most of the PMSCs under research, he acted as an 
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external observer and researcher. He, thus, conducted the interviews 
without influence from emotional bonds stemming from family, tribal or 
communal influences; all of which might have affected the interpretation 
of data or the holistic approach of their analysis. 
The researcher’s existing background relating to the specific issues 
involved was, in fact, a precondition for further research, yet it did not 
exercise an influence to the extent of misinterpreting information due to 
already formed concepts or theories. Additionally, the many years of 
engagement in the research in the specific maritime environment provided 
valuable experience and a sufficient time-frame for the study. The 
conclusions were based neither upon predictions of potential future 
behaviour of the specific companies, nor on the construction of theories 
for their further evolution. The research was focused on the “push – pull” 
factors of the maritime security companies in the global market and 
security environment, examining the reliability of the procedures and 
established frameworks for their certification and quality assurance. 
Nevertheless, there were still potential limitations in terms of the 
documents’ method study: a number of governmental, law enforcement 
agencies’ or the own companies’ reports were considered confidential and 
accordingly access could have been denied. However, this research did 
not intend to get involved in details of legal issues, naming specific 
companies, or to access documents characterised as ‘restricted’; so this 
potential limitation did not pose any obstacles. Simultaneously, most of 
the reports of various entities engaged in humanitarian, environmental 
and maritime issues are accessible through the internet since they are 
concerned to attract the public opinion’s support and awareness, so this 
potential limitation was overcome without affecting the research. Most of 
the PMSCs also report practices/certification/recruitment/incidents directly 
in their web-sites for marketing and promotion purposes, so no 
confidentiality issues affected the research in this context. 
Finally, the limitations that the researcher met with, in praxis, related to 
the commercial confidentiality of sensitive issues, such as weapons 
acquisition and storage, firearms training, recruitment and contractual 
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practices, etc. In this context, several invited interviewees declined to 
participate in the research. Although these potential interviewees had 
known the researcher personally for many years, having served together 
in the Hellenic Navy, and they were familiar with the researcher’s, 
character and respect for confidentiality, they refused to contribute, since 
they “didn’t wish to reveal hints and secrets of the profession and the way 
the global market works” (Reference withheld). As observed in the 
introduction, I was already aware of these ‘hints and secrets’, due to my 
personal experience in the field and perhaps more importantly my 
chairmanship in the IAMSP. Hence, their refusal demonstrates the air-
tightness of the sector, the reluctance of contractors and companies to 
communicate and externalise their activities and practices, and the lack of 
transparency in many companies’ affairs. It also indicates the extreme 
difficulty that outsiders must overcome in order to penetrate this ‘closed’ 
sector of the industry. And again, I have to highlight and stress that this 
explains to a great extent the lack of literature and research in the specific 




Chapter Four: Privatisation of Security – Key Themes 
4.1 Introduction 
After declining during the 19th century, the controversial practice of 
contracting private security providers emerged at the end of the Cold War 
in a new and broader form, becoming a global trend in almost every 
society’s daily practice, as analysed by international political sociology 
(see Section 2.2.6). The privatisation of security services within states, 
and as a part of their expeditionary military operations, inevitably 
expanded in the maritime domain due to increasing insecurity. This 
expansion was particularly due to the need for a response to the sharp 
increase of worldwide piracy incidents in general, especially evident from 
1999 onwards, as Figure 2 below shows, and of incidents off the Horn of 
Africa in particular. 
Figure 2: Incidents of worldwide piracy attacks, 1995-2010 (Source: Mudrić 
2011:237). 
This chapter builds on the analysis of the privatisation of security provided 
in Chapter Two (Section 2.4). It broadens and deepens the review of the 
existing theoretical background and provides an analysis of the overall 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis 
can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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concept of security privatisation and the fragmentation of security 
provision authorities among state and non-state actors. It presents the 
neoliberal privatisation model and the dilemmas which emerge from the 
outsourcing of hitherto state monopolies. A comprehensive analysis of the 
established private security model ashore demonstrates the legal, 
operational and ethical concerns stemming from the development and 
deployment of private contractors. Inevitably, a very similar framework, 
reflecting the complexity and vulnerabilities associated with the open 
seas, has been expanded and transferred to the maritime domain.    
 
4.2 Introducing Private Security 
The end of the Cold War introduced a new perception of security provision 
since many states demonstrated the will to outsource the monopoly of 
force projection to the free market. The active engagement of mercenary 
entities in African wars and the extensive involvement of private 
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan (as Table 1 clearly demonstrates) 
meant that the trend towards privatisation of security became the most 
controversial issue in contemporary international politics.  
Table 1: US Department of Defence Contractors16 as of 2008 
 (Source: Ortiz 2010:146) 
                                                          
16 USCENTCOM Countries: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, UAE, 
Uzbekistan and Yemen. 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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Interest in obscure companies’ operations generated extensive literature 
and made attractive headlines for widespread journalistic coverage (For 
example: Blackwater in action – The business of war 2008, Private 
Warriors 2005, Guns for hire (Afghanistan) 2005, Shadow company 
2005); as well as TV series (for example, Total Security 1997, Saracen 
1989, Hostile Environment 2012), and Hollywood films [Detroit threat 
management (Jacob Hurwitz-Goodman 2012), Delta Zulu (Chris Hickey 
2013), The Expendables (Patrick Hughes 2010, 2012, 2014), Blood 
Diamond (Edward Zwick 2006)]. It also provoked a significant amount of 
academic debate (Brooks 2000, Vaux 2002, Leander 2005, Bjork and 
Jones 2005). The prevailing debate concerns the privatisation trend per 
se: critics see privatised security personnel as disruptive mercenaries, 
addicted to violence and exploiting it for personal gain, enacting human 
rights violations, repression and turmoil in ruthless conflicts. On the other 
hand, PMCs/PSCs place themselves in the broader service provision 
industry, aiming at fulfilling client needs, as broadly discussed in section 
2.4.3. From their clients’ perspective, government officials have 
individually expressed the belief that PMCs/PSCs provide stability and 
save lives in areas where nothing else could provide solutions (Mandel 
2002:3-4). 
Furthermore, the consequences of this trend, as well as the privatisation 
of security per se, go beyond the military aspects and the conflict zones. 
They also penetrate the everyday activities of ordinary life, becoming 
omnipresent in the various operations of the commercial sector, such as 
manned guarding, installation security, risk analysis and surveillance, and 
are expanding at a phenomenal rate (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011:19). 
Private security companies provide military and security services mostly to 
states, international organisations, INGOs, but also to global corporations, 
and wealthy individuals. A detailed list of the services provided, 
categorised according to client, and indicating their various goals, is 
presented in Figure 3 below.  
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Figure 3: PMCs’ Goals & Tasks (Source: Ortiz 2010:85) 
Every multi-lateral peace operation conducted by the UN since 1990 has 
included the presence and services of PSCs. States that have contracted 
military services range from highly capable states like the US to failing 
states like Sierra Leone. Meanwhile, global corporations and INGOs 
working in conflict zones or unstable territories hire PSCs to provide site 
security and planning. Since the 11 September terrorist attacks on the 
United States, the ‘war on terrorism’17 has offered even greater 
opportunities for the private security industry (Avant 2005:7-9). 
This was not only evident in Iraq – where PSCs formed the second largest 
group of members of the ‘coalition of the willing’; it is also manifest in the 
growing presence of PSCs in the new jobs that accompany the war on 
terrorism, such as interrogators and interpreters (see Figures 2 and 3).  
                                                          
17 The term ‘War on Terror’ is a broadly used term, although inaccurate since someone cannot declare 
war on an abstract noun! It was firstly used by US President George W. Bush on September 20th, 
2001, in a televised speech, when he announced that the “war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it 
does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, 
and defeated.” See The White House (2001) ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American 
People, US Capitol, Washington DC, 9:00 PM EDT’. [online] Available from http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html [accessed 10 March 2014].    
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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Thus the number of private security providers rocketed during the 1990s. 
Private industry projections in 1997 suggested that revenues from the 
global international security market (military and policing services in 
international and domestic markets) would rise from $55.6 billion in 1990 
to $202 billion in 2010 (Vines 1999:47). Estimates also suggest that the 
2003 global revenue for the industry was over $100 billion. Private 
security companies with publicly traded stocks grew at twice the rate of 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the 1990s. Between 1994 and 2002, 
US-based PSCs received more than 3,000 contracts worth over $300 
billion from the US Department of Defence (Cited in Avant 2005:8).  
 
Numerous news reports of mercenary and/or private security activities 
were published in reference to security and military services. Some 
document the activities of individual soldiers of fortune. These are 
frequently linked to international criminal networks that profit from shady 
deals associated with natural resources exploitation (diamonds, oil, 
timber, coltan, and other minerals) or with the market for illicit drugs and 
sex. During the Democratic Republic of Congo civil war, the ‘white legions’ 
(composed of Serbian and other European individuals) made the press 
frequently and, in Chechnya, similar reports abound. Approximately two 
hundred such companies made the news between 1995 and 2004, as did 
trained militaries in more than forty-two countries during the 1990s 
(Avant 2005:9).  
 
In Russia, approximately 4,000 PSCs were founded within a year after 
being legalised in 1992. By 1999 they had risen up to almost 7,000, listing 
more than 196,000 of employees authorised to carry firearms. In 
Bulgaria, it is estimated that more than 9% of the male workforce is 
currently engaged in private security activities; the Indian private security 
sector employs around 5.5 million people whereas the overall personnel of 
state armed forces and police combined counts 1.3 million people. In 
China, the number of private guards is expected to grow from 3 to 5 
million in the next three years. In Latin America, there are more than 1.6 
million registered employees, with probably a further 2 million working 
informally or illegally. In Africa, South Africa alone is home to the largest 
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private security market in the world,18 with over 6,000 companies 
employing more than 375,000 officers. Nigeria and Kenya count 2,000 
companies each, while in Uganda the number of private guards equals 
that of police officers and in other African countries private security is one 
of the few sectors of employment growth and expansion (Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2011:20-21).  
 
4.3 The Private Security Model and Concept 
The rise, growth and globalisation of private security is interrelated with 
several recent global developments: Firstly, the rise of neoliberalism, as 
discussed in detail in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.4; secondly, the contemporary 
international security challenges that introduced a new attitude towards 
‘crime and punishment’ in broad terms; and, finally, the transformation of 
security and increasing risk projection into a commodity (Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2011:62-5). In a similar vein, Mandel (2002:7) identifies three 
related noteworthy trends: the increasing availability of military 
armaments to civilians at large, the rise in formally organised private 
security outfits and, finally, their increasing involvement in conflict 
environments, including war fighting, peacekeeping, humanitarian 
assistance, protection and intelligence gathering.   
What was hitherto perceived as the security obligation and proper function 
of the healthy and sovereign state is now increasingly outsourced to the 
private sector, with security in prisons and transportation facilities (such 
as ports and airports) being the most indicative examples. From the 
security industry’s perspective, the proliferation of market opportunities 
and the availability of high profit and long term contracts expanded the 
level of privatisation and of governance fragmentation. Hence, on the one 
hand, the use of private contractors is an attempt on the part of the 
states to reduce security spending budgets and fill security gaps, by 
relocating security provision rather than abolishing it. On the other hand, 
it demonstrates the states’ effort to make social actors at all levels more 
actively engaged with their own security, in respect to the increasing 
                                                          
18 Measured as a percentage of GDP 
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demands of the contemporary security environment (Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2007:249-250). 
In terms of security provision in the context of government and 
governance, security could in fact be regarded as a public good, which 
does not materially differ from other goods, such as health or education. 
All that mattered, in this case, would be that people should be secure, 
regardless of how that security is provided. Consequently, private 
security, like private education or health care, could be made available to 
anyone who was prepared to pay for it and so the whole sector might, in 
principle, be privatised. The alternative and traditional approach would be 
that security was a necessary and inalienable responsibility of the state, 
which could outsource its functions only under strict supervision. Of 
course, on the one hand, questions arise as to what extent fragile states 
are capable of providing this security and, on the other hand, to what 
extent states are capable of supervising the outsourcing (International 
Alert 1999:8).  
Furthermore, there are many cases, especially in developing countries, 
where the state per se, instead of being the security provider, became the 
violence projector, resulting in a public tendency to turn to non-state 
solutions for their everyday protection. And given foreign governments’ 
reluctant to intervene, the role of private companies can be perceived as 
that of a proxy state actor, yet without state responsibility for their 
actions (Bjork and Jones 2005:785). In this framework, Leander 
(2005:606) argues that reliance on private military and/or security 
companies does not enhance public security.  Instead, the market for 
force created by increased reliance on these companies actually weakens 
the foundations of public security. Moreover, a market for force increases 
the supply of military services and the number of actors who can buy the 
services, and so further undermines the consolidation of public security 
structures. The consequence is that insecurity and violence are likely to 
increase even further. 
However, the security privatisation trend is evident in states regardless of 
their development level. Even in the most powerful states, private actors 
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may influence policy making, although they act focused on their own 
interests; but in states with limited capabilities in terms of security 
provision the ground is ever more fertile for private companies to flourish. 
However, while the proliferation of non-state security actors and providers 
is encouraged according to the neoliberal approach, there are still many 
that function within the state, raising questions regarding their control, 
management, account, monitoring and regulation (Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2011:62-5). Hence, if the trend for private security companies to 
take on an increased role in future reconstruction and development 
processes continues, it is in the interest of all parties involved to have 
their mandates and roles regulated in a manner that is commonly 
accepted by the international community (Bjork and Jones 2005:785).  
Many PMCs have been employed by intelligence agencies for covert 
operations and unaccountable foreign policy activities: the explicit political 
purpose of employing PMCs to further foreign policy objectives is the 
capacity it offers for official deniability. Some authors are in favour of 
PMCs in, for example, future peacekeeping operations, while others have 
fiercely criticised such proposals and argue that such companies should be 
outlawed and shut down. Activists seek to drive governments, 
international organisations and political bodies into enacting legislation 
that will secure and enforce the conduct of PMCs in line with a commonly 
understood human rights-based agenda. Analysts view PMCs as a new 
phenomenon of growing importance in international relations and on the 
stage of international affairs. Their approach is to explore, and comment 
upon, the conduct and practice of PMCs against a background of issues 
such as globalisation, privatisation, and interventionism. Proponents take 
either a pragmatic or a promotional view of the privatised military and 
security industry and consider how non-state commercial actors can play 
a legitimate and positive role in international security and development 
(Schreier and Caparini 2005:9-13).  
The globalised private security model presents complex analytical and 
political challenges, since the established and developed public–private/ 
global–local networks could challenge the authority of the public security 
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agencies of a sovereign state. The development of private security 
companies with global reach, combined with the establishment of the 
above networks, will highlight the transformation of the state’s role in the 
contemporary global governance structures. In this framework, the 
authority of private security can be seen as stemming from three sources.  
 
First, its expansion has been both a product and an enabler of broader 
liberal processes of globalisation. Hence, private security companies’ 
authority in all kinds of states could be seen as the necessary response to 
contemporary shifts in the provision of security, and of states’ inability to 
provide adequate security. Second, these processes of privatisation have 
allowed PSCs to acquire the status of being legitimate authorities in these 
areas, possessing significant expert knowledge and technical, financial and 
organisational capacities specific to this field. This results in an increasing 
number of governments and private entities contracting private 
companies as the optimum means to address security issues. Third, the 
authority of PSCs arises from their increasing incorporation in hybrid 
security networks.  In most cases these networks are usually connected to 
state authority, with the intention of enhancing it. They introduce new 
methods of delivering security and new powerful actors who acquire 
significant authority in this field, with a consequent impact on the 
provision of security in our daily routine, as well as on social stability and 
state legitimacy (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007:249-250).  
This process does not necessarily mean that state authority has been 
either eroded or strengthened by integrating PSCs. Instead, it highlights 
the complexity of the new security provision structure and challenges the 
traditional international relations orientated approach to security, as 
analysed in detail in Chapter Two of the thesis (Section 2.2). Figure 4 
presents a visual interpretation of this new security structure and the shift 
from the traditional security state centric management structure to the 




Figure 4: Types of Security Provision (Source: Ortiz 2010:126) 
 
Undoubtedly, there is a controversial nexus between governance, power 
and privatisation, since private security providers operate in parallel with 
the law enforcement and judiciary sectors of the state. According to this 
model, the private industry in the free market could be seen as a ‘third 
sector’ of security provision, stressing the shift from government to 
security governance, where the state is the central node of security, and 
operates as a potential manager of the established networks. Yet, 
although the interests of those who participate in the network differ, the 
final objective of security provision and effective governance remains the 
goal; and the state still retains the legal, symbolic and material capacities, 
critical for its achievement. This nodal model can also be transnational, 
especially in cases where states are reluctant to undertake specific tasks, 
instead assigning them to the well-established and continuously growing 
global security market (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011:83-7).  
Avant (2005:3) added even more questions in this already complex 
framework, wondering if and why should we worry – or even care – about 
this globally expanding market. The simple answer - that private security 
may affect how and whether people can control violence - raises greater 
concerns, especially in terms of practice. How privatisation affects this 
control, then, is another critical question. Does the privatisation of 
security undermine state control of violence? Can the privatisation of 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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security enhance state control of violence? Does the privatisation of 
security chart new ways by which violence might be collectively 
controlled? How does private security affect the ability to contain the use 
of force within political process and social norms?  
4.4 Private Security Concerns 
Private security advocates point out that many of the activities undertaken 
by foreigners, for example in Africa, depend on PMCs/PSCs. Western 
governments are outsourcing tasks of training, consulting, logistics and 
military support in general, to private firms. They rely on them to back up 
military operations and provide the security necessary for their physical 
presence.  
 
Similarly, other outsiders rely on PMCs to compensate for the absence of 
effective state control over violence. Firms have to protect their 
installations and their personnel; aid workers need protection from 
racketeering, kidnapping and attacks. In contexts where public armed 
forces and police are either unavailable, ineffective or involved in activities 
against which protection is needed, private solutions are the only ones 
available (Spearin, 2001:30). 
 
In the framework of this broad spectrum of private security services 
offered, illustrated in Figure 5, the fundamental concerns regarding 
private security providers remain those related to their accountability, 
transparency and respect for human rights.  
 
Given their business orientation, in most cases private security firms have 
different interests from their employers. Besides the difficulty involved in 
monitoring their activities, the high cost of their services might include 
provision of access to natural resources. Through this it is possible that 
they may become more powerful than the client, turning into a threat 
themselves. Moreover, the use of private military/ security companies 
allows state actors to bypass national and international legislatures and 
assign controversial tasks which otherwise might have not been 
undertaken. In the same vein, weaker states may become more 
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dependent on wealthier states who are willing to pay for such services on 
their behalf, due to their inability to provide internal security (Frost 
2008:43).  
 
 Figure 5: The Private Security Service Spectrum (Jäger and Kümmel 2007:59,461) 
Additionally, the profound difficulty of states to control contracted security 
providers raises even more ethical concerns. The objective of financial 
gain undermines both the intentions of the employing state as well as the 
justifications of the principles supporting the sovereign state authority. 
Thus, this development actively counteracts the notion of ‘just war’ ethics 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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and legitimisation. Hereof, the practice of ‘marketising’ security, 
transforms the intention of providing a collective good into ‘private means 
and ends’ (Baker 2011:106-7).    
 
The key question, though, is how privatisation affects the way that all the 
dimensions of control fit together: the political, the functional and the 
social. Do the political changes introduced by privatisation engender 
needed capabilities governed by acceptable political processes that 
operate according to shared values? An argument can be raised that this 
is most likely when the consequential mechanisms economists pay 
attention to, (that is, screening and selection, monitoring, and 
sanctioning), work together with the mechanisms for transmitting 
appropriateness that sociologists pay attention to (Such as, norms, 
standards, education, and practices among security professionals). Thus 
between them creating something like a symmetrical outcome (Avant 
2005:5-6).  
4.4.1 Land Based Concerns  
Building further on the analysis of the neoliberal model of the privatisation 
of security, introduced in Chapter 2 (Section 2.4), one could argue that 
the primary feature of the private military contractor model is the 
disconnection between military service and the state. While the citizen-
soldier model is defined by mutual obligation and the professional soldier 
model by unilateral duty, the private military entrepreneur is only bound 
to the state by a temporary contract, which relies on a business 
orientation and focus and is usually project based (and will therefore 
expire as soon as the task is complete). The military contractor does not 
have any ultimate liability to defend the state with his/her life and is also 
generally motivated by profit. While professional soldiers ideally rank 
patriotism higher than financial rewards, private military contractors focus 
on monetary gain in their choice of employment. Neoliberalism assumes 
profit motivation to be a suitable means for ensuring the democratic 
control and accountability of private military contractors. Rather than 
believing that soldiers will honour abstract notions of duty towards the 
state and society, neoliberal thought contends that profit motivation can 
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be used to encourage, not only the efficiency and effectiveness of private 
military contractors, but also their responsiveness towards public and 
private demands.  
 
Moreover, military contractors lack a distinct professional and collective 
identity that would ensure their compliance with professional military 
norms and standards. While professional soldiers are categorised in terms 
of rank, private military contractors are trained, hired and paid for their 
individual skills, and do not develop a collective group identity. Most 
private military contractors work under short-term contracts and for 
different firms. They operate through lists of potential employees who are 
called up if and when their skills are required, and who usually form 
temporary teams of different nationalities for a particular operation with 
little training or preparation.  
 
Neoliberalism also contends that the associated fragmentation of influence 
and resources can facilitate democratic control and accountability by 
decreasing the size of the armed forces and mixing civilian and military 
occupational spheres.  
 
Finally, a neoliberal approach favours the alienation of political and 
military roles within the private military contractor model. Most private 
military contractors neither work for nor in their home countries. Most 
companies are happy to recruit anybody who has the necessary expertise. 
As a consequence, there is a separation of the political and military roles 
played by the military contractor; this is an advantage in terms of 
democratic control and accountability since it facilitates the political 
neutrality of the soldier. In return, the political actions of military 
contractors have no influence on their employers. This ideal-type model 
suggests that distinct civil–military relations in Western democracies are 
not only a product of divergent security demands and historical 
developments. They have also been shaped by theoretical and ideological 
beliefs regarding the most suitable means of democratic control and 




In the absence of adequate legislation and regulation, or in circumstances 
where regulations are in place but poorly enforced, there may be no 
control over the type or quality of services provided by PSCs. Untrained 
staff with questionable backgrounds may be able to access weaponry and 
use force in an illegitimate way. 
 
Beyond the basic argument concerning the privatisation of security, in 
particular, with reference to the weakening of states’ monopoly over the 
use of force, the introduction of armed PSCs can provoke social 
differentials in security between the rich and the poor. The consequence 
of this is that security becomes a privilege of the wealthy. Furthermore, 
unlike state security providers, PSCs are not directly accountable to the 
electorate or a parliament but rather to a combination of, often weak, 
regulators, company boards and shareholders (Richards and Smith 
2007:8-9). 
 
Commissioned military personnel of national armed forces are also divided 
over the use of the private military and security industry. On one side are 
those who argue that PMCs provide the armed forces with the ability to 
respond across the spectrum of conflict by contracting out for required 
non-core or emerging capabilities. They see in PMCs an untapped 
potential for peace and humanitarian operations, for conducting offensive 
information operations, and for use in countering asymmetric threats at 
the lower end of conflict. On the other side are those reluctant to use 
PMCs, because they are structured solely for commercial profit and not 
bound by the codes, rules, and regulations that make a nation’s armed 
forces unique and accountable.  
 
Numerous studies have been conducted by military colleges investigating 
the potential pitfalls of giving PMCs too large a role on the battlefield. A 
majority of these argue that the claimed cost savings are exaggerated, 
and that questions of coordination, command and control, supervision, 
and rules of engagement have not been adequately addressed. Thus, 
troops could be put at risk by PMCs, and their use could result in the 
displacement of state legitimacy. In terms of policy, just as state armed 
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forces have had to develop a system for working with NGOs during recent 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, they will have to consider also 
how to deal with the PMCs and PSCs that they will increasingly encounter 
within the battle space. At the decision-making level, governments and 
international organisations must develop standard contracting policies, 
establish vetting and monitoring systems adjusted to PMCs and PSCs, and 
ensure accountability and legislative supervision (Schreier and Caparini 
2005:9-13).  
 
Additional issues are raised by the use of private security actors that 
cannot be addressed through regulation enhancement alone, as discussed 
above. Even if the processes for hiring companies were formalised, and if 
it were possible to regulate who hires them, as well as how and where 
firms deliver their services (i.e. with adequate vetting of personnel, 
human rights standards and punishment for individual abusers); 
significant losses would still be entailed when a private company performs 
services in this sensitive area of policy. These losses are most significant 
in terms of loss of visible authority and prestige and weakening of long-
term commitment and sustainability of security and military relationships. 
Private security companies can only contribute to the furthering of such 
relationships if they are brought into such close and formal relationship 
with governments as to effectively make them ‘quasi-governmental’ 
bodies. This is unlikely to occur as it would compromise the private and 
independent character of the companies, as well as their flexibility; and 
hence the advantages of using the private sector would be lost (Holmqvist 
2005:58).  
 
Leander (2005:607-609) on the other hand identifies three pillars 
supporting the case that PMSCs would be helpful in restoring public 
security, specifically in African states. The first is based on the fact that 
they could break vicious circles of violence by working as ‘force 
multipliers’ for local forces, providing troops for outside interventions, by 
training locals, taking over non-military tasks, etc.. The second is that (at 
least some) PMCs are respectable. If this was not the case, encouraging 
their development and relying on them would be foolish. It is essential to 
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show that PMCs are not ‘traditional mercenaries’, hence the term ‘private 
military companies’ was launched as a new label and successfully 
marketed by Tim Spicer, partly for that reason. Finally the third is the 
insufficiency of many African forces. Leander asserts that PMCs stand out 
as far more professional and efficient, and even as potentially contributing 
to improving the behaviour of African forces, she claims, have looted, 
racketed and abused civilians to the point of being the key perpetrators of 
violence.  
 
In more practical terms, PSCs enable governments to avoid supervision 
when using force, as well as parliamentary inquiries or political cost 
attributed to embarrassing fallouts. Potential casualties of private 
contractors are also far less likely attract questions and resultant political 
cost than casualties among national armed forces. Furthermore, by 
outsourcing the use of force, governments can pay for and conduct 
controversial operations outside of the public budgeting process without 
external (and internal) legitimisation requirements. Consequently, their 
accountability is minimal, the companies have little to fear, and the 
international system continues to produce dangerous outcomes without 
much-needed legal restraint. Even when cases of abuse reach the general 
public, both PMCs and PSCs can avoid legal accountability. Weak or non-
existent local legal systems may be unable to prosecute offenders and the 
companies sometimes enjoy special impunity from national laws (Pingeot 
2012:16-17). 
4.4.2 The Maritime Domain 
A far more controversial development has emerged due to the recent 
growing practice of embarking PMSCs on board ships transiting piracy 
high risk areas. This led the IMO Maritime Security Committee (MSC) to 
urge states to issue guidance on their use (IMO 2011b), selection and 
employment (IMO 2011a). However, the MSC circulars make it quite clear 
that the IMO does not endorse the use of PMSCs. Instead, they state that 
the carriage of such personnel and their firearms remains subject to flag 
state legislation and policies. Furthermore, it remains a flag state decision 
as to whether and under which conditions, PMSCs will be authorised; 
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specifically as an enhancement to other best management practices, and 
not as an alternative. Dr Marie Jacobsson, Alternate Head of Delegation 
for Sweden on behalf of the European Union to the UN, made the 
following statement in relation to this issue:   
 
The IMO and other organisations strongly discourage the carrying 
and use of firearms on board merchant vessels, and the EU supports 
this point of view. However, when the vessels do not carry firearms 
on board, the states must take their responsibility to patrol areas in 
which incidents are most likely to occur, and to act against the 
criminals. This is indeed a costly business and the lack of capacity 
and funds to tackle it needs to be examined and discussed, as does 
the matter of what could be done to build up capacity (EU Presidency 
Statement 2001). 
 
While the international community focused on the deployment of non-
lethal anti-piracy measures, pirates have become more aggressive. The 
use of firearms (AK-47s) and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) have 
dictated that the security teams deployed on board merchant vessels need 
to be armed with equivalent firepower should they be a credible and 
effective deterrent. This necessity was further reinforced when an 
unarmed security team embarked on MV BISCAGLIA failed to prevent 
pirates hijacking the vessel in the Gulf of Aden on 28th November 2008 
(BBC 2008).  
The development of the concept was first mooted by SAMI along with 
various shipping associations and marine insurers at the beginning of 
2009 and developed further throughout that year. There was initial 
reticence on the part of the ship owners to accept any form of codification 
of armed security guards, as they believed that the navies of the world 
should protect their ships. However, since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and in the absence of significant maritime threats, Western navies had 
shrunk to the extent that it was impossible to provide the number of ships 
required to patrol and dominate such a vast area as the Indian Ocean. But 
it took some time for this to be accepted by the shipping industry. There 
was also significant concern voiced by many in the shipping industry that 
if private armed security was embarked on commercial ships, there would 
be a repeat of the “Blackwater” incident in Iraq; and that the Master and 
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shipping company that contracted the guards could be held liable (Cook 
2014). 
In terms of the incentive to have PMSCs on board, different types of 
insurers have also responded with different practices (Sloan and Griffiths 
2012). Hence, focusing on the maritime domain, there are many legal and 
logistical challenges to the use of armed guards aboard ships that have 
not yet been resolved (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2012). These can be 
summarised as follows: 
a. Documents such as the International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Providers, the Montreaux Document (both designed for 
land operations in times of conflict) and MSC. Circ. 1404 suggest protocol 
for private security teams. However, these have no legal status and no 
standardised training or certification to ensure compliance with guidelines. 
b. Currently the regulations meant to ensure quality within the 
private security industry are weak, making it difficult for ship owners to 
discriminate between reputable and disreputable companies. Furthermore, 
there is no required reporting of incidents, although it is recommended in 
all guiding documents. 
c. Flag State policies regarding the use of armed guards vary 
greatly; many policies are not even reported yet. 
d. International navies, the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB), INTERPOL etc., have a neutral or no stance toward the use of 
private armed security. The IMO considers the use of private armed 
security to be a flag state concern. There are varying stances among 
shipping companies, flag states and regional nations regarding their 
usage.  
This multiplicity of attitudes is indicative of the fact that this industry is 
yet very new and international bodies are still developing their official 
policies toward its usage. 
 
4.4.2.1 Flag, Port and Coastal State’s Responsibilities 
The fact that the IMO guidance places the responsibility for decisions 
about PMSCs employment with the flag state has both positive and 
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negative implications. On the positive side, it makes clear that the 
associated issues are ones that the governments of flag states should 
address, and there has been clear evidence of engagement in this respect 
in countries such as Germany, the UK and US. Yet, most flag states still 
adopt a variety of views about the carriage of PMSCs on board ships under 
their flag. These range from “No legal disposition allowing the existence 
and the use of weapons on board” as in the case of Portugal (International 
Chamber of Shipping 2012) to the mandatory character imposed by the 
USA Department of State’s in July 2011. This latter states that all US-
flagged vessels carry security personnel, whether armed or unarmed 
(Oceans Beyond Piracy 2012).  
This was evident in the remarks made by Thomas Kelly, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary, US Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in the context 
of ‘Combating Piracy Week’ in London: 
But perhaps the ultimate security measure a ship owner can adopt is 
the use of armed security personnel, either provided by their 
government as Vessel Protection Details (VPDs) or through 
employing Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP), 
where Flag state rules allow. The latter are often made up of former 
members of various armed forces, who embark on merchant ships 
and guard them during transits through high risk waters. To date, 
not a single ship with armed security personnel aboard has been 
successfully hijacked. These teams have served as a game-changer 
in the effort to combat piracy. 
For our part, the U.S. government has mandated that U.S.-
flagged merchant vessels transiting the high risk area conduct a risk 
assessment with specific consideration given to supplementing 
onboard security with armed personnel. 
When PCASP emerged on the scene a few years back, there 
were reservations ... From the evidence that we have seen, in most 
engagements, the attack ends as soon as pirates realize an armed 
security team is on board. Pirates often break off their boarding 
attempt and turn their skiffs around to wait for another less 
protected ship. These teams therefore have served as an effective 
deterrent. 
However, PCASP teams come in varying sizes and, to be frank, 
in varying degrees of quality. Their emergence as a security option 
has brought with it complications. Varying national legal regimes 
complicate the movement of these teams and their weapons from 
ship-to-ship or ship-to-shore. Some flag states do not have clear 
legal guidelines for addressing armed security personnel and are 
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struggling to formulate positions vis-à-vis armed security personnel 
at sea. 
Untangling legal and policy issues related to armed security will 
take time … As a legal matter, authority over the use of privately 
contracted armed-security personnel beyond territorial sea limits (12 
nautical miles from land) falls to the flag State. Once a vessel with 
armed personnel embarked enters territorial seas it may carry such 
personnel provided it is engaged in innocent passage or transit 
passage. If a vessel with an armed team embarked intends to enter 
a port, the port State may exercise authority for regulating the 
personnel or their arms (Kelly 2012). 
 
The shipping industry is therefore faced with a range of flag state 
positions, including instances of limited supervision of the use of PMSCs, 
as indicated above, and the option to choose an ‘Open Registry’19. This 
latter, however, does not impose an appropriate degree of regulation. 
Moreover, piracy related issues are only one of the many controversial 
issues surrounding the choice of flag practices. Although related to the 
movement to destabilise trade in commodities such as narcotics and arms 
rather than piracy, there are serious weaknesses inherent in the vessel 
registration system. A significant aspect of these, in the present context, 
is that “the rigour with which the norms and standards are implemented 
and enforced can vary widely between different registries”. There are also 
many examples of the ease of re-registering ships even when the vessels 
were subject to UN Security Council resolutions and subject to national 
sanctions (Griffiths and Jenks, 2012:60). 
To put the Open Registry issues in context, nearly 70% (by tonnage) of 
the world’s merchant fleet is not registered in the country of domicile of 
the owner. Almost half of this Open Registry tonnage (i.e. 30 - 35%) is 
registered in the open registries of Panama and Liberia. Panama neither 
recommends nor prohibits the presence of security personnel and does 
not place any prohibition on the presence of weapons on board. Similarly, 
Liberia does not place any prohibition on the embarkation of security 
personnel or weapons (International Chamber of Shipping 2012).  
                                                          
19 Open registries are also known as Flags of Convenience (FOC), and they refer to ships which fly the 
flag of a country other than the country of ownership. See International Transport Workers’ Federation 
(2012) ‘What are Flags of Convenience’ [online], available from http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-
convenience/sub-page.cfm [accessed 10 March 2014]    
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The employment of PMSCs also raises wide-ranging issues for port and 
coastal states, not least for national legislation concerning the presence of 
firearms on merchant vessels in their territorial waters. Some states do 
not permit their presence at all, while others require prior notification of 
the weapons, ammunition and personnel embarked. The former two may 
also need to be sealed in a secure compartment while the ship is in waters 
under their jurisdiction.  
The desire of port and coastal states to control the use and availability of 
weapons in their waters is obvious. However, such control imposes an 
obligation on a state that is concerned to uphold its sovereignty to provide 
the security necessary to reduce the risk of ships being attacked to an 
acceptable level. Port state restrictions on arms on board merchant 
vessels also affect the ability of PMSCs to embark and disembark legally 
with their weapons in many ports. In recognition of this problem, the 
Multinational Security Business Group (MSB) works with coastal states on 
a standard solution to the logistical challenge of “the use and movement 
of small arms and equipment used in the protection of merchant vessels 
sailing high risk waters”.20 Table 2, below, presents several flag states’ 
stance on PMSCs, as of early 2012. 
 
                                                          
20 See MSB Group Ltd, http://msbgroupltd.com/about/  
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Table 2: Flag States' stance on PMSCs (Source: Oceans Beyond Piracy 2012:8) 
 
Meanwhile, the challenge for PMSCs is being partly overcome in the Indian 
Ocean, for example, by the introduction of floating armouries (Houreld 
2012). But this development in itself raises a number of issues concerning 
the regulation, security and operation of the vessels being used as 
armouries and since they are flagged under open registries there is no 
clear supervision of their activities.  
 
The complex distinction between state and private security is clearly 
demonstrated by the use by states of the so-called Military Vessel 
Protection Detachments (VPDs) in vessels registered under their flags. 
These comprise small military teams embarked for the purpose of ship 
protection, under national control, and only armed if the flag state’s 
national laws permit this. Military personnel need to be trained and 
regulated, and to operate under nationally approved command and control 
arrangements (including Rules of Engagement), rather than under 
industry/company derived rules regarding the use of force. A statement 
by the UK Minister of Defence during a session in the House of Commons 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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for Somali piracy is indicative of this. Although he acknowledges industry’s 
enthusiasm for VPDs, he cautioned that resources for this are scarce:   
 
We have done it before. We have done it in different strategic areas. 
It is all a question of availability of resources. At the moment, our 
armed forces are very heavily committed. If a stage was reached 
when our armed forces were less committed, I am sure that the MoD 
would look at a request for providing VPDs (The Foreign Affairs 
Commitee 2012:20). 
 
In addition, the rotation of such personnel (normally larger teams than 
used by PMSCs), combined with the number of vessels involved, will 
create a further, and very significant, training and manpower burden for 
the armed forces of the nations involved. Even if the cost of providing the 
teams is recovered from the hirer, most western-style armed forces are 
currently reducing their defence budgets and therefore have fewer 
personnel to draw from. 
 
Further to the resource and availability issues, the shooting of two Indian 
fishermen by an Italian military team embarked on the MV Enrica Lexie in 
February 2012, reflects other problematic aspects of the employment of 
VPDs: their training and experience (Madden 2012). The incident raised a 
number of questions, including concerns about the prospects of other 
similar instances occurring where less well trained teams are embarked - 
especially since the use of lethal force on the open ocean can be covered 
up and remain unreported. There are also other challenges such as the 
requirement to provide medical support, which adds to the size of the 
team, liability issues in the event of collateral damage, and issues 
concerning the movement of government forces personnel and weapons 
from one state through the territorial waters of another. Finally, mistaken 
use of lethal force by a VPD, such as in the case cited above, immediately 
becomes a national diplomatic and legal problem; a risk that some nations 
will choose not to incur (Sloan and Griffiths 2012:65). 
 
Another issue which puts VPDs under question and illustrates a potential 
downside to the use of PMSCs, is the risk the unethical use of armed 
detachments, ostensibly embarked for ship protection, as a cover for 
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other activities. Such was the suspicion in March, 2012, when the Russian 
tanker Iman arrived in the Syrian port of Tartus with what were declared 
to be a PMSC on board, even though there were reports that the 
personnel were actually part of an anti-terrorist unit (Radia 2012). This is 
one aspect that is unlikely to be overcome by international regulation, but 
such cases still do run the risk of bringing the PMSC’s contribution to 
maritime security into disrepute. 
4.4.2.2 Regulation and Training 
Although the strategy of contracting armed guards has proved to be 
successful, the disproportionate and excessive use of force that resulted in 
injuring and killing fishermen mistakenly identified as pirates raised 
another significant concern that is also the subject of ongoing discussion. 
This relates to whether regulation by the industry itself or by external 
regulation is appropriate. There is, therefore, still a broad debate and 
significant gap to be filled in order to address the regulation and training 
of PMSCs when operating at sea. Some of these may also apply to VPDs 
consisting of armed forces’ personnel. The International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Service Providers21 was established in order to 
establish industry standards with which its members should comply. 
Although originally designed for security companies operating on land, it 
has provided a baseline standard to which many PMSCs operating in the 
maritime domain relate. However, it is not binding, and carries with it no 
enforcement mechanism. Beyond this, a number of organisations are 
engaged in the task of industry representation and moving the process of 
training and regulation forward. The Security Association for the Maritime 
Industry (SAMI) is a non-governmental organisation seeking to undertake 
a self-established accreditation programme. This initiative has the backing 
of a wide range of stakeholders within the shipping industry, and their 
original intention was to submit it to the IMO for approval (SAMI 2012). 
Membership requirements only include being a signatory to ICoC and 
paying a fee, but the concept behind the accreditation process for PMSCs 
involves more, including an on-site test. However, further issues have 
                                                          
21 See ICoC, available from http://www.icoc-psp.org  
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delayed and brought the initiative under question, which are researched 
and discussed in detail in a later section.  
 
Meanwhile, the focus of the International Association of Maritime Security 
Professionals (IAMSP)22 is also geared towards establishing “standards of 
best practice” within the maritime security industry. The organisation has 
been actively involved in working and technical issues. It has also 
developed and made available training associated with duty of care, use of 
force, human rights and legal elements of the maritime industry. 
Additionally it has established a range of procedures for personal and 
corporate vetting, use of technology, etc. (both associations, SAMI and 
IAMSP will be discussed in further detail in section 7.3). However, 
establishing such standards is not necessarily an issue to be left to the 
industry alone, as is recognised by a number of states. This is indicated by 
a UK House of Commons Committee statement:  
 
[We] conclude that it is vital to ensure that armed guards are 
properly trained and deployed in sufficient numbers. We urge the 
Government in its response to this report quickly to bring forward 
proposals for a national regulatory structure (whether governmental 
or industry based self-regulation) that would provide a measure of 
quality assurance” (Foreign Affairs Committee 2011:6). 
 
 
4.4.2.3 The Industry 
The primary concern of the shipping industry is to be able to undertake its 
commercial operations at an acceptable level of risk to crews, passengers, 
cargoes and vessels, at an economically acceptable cost, and in a timely 
manner. In terms of risk and the employment of armed guards, this 
includes being able to hire personnel who are trained and experienced to 
the level necessary to conduct the task effectively; and at the same time 
protecting the owners, operators and master of the ship from the risk of 
liability arising from the PMSCs’ conduct of the task.  
 
In addition, insurers are driving certain aspects of the operational 
response to piracy. The insurance industry sets the premiums for ships 
                                                          
22 See IAMSP, available from http://iamsponline.org  
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transiting HRAs, monitors the implementation of security measures 
(including armed guards) and offers premium discounts for ships using 
armed security teams. Consequently, the maritime insurance industry is a 
protagonist in defining the costs associated with piracy and in the 
dynamics of the operational response. It is indicative that in 2011 
insurance companies’ revenues increased by $600 million, which accounts 
for six times more than the money paid for ransom to pirate groups within 
the same year (Singh 2013). 
 
Many observers have voiced concern that the embarkation of PMSCs will 
lead pirates to adopt a more violent approach in order to gain access to 
the target vessels. To date, although boardings and kidnappings can 
certainly be violent, the feared escalation has not been observed. Indeed, 
the measures enacted appear to have contributed significantly to the 
reduction in successful attacks in the Indian Ocean at least. In the case of 
Somali piracy, pirates aim at ransom of hijacked crews rather than 
ransom or resale of the cargo. In this case, also, it may be counter-
productive for them to increase the risk of injury or death of 
crewmembers in their attacks. Hence, the primary objective would be to 
deny them boarding in the first place. However, increased security in 
some vessels will inevitably drive the pirates to focus on others that are 
less secure, or more vulnerable by design. This further reinforces the 
situation whereby all vessels are vulnerable and subject to threat. Thus 
increasing the need for risk assessments and for the application of the 
appropriate security measures (involving BMPs and PMSCs in high risk 
areas), as well as to achieve a higher level of cooperation with maritime 








4.4.2.4 The Use of Force 
The armed pirate attacks per se, and, in particular, their adaptability in 
switching tactics and using longer-range weapons, raised additional 
concerns, stemming from the increased risks of fire, hull and 
environmental damage and, of course, human casualties. Picture 1 shows 
a typical PMSC’s armed escort team in alert on board a merchant vessel, 
prepared to use force if attacked by pirates.    
 
Moreover, given that crew and passenger ransom is the pirates’ aim, it 
increases also the risk specifically for cruise ships. Hence, debate about 
the employment of PMSCs also raises the question about whether they 
should be defensive (aiming at deterrence or, as a last resort, to protect 
the ship as for example in Picture 1) or they should adopt a more 
offensive role. This latter could involve conducting activities such as the 
wider suppression and apprehension of suspected pirates - roles which 
have traditionally been the responsibility of governmental forces. 
However, as Spearin (2010:61-2) argues, international law does not 
permit PMSCs to conduct offensive action against pirates. The distinction 
thus appears to be quite clear, and one that is generally supported by the 
industry. However, the introduction by Greek ship owners of a potential 
Convoy Escort Program (CEP) in the Indian Ocean announced for the 
summer of 2012 (Hellenic Shipping News 2012) raises a number of 
offensive-versus-defensive questions. More specifically, the rules for the 
Picture 1: Neptune Maritime Security Team stands alert during a transit through 
the IRTC, Gulf of Aden (King 2012:194) 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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use of force issued to the crews operating the boats need to be quite 
explicit about the threshold at which defensive actions become offensive, 
and these will need to be applied scrupulously. This will be a challenge to 
enforce in a fast moving scenario in the usually ‘crowded’ maritime 
environment (with many vessels of various types) and the program brings 
with it the inherent risk of operating beyond the legally acceptable limit. 
In addition, another PMSC’s announcement that its own escort vessels will 
maintain an exclusion zone around the ships being escorted (Sibun 2012), 
introduces a number of additional issues. This strategy is not in 
accordance with the legal basis on which commercial units can use force 
in the ‘high seas’ against another civilian vessel (in accordance with the 
‘freedom of the seas’ regulation and principles). Nor is it even a legal right 
to enforce an exclusion zone on the high seas, and is definitely not in the 
provisions of the anti-collision regulations.  
 
4.5 Causal Factors and Consequences 
A common and key variable in all the above questions, arguments and 
debates is obviously the will and capacity of the state, mostly in terms of 
providing security, regulating the free market and consequently the 
private contractors. Yet, the situation becomes even more complicated 
and debateable, since non-state actors have the right, the will and the 
wealth to contract private security companies for their own use. This 
brings into question whether this form of financing of security enhances or 
erodes the control of violence (Avant 2005:5-6).  
 
NATO’s recent strategic concept (NATO 2010) identified the contemporary 
security challenges that were going to be the causal factors and driving 
forces for the organisation’s transformation. Consequently, these would 
define the NATO states’ orientation towards international security, in 
terms of collective defence, cooperative security and crisis management. 
According to respective official documents, the security environment, in 
addition to the conventional threat of traditional conflict, is challenged by 
numerous further threats. These comprise the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction; terrorism; trafficking in arms, narcotics and people; 
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cyber-attacks; and the disruption of communication, transit and transport 
routes with indirect implications for energy security and environmental 
degradation (NATO 2010, par. 7-15). In this framework, contemporary 
navies had to be deployed in anti-piracy operations and so prevent the 
disruption of vital sea-lanes. Picture 2 below shows such operations in 
action.  
Picture 2: US Navy in anti-piracy operations (McLay and Staffelbach 2012:52) 
        
Even the traditional ‘conventional’ conflicts have been recently 
transformed from interstate to intrastate violence. According to Kaldor 
(2006), these “New Wars” are a form of organised violence in states 
whose political legitimacy has eroded and whose economy is in decline. 
Furthermore, in these cases, the genesis of criminality and corruption 
tends to stem from the systematic multiplication of privatised violence 
ascribed to organised crime networks and paramilitary groups. As such, 
“New Wars” can be described as the reverse process of the traditional 
Western perspective of state building. Also, in contrast with conventional 
warfare, these new forms differ in terms of their objectives and in the 
ways in which they are fought and funded.    
 
The last Western intervention in Libya (BBC News 2011) (and non-
intervention in Syria) demonstrated the new perception of international 
security. The reluctance of the states to deploy ‘boots on the ground’ and  
avoid the political cost at home from potential casualties prevails in the 
concept of humanitarian interventions. Navies in particular exert a 
continuous effort to redefine themselves as well as their missions. The 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
99 
 
traditional confrontation between opposing fleets, lined up in formations 
and firing against each other has not been evident since the Second World 
War. The Falklands (Malvinas) War of 1982 was an arguable exception, 
since it was essentially a confrontation between the UK fleet and the 
Argentine air force, developing into an amphibious landing and naval 
support of a ground campaign.23  The role of navies was reconfigured 
during the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya and became focused on 
strategic transportation, bombing specific targets with long range missiles 
and imposing sanctions under the UN mandate such as the sea-blockade.    
Yet, all the identified international security challenges – other than war - 
do not have military character. Cyber security, trafficking in weapons, 
drugs and humans, for example, are clearly law enforcement tasks. The 
globalised orientation of international security and the adopted 
multilateral approach have re-identified military missions, since in the 
contemporary environment these are also assigned to countering crimes 
such as piracy and trafficking of weapons by sea.24 It does not take an 
expert to conclude that deployment of ships costing billions of the states’ 
defence budget, with sophisticated weapons’ systems and missiles, in 
tasks like prevention and deterrence of pirate skiffs is by no means either 
cost effective or an appropriate use of the asset. And, perhaps even more 
significant in an era of austerity measures, the need for building, 
equipping and maintaining such high-tech fleets – which consume so 
much tax-payers’ money in the process - to operate as anti-piracy task 
forces cannot be justified in the public opinion of any state.   
   
4.6 Summary and Evaluation 
This chapter broadens and deepens the analysis of the conceptual 
framework of privatisation of security, in the context of international 
security academic literature and professional practice. Building on the 
basis established in Section 2.4, it identifies the causal factors of the 
                                                          
23 The Argentine Navy was deterred from taking part by the sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano by 
a British nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine (SSN), HMS Conqueror, with the loss of 323 
Argentine lives 




trend, examines the major concerns and issues that are raised ashore and 
transfers them to the maritime domain.    
 
The private security model has been broadly applied, both ashore and at 
sea and a mutually beneficial relationship between the state and the 
private sector can be identified in this. Through instituting this model, the 
state, on the one hand, reduces the defence expenditure budget for 
providing security in the globalised environment. On the other, it 
simultaneously minimises the political cost from potential human 
casualties, or even engagement in ambiguous operations in the territories 
of foreign sovereign states. The private sector offers jobs to former well 
trained military personnel, and the profitable contracts provide an 
attractive generation of income for the companies, and also for the state 
in terms of taxation. 
 
The dividing line between state and private security is even murkier in the 
maritime domain than it is ashore. The private maritime security sector 
takes advantage of the unemployed, retired and well-trained military (or 
naval) personnel to develop the already booming and well-established 
business model, in the same way as on land. At the same time, the state 
gains a dual reward for the defence budget expenditures that were 
invested in their training: The allocation of funding required for the 
deployment of naval assets on the other side of the globe is minimised 
whilst income is generated in terms of taxation from the private sector 
activities. Public opinion (at a global level) may be in favour or against the 
deployment of PMSCs on board merchant vessels, given the numerous 
ethical, operational and legal concerns stemming from their applied 
practices. However, the shipping companies are treating their use as the 
sole security provision through high risk areas and as the main guarantee 
for the safety and security of both the seafarers and their cargo. 
 
Finally, it needs to be said that there are definitely situations in which 
there is a need for specific vessels to employ PMSCs or VPDs in order to 
provide an additional layer of ship protection. In respect of this, although 
international organisations, such as the IMO, recognise this reality, they 
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still need to provide a firm lead on related issues such as regulation, 
training, and rules for the use of force. The regulations of armed security 
providers do not include elements that provide minimum standards with 
respect to these services (regardless of their status as military, 
paramilitary or private). Moreover, there are no supporting globally 
recognised regulations in place to ensure that all providers of these 
services are subject to comparable controls at international level. Without 
such regulation, and the concomitant checks and controls, the risk of sub-
standard service raises debates and breeds mistrust, as well as the 
likelihood of the inappropriate use of force, including lethal force.  
 
However, it should not be assumed that employing PMSCs is the standard, 
sole response. The level of defence that is appropriate for individual 
vessels can only be determined by an objective assessment of the threat, 
vulnerability and risks involved. In the following Chapters, the arguments 
outlined above, regarding the legal, operational and ethical issues 
surrounding the contracting and deployment of PMSCs, is researched in 
depth. To this end, the structure, role and modus operandi of these 





Chapter Five: Maritime Security and Sea Piracy 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops an analytical framework for the integration of 
maritime security, in general, and contemporary piracy, in particular, into 
the contemporary paradigm of global security. Building further on the 
framework established in Section 2.4.2 of the literature review, it focuses 
on an under-researched and overlooked contemporary security challenge 
with severe implications both at sea and on land.  
 
Maritime insecurity is one of the multidimensional threats to global 
security, which directly (and indirectly) affects such essential issues 
relating to food, energy and economic security After defining and 
overviewing the spectrum of maritime security issues, the research 
focuses specifically on maritime piracy. An historical overview of the 
phenomenon throughout the ages, and around the globe, demonstrates 
both the ancient character of this maritime crime and the diachronic 
nature of the causal factors of their genesis, sustainability and 
suppression, and also of the response to these. 
 
5.2 Maritime Security  
There are a variety of possible definitions of maritime security, the form of 
which depends on the specific perspective taken. As an element of the 
broader concept of global security, maritime security was, and is, 
traditionally related to a state’s military interests.  
 
On the one hand, the vastness of the oceans provides huge ungoverned 
areas within the leaderless international system. These areas are outside 
any state’s jurisdiction, the mare liberum, providing a large part of the 
common goods. These waters also provide natural barriers in terms of 
multipliers of defence capabilities for those in a favourable geographical 
position, as well as the arena in which battle fleets can be deployed 




On the other hand, the littoral and coastal waters are directly related to a 
state’s sovereignty, as well as projecting and enforcing power on other 
states. Hence, throughout history the oceans’ role in military terms has 
been of great strategic importance, and their security cannot be taken for 
granted due to their size and the consequent ‘tyranny of distance’.  
 
Moreover, oceans magnify the states’ relative power by enabling global 
reach, competent seaborne trade, and control of territories, people, and 
vital offshore resources. Obviously, these factors also boost the state’s 
development and economic sustainability, a role critical for achieving the 
desired circumstance of ‘freedom from want and freedom from fear’. 
 
Inevitably, all these advantages have also generated and motivated 
disputes between coastal states, due to efforts to claim jurisdiction over 
as large a sea-area as possible. In this framework, the definition of 
maritime security becomes rather complicated and multi-dimensional 
(Klein 2011:130-133, Reveron and Mahoney-Norris 2011). 
 
5.2.1 Defining Maritime Security 
Within the broader conceptual debate on security, it is possible to identify 
maritime security as a specific dimension of global security. However, the 
existing literature of security studies does not reflect such a concept. 
Hence, despite its doubtless significance, maritime security has never 
been identified as an independent and structural sector of security 
studies. Conversely, the paradox is that all contemporary challenges of 
global security can also be applied to the maritime domain. Hence, we can 
discuss, for example, “maritime environmental security” and “maritime 
terrorism”, etc. Furthermore, the existing literature tends to focus on the 
sea and its characteristics as a means to a variety of uses, as well as on 
the seaborne threats to these same applications. Without ignoring the 
significance of the sea in forming and developing strategic perspectives, 
this section is focused on the non-traditional and alternative aspects of 




Following the paradigm of many significant global issues lacking 
internationally accepted definitions, analogous efforts have been made to 
define maritime security. These reflect the different perspectives involved 
in security, such as the professional domains in which it might be used, 
but they simultaneously entail a greater spectrum of contemporary 
threats. For example, from the shipping industry aspect, maritime security 
could be defined as the avoidance of violence at sea which could 
encompass a broader reference to piracy, maritime terrorism etc., without 
the need to provide specific legal definitions for each crime. Moreover, 
from the shipping industry operators’ perspective, maritime security 
focuses on transportation systems and the safe delivery of cargoes 
without violent interruptions. In this framework, Hawks defines maritime 
security as, 
those measures employed by owners, operators, and administrators 
of vessels, port facilities offshore installations, and other marine 
organisations or establishments to protect ships against seizure, 
sabotage, piracy, pilferage, annoyance or surprise (Klein 2011:8).  
 
Before citing the various definitions of maritime security, it is quite 
important to draw the distinction to maritime safety. Due to linguistic 
obstacles,25 the distinction between these two terms was not clear until 
the introduction of an IMO initiative in 1974, which coincided with the 
revision of the legal framework of the maritime domain (IMO 1974). 
According to this distinction, while maritime security refers to the 
protection against unlawful and deliberate acts, maritime safety is related 
to the prevention or minimisation of accidents that occur at sea (Klein 
2011:8-9). However, the starting point and fundamental approach in the 
international effort to define maritime security, is set out the Secretary 
General’s 2008 report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
under the title “Oceans and the Law of the Sea”. Hereof, the 2008 UN 
report cites that, 
Maritime safety is principally concerned with ensuring safety of life at 
sea, safety of navigation, and the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment. The shipping industry has a predominant role in 
that regard ... : vessels must be safely constructed, regularly 
surveyed, appropriately equipped ... and adequately manned; crew 
                                                          
25 Many languages use the same word for safety and security, including French, Spanish, Greek, etc. 
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must be well trained; cargo must be properly stowed; and an efficient 
communication system must be on board (UN General Assembly 
2008:44, par 161). 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two (Section 2.4.2), in this report the Secretary 
General identified seven specific threats to maritime security: piracy and 
armed robbery at sea; terrorist acts involving shipping; offshore 
installations and other maritime interests; illicit trafficking in arms and 
weapons of mass destruction; illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances; smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea; 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; and intentional and unlawful 
damage to the marine environment (UN General Assembly 2008:17-33).  
 
In September 2005, the George W. Bush administration released the US 
National Strategy for Maritime Security. After citing the inherent right to 
self-defence and the fundamental commitments of acting appropriately for 
protecting the US essential national interests and defending against all 
enemies, the strategy mandates three broad principles for fulfilling the 
strategic objectives:  
 
First, preserving the freedom of the seas is a top national priority ... 
Second, the United States Government must facilitate and defend 
commerce to ensure this uninterrupted flow of shipping ...  Third, the 
United States Government must facilitate the movement of desirable 
goods and people across our borders, while screening out dangerous 
people and material (Bush 2004). 
 
Within this framework, the US planned the biggest navy in the world, 
under the concept of the ‘1,000 Ship Navy’. To this end, it presented the 
spectrum of its missions in its 2006 document, Naval Operations Concept. 
This included the term, Maritime Security Operations among the other 
missions. These others were: a forward naval presence, crisis response, 
expeditionary power projection, sea control, deterrence, maritime 
dominance, civil-military operations, security cooperation and initiatives 
countering insurgency, arms proliferation and terrorism. This document 




U.S. Naval forces will partner with a diverse array of multinational, 
federal, state, local and private sector entities to ensure freedom of 
navigation, the flow of commerce, and the protection of ocean 
resources (USA 2006:14). 
 
However, the 2010 edition of the Naval Operations Concept, dedicates a 
whole chapter to maritime security, providing the following definition: 
  
Maritime security is a non-doctrinal term defined as those tasks and 
operations conducted to protect sovereignty and maritime resources, 
support free and open seaborne commerce, and to counter maritime 
related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, 
environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration (USA 
2010:35). 
 
Furthermore, this edition divides maritime security into individual and 
collective categories. According to the US concept, individual operations 
encompass a single nation-state’s actions – consistent with its rights - 
aiming at enhancing its safety and security. Yet, unilateral action that 
secures a state’s territorial waters is not enough for securing the ‘global 
commons’. This requires a comprehensive effort including multilateral and 
collective operations in order to promote mutual safety and security at sea 
(USA 2010). 
 
Accordingly, in 2009, the UK National Security Strategy identified that 
maritime security, 
  
comprises a very wide range of issues, interests and activities, many 
of which relate to the operation of threats and drivers across the 
marine and in the littoral environments. The maritime domain 
remains a conduit for threats but also offers a range of opportunities 
for the UK’s national security (The Cabinet Office 2009:99). 
  
From the definitions adopted from these two great naval powers and 
maritime nations, we realise that instead of defining the term, the 
preferred practice is to identify the threats that constitute maritime 
insecurity; thus avoiding controversies, overlapping and conflicting 
internal and external interests. In a similar context, the maritime 
dimension of the EU’s security is no longer limited to the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Various policy areas are 
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concerned with transnational threats at sea, marine environment 
degradations and maritime insecurity. There are concerned with 
maritime safety (Transport), marine pollution (Environment), energy 
security (Energy) and fisheries control (Common Fisheries Policy 
[CFP]), as well as drug smuggling, illegal trafficking and clandestine 
immigration (Justice, Freedom and Security). The growing maritime 
competences within these policy areas do not diminish the importance 
of the CSDP, especially when it comes to fighting terrorism or simply 
using or coordinating military assets, as in the case of counter-piracy 
(Germond 2011:568).  
 
The EU’s and its member states’ embrace of a broadened security 
agenda in the post-Cold War era has induced the development of a 
specific EU geopolitical vision. The EU’s own security now strongly 
depends on the security (or securing) of others, and the securing of 
areas where threats originate. Hence, to fight transnational threats 
and to maintain internal security, the EU projects its security 
operations outside and exercises its power beyond its external 
boundaries and even beyond its direct neighbourhood (Germond 
2011:573). Consequently, the EU is now active in various maritime 
margins, including those that are far away from its coasts. A potential 
EU maritime security strategy should address four issue areas: 
maritime-related risks and threats, maritime strategic objectives, the 
means to implement the strategy and to fulfil its objectives and the 
potential theatres of EU maritime operations. Many of these points are 
implicitly recognised by the EU and/or by the member states, but 
never approached in a coherent manner. By systematising the 
aforementioned constituting elements the EU can pave the way for the 
production of an effective EU maritime security strategy. This would 
require the pursuance of three strategic maritime objectives to enable 
the EU to address all the above maritime related risks by implementing 
a holistic approach to security: engaging in maritime power and force 
projection, securing the sea (against transnational threats) and 




5.2.2 Maritime Security in Practice 
Almost sixty per cent of the earth’s population lives within 100 kilometres 
from a coastline, demonstrating the great significance of the sea for 
humanity. The sea-based trading system, developed mostly by littoral 
states, offers access to and distribution of energy resources, raw materials 
and all kind of products around the world. Since almost 80% of global 
trade is transported in ships’ hulls, littoral states developed a maritime 
infrastructure to establish and support these energy supply chains and the 
links between them and the hinterland; and to ensure the secure flow of 
goods to the international markets (Sakhuja 2010:3-4). In this 
framework, maritime security became one of the primary concerns and 
contemporary challenges of global security due to its essential 
contribution to economic development from the local to regional up to 
international level. 
 
In terms of the threats to this infrastructure, the behaviour and 
methodology of those threatening maritime security are closely aligned 
with those of insurgents. They are localised, small in number, disparate, 
irregular; targeting the perceived weaknesses of conventional forces or 
government agencies ranged against them. Rather than a deployment of 
conventional forces, it would be more efficacious and cost-effective in the 
delivery of a long-term solution if there were a coherent, well-resourced, 
multi-agency international response. This recognises that a military 
response seldom delivers a lasting conclusion to such a multidimensional 
problem. The various tactics and conflicting approaches that need to be 
represented in the doctrines addressing these challenges can be set out as 
follows:  
 
 The establishment of political primacy and maintenance of the 
political aim to allow governments to formulate long-term plans 
 Co-ordinated government machinery – an essential, given the 
requirement for an integrated response and the likelihood that each 
government agency will likely approach the problem differently 
 Intelligence and information management 
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 Separating the terrorists/criminals from their support 
 Neutralising the terrorists/criminals 
 Stabilisation planning is the key to a successful campaign as it 
provides a significant impetus to any non-kinetic initiative 
(Mugridge 2009:308-9) 
     
In the contemporary geopolitical environment, maritime security has 
emerged as one of the most significant elements of global and human 
security (Reveron and Mahoney-Norris 2011:129-157). The various 
security challenges, introduced above, that actually generate and 
synthesise maritime security’s definition (UN General Assembly 2008:18-
33) are briefly explored below. Following this, Somali piracy – the focal 
point of this research - is discussed and analysed in depth in Chapter Six. 
 
5.2.2.1 Modern Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 
 
Figure 6: World Oil Transit Choke Points - (EIA 2012)  
The phenomenon of modern piracy that flourishes in the Horn of Africa 
(Pardo Sauvageot 2009, Murphy 2011), and also in the Gulf of Guinea 
(Gilpin 2007, Anyu and Moki 2009), without attracting the proper 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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attention from the international community, poses a major threat to 
regional and global security. The choke points where world oil supplies 
could be intercepted are shown in Figure 6. From this, it is clear that both 
sites are choke points not only for international shipping, transporting vast 
quantities of oil, but also for raw materials, manufactured goods and food 
for the global market. Consequently, the impact on the global economy 
and development could be substantial (Fu et al. 2010:689-690).  
 
As the Assistant Secretary at the US Bureau of Political-Military affairs 
highlighted,  
 
Despite the romantic notions surrounding piracy of previous 
centuries, modern day piracy represents a new and complex threat 
to the international community. While piracy at sea is certainly not a 
new problem, its modern re-incarnation has an impact of a different 
magnitude. Piracy off the coast of Somalia threatens one of the 
principal foundations of today’s modern interconnected global 
economic system – and that is freedom of navigation on the high 
seas. In a globalized world, the impact of piracy in one area of the 
world can cause a ripple effect greater in magnitude than ever 
before. We live in an era of complex, integrated, and on-demand 
global supply chains. People in countries around the world depend on 
secure and reliable shipping lanes for their food, their medicine, their 
energy, and consumer goods. By preying on commercial ships in one 
of the world’s most traversed shipping lanes, pirates off the Horn of 
Africa threaten more than just individual ships. They threaten a 
central artery of the global economy, and therefore global security 
and stability (Shapiro 2012). 
 
 
Hence, piracy and armed robbery against ships threaten maritime security 
by endangering seafarers’ lives, as well as the security of navigation and 
commerce. In his remarks at ‘Combating Piracy Week’ in London, Thomas 
Kelly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the US Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs expressed his country’s view on piracy:  
 
In a globalized world, the impact of piracy in one area can ripple 
across the globe. People in countries around the world depend on 
secure and reliable shipping lanes for their food, their energy, and 
their consumer goods brought by cargo ships and tankers. By 
preying on commercial ships in one of the world’s busiest shipping 
lanes, pirates off the Horn of Africa threaten more than just 
individual ships. They threaten a central artery of the global economy 
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-- and that means that they threaten global security and exact a 
painful toll (Kelly 2012). 
 
In doing so, this might result in physical harm or hostage-taking of 
seafarers (see Figure 7), significant disruptions to commerce and 
navigation, financial losses to ship-owners, increased insurance premiums 
and security costs, increased costs to consumers and producers, and 
damage to the marine environment. For example, as Table 3 shows, 
despite the reductions due to ‘no claim bonuses’ (50%) and to having 
armed guards on board (30%), insurance against war risk for most types 
of ships is barely double that against kidnap and ransom. 
Table 3: Piracy Related Insurance Costs26 (Source: Bowden and Basnet 2012:16) 
 
Available statistics – in particular, those from the International Maritime 
Bureau of the International Chamber of Commerce which monitors 
                                                          
26 In Table 3, the estimated war risk insurance premium (top rate) is 10%, the ‘no claim bonus’ is 
50% and the reduction for Armed Guards (25% of vessels) is 30%, for all types of ships. 
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worldwide incidents - do not actually reflect the real dimension of the 
problem. Since ship-owners are reluctant to report incidents, owing to 
resulting business disruptions and increased insurance premiums, such 
events are seriously under-reported. Needless to say most insurance 
companies tend to settle such claims discretely. 
 
Another significant implication of the above crimes is prevention of 
humanitarian assistance and increase of the costs of future shipments to 
the affected areas. For example, recent incidents of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships off the coast of Somalia have disrupted critical 
shipment of food aid by the World Food Programme. 
 
Figure 7: Seafarers' piracy related deaths (Source: Bowden and Basnet 2012:36) 
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International initiatives have consequently been undertaken to encourage 
greater cooperation between coastal, flag and other states to reduce 
incidents of both piracy and armed robbery at sea. Simultaneously, 
various measures have been envisaged to enhance cooperation at the 
regional and bilateral levels, including sharing information and providing 
mutual legal assistance. The US Department of State in its official blog 
demonstrates to what extent the 21st century effort to suppress modern 
piracy is multinational, with an indicative example:  
 
Consider this: when a Greek-owned, Egyptian-flagged vessel recently 
came under attack south of Yemen, South Korean destroyer Munmu 
the Great from Combined Task Force 151 came to the rescue, joined 
by flagship USS Gettysburg and the force’s commander, Turkish Rear 
Admiral Caner Bener, detaining 17 Somali suspects. Created by the 
U.S. Navy to confront piracy, the force has also included naval 
personnel from the United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, Pakistan, and 
Singapore (McKeeby 2009). 
 
 
 5.2.2.2 Terrorist acts involving shipping, offshore installations and 
other  maritime interests 
Shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests could be 
potential targets for terrorist attacks. Such attacks could have widespread 
effects and thus constitute a major threat to maritime security. According 
to the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, the attacks 
related to the maritime domain represent only 2% of overall attacks 
perpetrated since 1972 (RAND 2012). Yet, maritime terrorism includes a 
variety of threats and complicated scenarios, which pose significant 
challenges to global security.  
 
Significantly, through its former leader, Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda 
declared its  vision of creating, ‘a greater state of Islam … established 
from the ocean to the ocean’ (Rawley 2011:5). Its maritime ‘strategy’ 
included the ambition to have attacks against seaborne targets that would 
damage Western prestige and economy. Indeed, the terrorist attacks 
against the destroyer USS Cole27 in 2000 (see Figure 8), and the French 
                                                          
27 Al Qaeda suicide bombers in a speedboat packed with explosives blew in the side of USS Cole, 
killing 17 sailors, in October 2000 in the Yemeni port of Aden 
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oil-tanker Limburg in 2004, both in Yemen, confirmed these plans and 
reminded policy makers and security officials that, besides land and air, 
terrorist organizations can also attack seaborne targets (Luft and Korin 
2004:62).  
 
Figure 8: Diagram of USS Cole Bombing  (Reuters 2000)  
 
Moreover, the terrorist attacks against Mumbai in 2008 (BBC News 2009b) 
- as shown in Figure 9 - demonstrated that the sea can also be used as 
the medium to launch well organised lethal attacks against targets ashore 
(Basrur et al. 2009). Maritime terrorism includes the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), exploiting cargo ships and trade 
routes as the ‘delivery system’, or even using the ship itself as a WMD, 
following the paradigm of the 9/11 attack (Nincic 2005:624-631).  
  
Numerous UN resolutions, as well as international conventions and 
protocols are in force, aimed at enhancing maritime security and 
countering the threat from terrorist acts. They also intend to ensure that 
appropriate action will be taken against persons committing unlawful acts 
against ships, including the seizure of ships by force, acts of violence 
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against persons on board ships, and the placing of devices on board a ship 
that are likely to destroy or damage it.  
Figure 9: Mumbai Terrorist Attack in 2008 (allvoices 2011) 
Finally, although terrorism and piracy can be differentiated by their 
motivations and objectives (Power 2008:112-116), potential established 
links between terrorist organisations, organised crime networks and piracy 
groups, could result in catastrophic effects against regional and global 
security. Therefore, the relationship between terrorist groups and piracy 
(e.g. Al Shabaab and piracy groups in the case of Somalia), and the 
potential funding of the former through its taxation of the latter, is under 
the microscope of researchers and analysts (Shortland and Vothknecht 
2010, Stevenson 2010, Lehr 2010). 
 
5.2.2.3 Illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs and people  
Illicit trafficking by sea of small arms and of biological, chemical or nuclear 
weapons constitutes one of the major threats to maritime security. The 
UN Security Council has recognized that the dissemination of illicit small 
arms and light weapons has hampered the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, at times fuelling such disputes into armed conflicts and 
contributing to the prolongation of armed conflicts. Moreover, the absence 
of common international standards on the import, export and transfer of 
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conventional arms is a contributory factor to issues such as conflict, the 
displacement of people, crime and terrorism. In turn, these undermine 
peace, reconciliation, safety, security, stability and sustainable 
development (UNODC 2005). Illicit trafficking in small arms is regulated 
by a number of international instruments; however, there is currently no 
global small arms control instrument specifically regulating trafficking by 
sea. In respect of trafficking in biological, chemical or nuclear weapons, 
the Security Council with its Resolution 1540/2004 called upon states to, 
 
develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law 
enforcement efforts to detect, deter, prevent and combat the illicit 
trafficking and brokering of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons 
to non-State actors..., [as well as] ...to take cooperative action to 




Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances by sea is 
another threat to maritime security included in this category. 
Approximately 70 per cent of the total quantity of drugs seized is 
confiscated either during or after transportation by sea. Fishing vessels, 
pleasure craft, and container vessels are particularly favoured by 
syndicates as the medium for this transportation (UNODC 2007). Drugs 
are often concealed secretly among legitimate cargo consignments on 
container vessels without the involvement of the crew and fishing vessels 
provide both a means of transport and of offshore refuelling and 
provisioning. Drug cartels regularly alter transportation patterns and 
shipping routes in order to evade detection and respond to drug markets 
(UNODC 2006). 
 
As Figure 10 indicates, organised crime has a globalised character and the 
already established routes are utilised for trafficking and smuggling of 
drugs, migrants, consumer goods, etc. These maritime routes are still 
essential to the continued intercontinental reach of the crimes.  
 
Apart from assisting states in addressing practical problems, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has fostered inter-agency 
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cooperation and information exchange in relation to illicit trafficking 
through its Container Control Programme,28 while it also established 
information exchange channels to enable states to send and receive alerts 
concerning the movement of suspicious containers.29 
 
Figure 10: The Globalisation of Crime (UNODC 2010)  
Significant numbers of people continue to enter countries every year 
without authorization, including smuggled migrants and victims of 
trafficking. The root causes stem from people’s need for a secure 
environment and to flee from conflict, human rights violations, economic 
deprivation and destruction of their natural environment and resources. 
Clandestine and irregular migration usually entails considerable risks, such 
as from unseaworthy ships/craft, inhumane conditions on board, or from 
being abandoned at sea by smugglers. Amid concerns over the increase of 
the phenomenon, and the exploitation and abuse of migrants in these 
                                                          
28 That Programme focuses on assisting law enforcement agencies from developing countries in 
identifying high-risk freight containers and is currently being implemented in four pilot countries 
29 UNODC developed a project on law enforcement and intelligence cooperation against cocaine 
trafficking from Latin America to West Africa by improving interdiction capacity. For further details, 
see UNODC/HONLAC/2007/2, paragraphs 11 and 13 
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situations, the international community has recognised the need for 
urgent action at all levels to combat trafficking in persons and the 
smuggling of migrants. Destination countries are especially concerned 
about maintaining effective border and immigration controls and 
combating transnational organised crime. 
 
The legal and policy framework applicable to international migration by 
sea is multifaceted and includes international human rights law, refugee 
law, the law applicable to transnational organised crime, as well as the 
law of the sea. The problem of clandestine maritime migration has led to 
increased cooperation between states, including African and European 
states. These have focused on the following:  
 
(a) The control and surveillance of borders of destination countries 
and preventing clandestine journeys by sea;  
(b) Strengthening the capacity of countries of origin to identify 
people in need of protection under international instruments;  
(c) Managing migration through legal channels; and  
(d) Addressing the root causes of migration.  
 
Obviously, organised crime networks also exploit sea routes for their illicit 
activities. In a comprehensive study, UNODC examined and reported 
criminal activities in the fishing industry, including trafficking in persons, 
smuggling of migrants, illicit drug trafficking and environmental crimes 
(UNODC 2011).  
 
A recent report also reveals the nexus between human 
traffickers/smugglers and pirate groups in Somalia, where the established 
network charges $100 per person to cross from Puntland to Yemen. The 
groups work hand-in-hand, using boats in common, depending on the 
assignment (Beerdhige 2012). Again, the interconnectedness of all 





5.2.2.4 Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
Food insecurity has been identified as one of the major threats to 
international peace and security (UN 2004). In the context of the fishing 
sector, overexploitation of fishery resources remains a major challenge to 
achieving sustainable fisheries, and thus contributes to food insecurity 
around the world. It is well recognised that one of the main causes of 
overfishing is IUU fishing. These fishing activities involve complex webs of 
actions and entities (Committee on Fisheries 2007), which have 
undermined international conservation and management efforts. They 
have also constrained progress in achieving food security and sustainable 
livelihoods for dependent populations, as well as poverty alleviation 
strategies for fishers and fishing communities, particularly in developing 
countries. 
 
Figure 11: Smuggling of Migrants (UNODC 2011:61,81) 
 
IUU fishing activities have been reported in various regions of the world 
and take place both on the high seas and in areas under the national 
jurisdiction of coastal states. Some IUU fishing has also been associated 
with organised crime and other illicit activities, such as actions to avoid 
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detection, bribery and corruption, and the use of armed resistance to 
surveillance and enforcement operations. As indicated in Figure 11, 45% 
of the reports to the IMO by Greece, Italy and Turkey involve fishing 
vessels involved in the smuggling of migrants by sea.  
 
One major factor that makes IUU fishing possible, and increasingly so, is 
the continued lack of effective control by states over fishing vessels flying 
their flag, while the increasing demand for fish and fish products fuel 
these activities even further. For coastal states - particularly developing 
states - the inability to exercise effective monitoring, control and 
surveillance of fishing activities in areas within their national jurisdiction 
creates an environment in which IUU fishing can flourish.  
 
Table 4: Fishing Vessels Registered to 10 FOC States30 in 2005, 2008, 2009 (EJF 
2010: 20) 
                                                          
30 The website ‘International Ship Registries’ lists 13 countries under the heading ‘International ship 
registrations: Belize, Cambodia, Cyprus, Dominica, Honduras, Jamaica, Malta, Mongolia, Panama, St 
Vincent and the Grenadines, State of Delaware (USA), Vanuatu (see 
http://www.flagsofconvenience.com/ ) [accessed 10 March 2014].  
The International Transports Federation’s (ITF) Fair Practices Committee lists 27: Antigua and 
Barbuda, Aruba (Netherlands), Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda (UK), Burma, Cambodia, Canary 
Islands (Spain), Cayman Islands (UK), Cook Islands (New Zealand), Cyprus, German International 
Ship Register (GIS), Gibraltar (UK), Honduras, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands 
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The task of addressing IUU fishing becomes even more complicated due to 
the practice of numerous fishing vessels registering under Flags of 
Convenience (Or Open registries – see footnotes 18 and 29) as Table 4 
illustrates. Thus, more effective flag states’ and port states’ control, as 
well as market-related measures, could significantly contribute to 
eliminating the phenomenon.  
 
NGOs (such as Greenpeace, the Environmental Justice Foundation) have 
also identified the danger to the marine eco-system stemming from the 
IUU fishing and other destructive fishing practices. The European 
Parliament recognised the existence and severe implications of these 
practices, and that they also endanger regional and global food security, 
and called on member states to take imminent measures to deal with this. 
According to the 2011 European Parliament’s Committee of Fisheries 
report, entitled ‘Combating Illegal Fishing at the Global Level - the Role of 
the EU’, IUU fishing (although impossible to be reported accurately) is 
estimated to account for between 11 and 26 million tonnes of fish per 
year. At its lowest limit, this is equivalent to 15% of annual marine 
catches (Lovin 2011:13-15). Accordingly, the Environmental Justice 
Foundation’s action focusses on reporting the extensive IUU exploitation 
of West African fisheries by foreign perpetrators, especially off the coasts 
of Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Liberia (EJF 2012:6).  
 
Many analysts also identify IUU fishing as the root cause of piracy in the 
Horn of Africa (Onuoha 2009:41, Kisiangani 2010:362). Foreign fleets that 
take advantage of the lack of governance ashore, are leveraged in illegal 
fishing up to and over exploitation levels31 and also dumping of toxic 
waste in Somali territorial waters (Ama Osei-Tutu 2011). These dual 
iniquities illustrate how interrelated maritime security challenges are. The 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(USA), Mauritius, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Vincent, Sri Lanka, Tuvalu, Vanuatu (see 
http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm ) [accessed 10 March 2014]. 
31 “It is estimated that annually between $4-9billion is generated from this illegal activity with 
encroachment in Sub-Saharan Africa’s waters amounting to about $1billion. With no effective 
authority over the territorial waters of Somalia, these fishing fleets have taken control of the 3,300km 
coastline available to Somalia and its abundant marine resources. It is estimated that annually about 
700 international vessels illegally poach in Somali territorial waters exploiting species of high value 
such as deep-water shrimps, lobsters, tuna and sharks”(Ama Osei-Tutu 2011:10) 
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extent of their interaction and interconnectedness is reflected to a great 
extent in the following post on the US Department of State’s official blog: 
 
 
Besides the illegal dumping of toxic waste products on Somali 
shores, much of the problems associated with the root causes of 
piracy could have been prevented had the international community 
addressed the illegal fishing in Somali waters by western companies 
that have taken an estimated $300 million a year from Somali 
fishermen, whereas pirating made the Somalis about $100 million … 
And those arguing for the Somali case do admit that there are 
pirates who are simply gangsters, particularly in West Africa, but 
piracy is not a new phenomenon. Somali pirates have been active 
since the early 90s, and it’s pretty pathetic that the only time the 
international community will scream bloody murder is when piracy 
threatens trade in one of the busiest trade routes in the world, a 
route that is busier than the Suez and Panama canals combined. 
 
There's a reason why 70% of Somali citizens support these pirates: 
because they bring with them revenue to spend in Somali markets so 
that average Somalis are now making money too. No one cared 
when fisherman were losing their livelihood or when the Somali 
economy continued to spiral downwards forcing its citizens to live 
below subhuman conditions ... but now that Somalis are acting out 
we're going to label them as the bad guys because they're 
threatening our livelihood. Yes, it is politics, but it's in the interest of 
the international community to address the root cause of the 
problem in most cases: economic injustice caused by the backlash of 
globalization in these areas. I'm not against globalization in all its 
forms, but if there is not a more humane face to it, things will not 
improve (McKeeby 2009). 
 
 
5.2.2.5 Marine pollution and natural disasters’ management 
Breaches of environmental laws and regulations can threaten maritime 
security in a variety of ways, including loss of marine habitats, loss of 
species and reduced fish catch, coral bleaching and decreased 
biodiversity. Through these, such breaches can directly impact the social 
and economic interests of coastal states. This can consequently lead to 
direct conflict, or exacerbate other causes of conflict, such as poverty, 





Not every breach leads to a threat to maritime security; however, 
intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment can be on 
such a scale that it threatens the security of one or more states. The link 
between organised crime and pollution has also become increasingly 
evident, as shown by work undertaken by INTERPOL. Furthermore, the EU 
is investigating potential links between the South Italian mafia and Somali 
piracy, and specifically the possibility that the former provides small arms 
and the latter permits dumping of toxic waste (Rettman 2012). 
 
The recent incidents of the oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico and the North 
Sea increased the awareness of governments, companies and 
environmental entities, since they caused unprecedented disasters to the 
marine ecosystem. Clearly, this also has serious consequences for 
development, tourism, food security and fishing opportunities. Moreover, 
the tsunami that hit Japan’s coast in 2011, stressed the need for proper 
infrastructure and early warning mechanisms in order to cope with natural 
disasters and provide civil society with the required sense of ‘freedom 
from fear’. 
 
5.2.2.6 Port security 
Significant among the difficulties in controlling all these maritime security 
challenges (international arms movements, drug trade, smuggling and 
trafficking of migrants, IUU fishing etc.) are the inadequate flag state and 
port state controls.  
 
UNCLOS (Section 6, Article 217) requires flag states to assert effective 
control over ships flying their flag. In addition, its provisions regarding 
transit passage (Part III, Section 2, Articles 37-44), innocent passage 
(Part III, Section 3, articles 17-26), archipelagic sea lanes passage (Part 
IV, Article 53), and the contiguous zone (Part IV, Section 4, Article 33) 




The monitored use of container ships in reported destabilising commodity 
transfers is indicative of the current port insecurity. The increase in this, 
as well as the increase of incidents overall is shown in Figure 12, below. 
 
Figure 12: The use of container ships in reported destabilising commodity transfers 
(Griffiths and Jenks 2012:36) 
 
 
A precondition for the exploitation of sea routes by all legal and illegal 
actors is the existence and accessibility of port facilities. Hence, proper 
port controls, efficient port authorities and law enforcement agencies, 
could thwart all the criminal activities cited above as security challenges of 
the maritime domain ashore, even before sailing. This would 
simultaneously enhance the security of the maritime supply-chain and 
also of the hinterland (Banomyong 2005, Blümel et al. 2008). However, 
this process is further complicated by the trend towards privatising most 
major ports, which results in the privatisation of their security as well, 
thus reducing the state’s jurisdiction and engagement as security 
provider. 
 
It might sound like an oxymoron, but modern technological advancements 
could pose another risk to vessels, port facilities, infrastructure and 
security as a whole. The increasing dependence of maritime activity on 
information and communication technology (ICT) for a variety of essential 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
125 
 
operations such as navigation, freight management, traffic control, 
creates various vulnerabilities in terms of cyber-crime. Thus,  the task of 
enhancing their security against potential cyber-attacks becomes critical in 
ensuring security per se (ENISA 2011:3).  
 
Besides the interconnectedness between all the maritime security 
challenges cited above, at this point we can also identify interactions 
between maritime and other forms of contemporary threats to global 
security. According to the 2011 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Program (AMAP) report, sea level is projected to rise by 0.9 to 1.6 meters 
by 2100, almost five times more than measured in their previous one in 
2007 (AMAP 2012:ix). Obviously, this long-term rise in sea level will affect 
livelihood and critical port infrastructure with catastrophic effects in littoral 
states’ trade, economy and development (Barnett and Adger 2003:323). 
At the same time, this clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of the 
maritime sector from ‘threats without an enemy’, such as the environment 
per se (Barnett 2010:228-232). 
 
 
5.3 Historical Overview of Piracy 
5.3.1. Piracy as an ancient phenomenon  
In the Western world, piracy was a constant feature of the political 
geography of ancient littoral communities along the Mediterranean 
coastline from 2,000 B.C, when the history of piracy began in the Minoan 
civilisation. During that era, the Minoan civilisation dominated the 
microcosm of the eastern Mediterranean and King Minos was the first to 
form a navy. The purpose of this was to defeat the piracy and plunder 
that was perpetrated by raiding communities along the Greek coastline, 
islands and on the island of Crete. The intention was also to assert control 
over the Aegean Sea so as to establish legitimate trade and settlements 
on the Aegean islands (De Souza 1999:17-25).  
 
The Ancient Greek language contains two particularly relevant words that 
are related to the modern translation of pirates: leistes and peirates. The 
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former, found in Homer's works and in literature throughout the Greek 
Classical era, means "booty" or "plunder" and it came to describe what 
today we call the perpetrator of armed robbery. The latter term, peirates, 
also used during the same period, comes from the word peira meaning 
"trial" or "attempt". This  was  the antecedent of ‘pirate’ in English and  
eventually became distinguished from that of ‘leistes’ or ‘bandit’ by the 
pirates’ use of ships to facilitate maritime armed robbery (Blumberg 
2013). 
 
During the 13th century BC, sea raids were recorded from the Aegean and 
Adriatic against the coastal communities of Asia Minor and Egypt, reaching 
up to the Nile Delta. Later on, the Phoenicians, who were based in the 
Levant, expanded their area of raids as far west as Spain. The fact that 
they also offered mercenary services to the Persian Empire in terms of 
contracted naval forces blurred the distinction between piracy and naval 
warfare for that era. It also represents the first known case of private 
contractors providing an armed service for a ‘state’s’ armed forces 
(Kraska 2011:10-14). 
 
Towards the end of the 8th century BC, Homer, in his famous epic poem 
Odyssey, describes Crete anew as a maritime piracy sanctuary, which was 
later fought by the great naval power of that era, the city-state of Athens. 
Later, Thucydides described the co-existence and blurred distinction 
between piracy and warfare during the major Peloponnesian War (431-
404 BC). When the Kingdom of Macedon rose as a great power of that 
era, joint initiatives were undertaken with the city state of Athens, aiming 
at suppressing piracy and denying pirates access to their sanctuaries and 
safe havens (De Souza 1999:26-41).    
    
During the late 4th and early 3rd centuries BC, Tyrrhenian pirates were 
considered as a major problem in Magna Graecia32 and in parts of the 
Aegean. The references to the evidence are very diverse in terms of 
location and possible identity of the pirates, so a common origin to the 
                                                          
32 Latin term meaning ‘Great Greece’: group of ancient Greek cities along the coast of Southern Italy, 
an important centre of Greek civilisation and trade. See 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/356847/Magna-Graecia  [accessed 10 April 2014]  
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various groups cannot be ascribed with certainty. Hence, most likely this 
label applied to maritime armed robbers suspected to be from Italy, and 
this form of piracy manifested as a result of the increasing intensity of 
seafaring activity of that era. Again, some of the fundamental causal 
factors of the crime – maritime traffic density due to trade and military 
expeditions, political instability among Greeks or Italians - contributed to 
the existence and flourishing of piracy (De Souza 1999:50-53). Even in 3rd 
century BC, there is evidence that the release of pirates’ prisoners after 
payment of ransom was a typical objective of pirates (De Souza 1999:65-
69).         
 
By the end of the 3rd century BC, the Roman Empire conducted a series of 
expeditions against pirates across the Dalmatian coast on the Adriatic 
(contemporary Croatian) coastline. Later, in 122BC they conquered the 
Balearic Islands (located in the West Mediterranean between Spain and 
Algeria) with the justification of piracy suppression. In 102BC, an 
expedition under the leadership of Markus Antonius resulted in the 
occupation of the Cilician territory. The Cilicians were among the most 
notorious pirates in Asia Minor (today’s Turkey) in ancient times, 
plundering coastal communities and disrupting the trade lines from the 
Middle East. However, even at the time it was questioned whether the aim 
of Markus Antonius’ expedition was to deny pirates a safe haven or if this 
was just a legitimisation for the further expansion of the empire.   
 
Almost 30 years later, even the famous Julius Caesar’s ship was attacked 
by pirates while en route to the island of Rhodes. It was held in captivity 
for 38 days until the requested ransom was paid. Later on, in 68BC, 
General Pompey launched one of Rome’s greatest anti-piracy naval 
campaigns against Cilician pirates. Leading a fleet of 500 ships with 
120,000 Roman troops on board, he covered all the Mediterranean 
starting from Gibraltar and sailing eastwards. In the last battle, close to 
their sanctuary (in modern Turkey), more than five hundred pirate ships 
were destroyed and 10,000 pirates were killed in battle or executed. This 
was the first time in history when the Mediterranean was clear of pirates 




Although there are limited available sources citing piracy after pirates’ 
slaughter from Pompey, it seems that piracy was an issue in the 
Mediterranean, even until the late 1st century BC. Sources stressing the 
importance of Pompey’s campaign success highlight also the implications 
of the removal of pirates from the sea and the restoration of food supplies 
to Rome. Yet, this attempt to downgrade pirate activity is ascribed to 
strengthening Pompey’s profile for political reasons. Hence, 
underreporting is also evident in that era, again providing a false image of 
their status and activity in the region. Furthermore, the campaign to raise 
Pompey’s profile, on top of the suppression of piracy, built on the 
legitimisation of Rome’s control over Syria, Cilicia, Cyprus and Crete in 
terms of denying pirates their safe havens. This also proves that the naval 
projection of power and geopolitical interests were linked with the 
legitimisation of anti-piracy operations, even in the Graeco-Roman world 
(De Souza 1999:179-80).   
 
Still, the suppression of pirates was a task for the standing armed forces 
the Roman Emperors to maintain. Although the navy’s main task was to 
carry out maritime operations in wartime, they were supposed to take 
action and ensure the freedom of civilians and military personnel, protect 
coastal infrastructure and settlements and prevent navigation by hostile 
forces within the area of Roman influence. All these operations, other than 
traditional naval warfare, fall under the suppression of piracy activities 
(De Souza 1999:204-205).   
        
During this late Roman period, the Vikings started their raids from 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden against coastal communities in England, 
Scotland, Ireland, France, and even Eastern and Southern Europe via the 
river-ways. This ‘Viking Age’ was characterised by both seaborne trade 
and plunder, since due to the tough Scandinavian climate the region was 
unable to support the expanding population. Hence, since it was easier 
and faster to travel by sea than by land, the Vikings were led to seek 
conquests, settlements and colonies abroad. By the end of the 9th century, 
large Scandinavian settlements in Britain and many British isles were 
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established, providing a vast income for the Vikings from tribute 
payments (Kraska 2011:14-16).   
 
In the Middle Ages and the early modern period, the Ottoman Empire 
employed piracy at the strategic level, aiming at enriching the caliphate’s 
treasury end expanding its conquests. To this end, they used their North 
African principalities as bases for employing maritime piracy as a method 
of warfare against the Christian kingdom of the West. Hence, Muslim 
Piracy expanded dramatically in the early 16th century, when Barbary 
corsairs, along with Islamic fleets from Turkey and Arabia, conducted a 
continuous campaign of terror and plunder against the European coasts 
until the 19th century.  
 
Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli and Morocco, although they remained under 
Ottoman rule, exercised greater autonomy, due to their issuing 
permission for pirates to operate from their ports. The notorious 
Barbarossa brothers – Aruj and Khayr ad-Din - led the piracy campaign in 
the Mediterranean against South East Europe. They were born in Greece 
but converted to Islam and resettled in Tunis, where the governor offered 
them his protection in exchange for one-fifth of their booty. In 1518, their 
fleet was wrecked in Algiers by a force of 10,000 soldiers led by Charles V. 
Although Aruj was killed, his brother continued his raids until 1546, 
conducting numerous attacks against Christian communities in Spain, 
Italy and Greece. It is estimated that between 1580 and 1680, more than 
850,000 Christians from the shores of Europe were enslaved by Barbary 
corsairs and forcibly carried back to North Africa. But Christian entities, 
such as the Knights of Saint John, were also enslaving Muslims and using 
them to row their galleys, and for construction labour or profit. Hence, the 
slave market in Malta was as active and busy as in Algiers and 
Constantinople, relating the concept of piracy of that era with that of ‘faith 
slavery’ (Kraska 2011:20-22).  
 
Between 1650 and 1720, when English and French power displaced 
Spanish authority from the Caribbean, pirates who were not in the service 
of any state became very successful in the region. Operating from the 
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lawless British port of Port Royal in Jamaica and the French settlement in 
Tortuga, they targeted Spanish colonies and shipping in the Caribbean 
and Eastern Pacific. They sailed as far as West Africa and the Indian 
Ocean, demonstrating that no merchant vessel was safe from attack, 
regardless of their flag state (Kraska 2011:30-33).  
 
During this era we also find the ‘Privateers’. These were lawful pirates, 
authorised by their government to attack and pillage ships of enemy 
nations and share their profits with the government. Those privateers who 
operated from bases in the West Indies, and attacked Spanish shipping in 
the Caribbean are known as ‘Buccaneers’. Between the 16th and 18th 
centuries governments issued ‘letters of marque’ which in reality were 
licences for privateers to plunder alien ships without danger of being 
charged with piracy, and consequently punished by the death penalty. 
Francis Drake was England’s most famous privateer; in the 16th century 
he attacked Spanish treasure ships returning from the New World, sharing 
his profits with Elizabeth I, who knighted him for his services (Royal Navy 
2002).  
 
However, piracy declined throughout the 19th century. This was largely 
due to the activities of navy associations with the upgraded authorities 
that the ‘Treaty of Westphalia’ provided to states, as well as the 
technological advancements that converted modern ship’s propulsion to 
steam instead of the wind. As a result, the combination of the Royal 
Navy’s emergence as the guarantor of Pax Brittanica, as well as the 
advantages of its modern ships in terms of firepower, endurance and 
speed at sea, was able to enforce ‘law and order’ at sea, discouraging 
pirates from their activities – at least until the end of the Cold War and 
the emergence of ‘globalisation’ (Kraska 2011:30-33).  
 
5.3.2 Piracy in Asia 
Piracy was ever present throughout Asian history, where the Indian 
Ocean, South and East China Seas were high risk areas for both seafarers 
and coastal communities. In comparison with the Western form of piracy, 
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it was mostly associated with criminal gangs and illicit enterprises which 
resulted in the formation of huge secret societies.   
The notorious Japanese pirates prevailed in the region from the 13th until 
late 16th century, and besides plundering of coastal towns they were also 
renowned for rape and murder. They usually emerged from the marginal, 
poverty stricken littoral communities of fishermen and sailors, who often 
rotated between seafaring and pirating as a survival strategy. Their 
primary targets were the Korean and Chinese coastal cities which suffered 
numerous attacks for centuries. Only in the late 14th – early 15th century, 
did massive Korean defensive attacks against Japanese pirates’ safe 
havens limit the pirates’ activities in the region. The largest one, known as 
the ‘Oei Invasion’, landed 17,000 Korean troops on Tsushima and 
destroyed hundreds of pirate ships, forcing them into peace negotiations. 
 
Later, pirate groups consisted of both Chinese and Japanese due to the 
socio-demographic and economic conditions in China, as well as the 
evolution of piracy throughout the centuries. Hence, piracy in Asia 
reached its zenith in the 17th century when the labouring poor joined the 
marginalised sailors and fishermen. This, combined with imperial 
inattention and lack of resources, enabled piracy to flourish.  
 
By the 19th century, Chinese pirate organisations became extremely 
powerful, to the extent of having a significant effect on black market trade 
for the Chinese economy. One of the largest and most notorious of such 
organisations, known as the ‘Red Flag Fleet’, was formed in 1804 by the 
joint efforts of Zheng Yi and his former prostitute wife Zheng Yi Sao. After 
her husband’s death, she became one of the most powerful and famous 
female pirate-admirals leading a powerful coalition counting 17,000 
followers and 1,500 ships (Kraska 2011:16-20).   
 
Although there was a decline in the phenomenon for over a century 
following this coalition, after World War Two piracy resurfaced in South 
East Asia in the 1950s and 1960s, as colonial powers transferred 
governance to newly independent states. It remained small scale through 
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the 1970s and 1980s till, between 1990 and 1992, the Malacca and 
Singapore Straits developed into a “hot spot” of piracy. Consequently, 
anti-piracy patrols intensified and the International Maritime Bureau’s 
Regional Piracy Reporting Centre was established in Kuala Lumpur. Most 
activity then shifted to the South China Sea, especially the “HLH Terror 
Triangle” between Hong Kong (China), Luzon (Philippines) and Hainan 
(China); albeit the pirate gangs involved there were not the same as 
those in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. After 1995, increased Chinese 
enforcement at sea and in the ports, resulted in the epicentre moving 
back to the Indonesian coast, particularly in the wake of the 1998 collapse 
of the Suharto regime. The 1997 Asian financial crisis coincided with 
increased frequency of attacks until, in 2000-2005, the region reached its 
peak as the global piracy “hot spot”, with South East Asia accounting for 
over half the cases reported worldwide (242 out of 469 attacks) (Banlaoi 
2011:25). 
 
The numerous coasts of Southeast Asia fulfil all the identified criteria for 
the existence of piracy, with its mazes of islands, reefs, sandbars, narrow 
seas with heavy traffic and the fragility (environmental, state and 
economic) of both Indonesia and the Philippines. Smuggling of people and 
goods, as well as IUU overfishing, further exacerbates the situation, with 
an approximate cost of more than $4 billion to the Indonesian 
government. Resultantly, the corruption and drug trafficking associated 
with the Philippines meant the islands have emerged as another epicentre 
of modern piracy. However, under-reporting is another major problem in 
the region (out of 143 known cases of piracy in the Philippines during 
1993, none was officially reported33), which, simultaneously, further 
demonstrates the interaction and interconnectedness of all maritime 
security challenges. 
 
The situation in the Malacca Straits became even more complicated due to 
the widespread cultural acceptance and the regional scope of the 
                                                          
33 According to the Philippines’ Navy and Coast Guard, 1,329 piracy incidents were recorded between 
1993 and 2005 
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phenomenon. Pirates could easily cross boundaries34 after their attack and 
dispose of their cargo in another state, while the men/women controlling 
the operation were maybe based in a third country. Yet, there has been a 
significant decline in piracy activity in recent years,35 ascribed mostly to 
three factors: increased national and regional counter-piracy measures 
and cooperation with international encouragement and support (Murphy 
2009:72-98);36 the effects of the 2004 tsunami on the province of Aceh, 
which destroyed/severely damaged many pirate communities and 
resources; and the significant improvement of governance in Malaysia, 
both in terms of law enforcement and regional cooperation in countering 
piracy. Moreover, additional measures were applied by the littoral states 
in late 2005, such as joint regional naval patrols including airborne assets. 
These demonstrated the continuous efforts for the suppression of piracy in 
the region (Murphy and International Institute for Strategic Studies. 
2007:25-28).      
   
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter used an exploration of the concept of marine security and the 
historical dimensions of piracy to develop an analytical framework that 
facilitated the integration of maritime security into the contemporary 
paradigm of global security, thus fulfilling the second stated objective of 
the thesis (Section 1.1). The relevant issues were considered both from 
the traditional state-centric perspective and the UN human-centric 
approach. The chapter focused on contemporary piracy in particular as a 
diachronic maritime crime, and securitised contemporary threat 
(according to the securitisation approach discussed in Section 2.2.5).  
 
As Till (2007b:32) states, “disorder at sea is most often the consequence 
of disorder on land and that, in consequence, naval activity conducted 
purely at sea usually deals with the symptoms of the problem rather than 
its causes”. Despite this fact, situations will exist where the actions 
                                                          
34 Some of the existing maritime boundaries in the region are still under dispute. 
35 From 80 attacks recorded in 2000 in the Straits, only 19 were reported in 2005.  
36 Many years of Japanese encouragement and the US led Regional Maritime Initiative in 2004, were 
the most important international acts of supressing piracy in the straits.   
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necessary to address root causes on land cannot be taken. In Somalia, 
although the initial cause of piracy was foreign exploitation of their marine 
resources, the on-going situation exists because of the lack of effective 
government throughout much of the country, limited alternative 
employment and lack of Western will to place military forces in the 
country because of previous experience. 
 
Piracy is one of a range of threats both to maritime security and to 
security on land. Its impacts are political, social and economic, at all levels 
- local, national, regional and international. It therefore poses a security 
challenge to be addressed by a range of authorities concerned with 
upholding the rule of law, rather than just by armed forces. Moreover, it 
needs to be treated in conjunction with other threats such as arms 
smuggling and illegal fishing.  
 
The above historical overview of the phenomenon demonstrates that 
piracy is diachronic and all its causal factors remain unchanged, yet 
updated given the advancements and developments in terms of economy, 
technology and organised crime. State fragility has always been a 
precondition in terms of providing a safe haven to pirate groups; and the 
busiest sea lanes and favourable geography has always provided a 
promising reward and risky but lucrative endeavour for seagoing outlaws. 
However, from a closer look at the lessons learned from suppression 
methods used throughout history, it is evident that they were effective at 
regional level only when measures were undertaken ashore. Definitely, 
the author does not recommend a massacre ashore or hanging of the 
perpetrators; yet, non-violent and long term strategies could eliminate at 
least one of the causal factors – such as state fragility and the consequent 
sanctuary provision and human insecurity. This will inevitably disrupt the 
structure of the networks, disable the continuity of pirate activities and 
minimise the social motivation for land-based desperate humans to 
become sea-going criminals.       
 
Piracy not only poses a risk to maritime commerce and seafarers, and 
therefore to food and energy security, but also to the economic and 
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political stability of the countries and regions affected. The risks from 
piracy run through the global supply chain, the just-in-time nature of 
which can only absorb very limited disruption, and also extends into other 
contingent sectors, such as insurance. The causal factors of this maritime 
crime remain more or less the same throughout human history. However, 
the subject of our research – PMSCs - serve as a short term response to 
address the symptoms rather than the root causes, are best understood 
through the human security approach discussed in detail in Section 2.2.4.  
 
Piracy will never be eradicated globally, especially in its subsistence form. 
Where it does occur, efforts should be made to reduce it to, and maintain 
it at or below an internationally agreed level of risk to the conduct of 
lawful activities on the seas. This equates to the approach taken to crime 
on land, where it is recognised that there are insufficient resources to 
eradicate crime completely, but sufficient resources are generally applied 




Chapter Six: Modern Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea: The 
Somali Case  
6.1 Introduction 
Maritime piracy is an historic problem but, although it was in decline for 
almost two decades, it has resurged in recent years. The International 
Maritime Organisation recorded 5,667 piracy attacks against international 
shipping since 1984; in 2009 only, the 406 recorded reports of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea, accounting for an increase of 24.6% (106 more 
attacks) compared to 2008. Similarly, the International Maritime Bureau 
recorded 3,000 maritime piracy attacks worldwide – attempted and 
successful - for the period 2009-2010 (Kraska 2011:1)37.  
 
Figure 13: Maritime Piracy & Trade   (Bowden and Basnet 2012:31) 
 
Some 33,000 ships a year currently transport oil, gas, manufactured 
goods, raw materials and food through shipping lanes around Somalia. As 
Figure 13 demonstrates, millions of tons of seaborne trade depend on the 
                                                          
37 See http://www.icc-ccs.org/icc/imb  
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sea lanes and transit the region’s choke points, which are increasingly 
affected by modern piracy. Reports reveal that modern pirates in the Gulf 
of Aden on the eastern Horn of Africa have captured more than 1,600 
vessels in those waters in the last five years (Smallman 2011).  
 
The above cost paid by the global economy and development is attributed 
to violent non-state actors who have developed methods and capabilities, 
leveraged to challenge this economic order. The root causes of their 
appearance stem from the lack of human security, ineffective social 
security and bad (or even complete absence of) governance in their 
homeland. Additionally, the reluctance of littoral states to occasionally 
exceed their jurisdiction in order to thwart piracy is a primary weakness.38 
Moreover, the absence of a legal system and infrastructure that will 
robustly support their potential effort and the existence of ungoverned 
areas inside their territories due to lack of effective law enforcement both 
conspire to enable the establishment of safe havens for such activities. 
Thus, perceiving contemporary piracy not as a popular lifestyle but as the 
means to survive, these states actually facilitate the disruption of the sea-
based trade and supply chain by revealing their vulnerability to piracy and 
the other forms of maritime crime detailed in the previous chapter. 
Figure 14 shows the three ‘choke-points’ of international shipping 
identified as the most risky in terms of incidence of pirate attacks. These 
lie in relation to reported incidents from 2006-2013 in the Malacca strait in 
South East Asia, the coast of Somalia/ Gulf of Aden and the coast of 
Nigeria/ Gulf of Guinea. All three of these are also directly related to 
energy security as the primary routes of oil tankers towards the energy 
dependent economies of Europe, India, China,39 Japan and US. Inevitably, 
piracy also proves to be interconnected with food, energy and economic 
security. 
                                                          
38 States that have not ratified UNCLOS are not subject to the piracy related clauses & definition. 
Consequently they do not recognise/apply their universal jurisdiction to combat piracy in international 
waters, which is legal in typical terms. This also reflects their reluctance to intervene as well the 
inevitable convenience.  Additionally, if an attack occurs in their territorial waters (i.e. armed robbery 
at sea) and they have no relevant laws to suppress it, there is no international jurisdiction to 
intervene. 
39 China is the world’s second largest importer of crude oil, obtaining 46% of its imports from the 
Middle East and 32% from Africa; see Greenberg, E. L. (2010) 'Dragon Boats: Assessing China’s Anti-
Piracy Operations in the Gulf of Aden ', Defense & Security Analysis, 26(2).  
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Figure 14: International shipping choke points and acts of piracy and armed 
robbery, 2006-2013 (Unitar 2013)  
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can 




Building further on the previous chapter’s established framework, and 
given that PMSCs are primarily used so far as anti-piracy measures 
against Somali piracy, Chapter Six focuses on this specific region which 
forms the focus of the case study of this research. It provides a detailed 
examination of the root causes and develops a typology of piracy, based 
on existing regional distinctions, that complements the typology of private 
security given in Section 2.4.3. The extracted conclusions essentially 
contribute to acquiring a deeper understanding of the situation and a 
holistic picture of the operational environment in which PMSCs have to be 
deployed.      
6.2 Defining Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 
Piracy is an ancient phenomenon, which is described by the international 
law as unique in jurisdictional terms. Since ships of all states are 
threatened, piracy is labelled as “hostis humani generis”,40 hence all 
nations are provided with the authority to assert jurisdiction over pirates, 
the right to self-defence, and also the obligation to suppress it. Things 
become complicated when the suspected pirate ship is of one flag-state 
and has to be stopped, checked or boarded at sea by a war ship of 
another flag state. Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that piracy is 
not an international crime such as genocide that can be prosecuted at the 
International Criminal Court at Le Hague. It is, rather, a “domestic or 
municipal crime of universal jurisdiction” which, according to international 
law, means that this jurisdiction can be enforced through domestic 
criminal law systems (Kraska 2011:106). 
Finally, the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which 
ended in 1982 in Montego Bay, led to the adoption of the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); yet, although 160 
states were party to the convention, it remains, to a great extent, subject 
to ratification by many states (Geiss and Petrig 2011:37-41). 
                                                          
40 ‘Hostis humani generis’  is the legal term meaning ‘enemies of all mankind’  
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In the UNCLOS (Article 101, pp 60-61), piracy is defined as any of the 
following: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of 
depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place 
outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of 
an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described 
in subparagraph (a) or (b).  
 
Accordingly, a pirate ship is defined as such, if 
it is intended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the 
purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101. The 
same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any such 
act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of 
that act (UNCLOS, Article 103, p 61). 
 
Although the term ‘armed robbery at sea’ has been used extensively in UN 
Security Council Resolutions,41 the term does not even appear in the 
UNCLOS. The result is of course the existence of variable interpretations, 
resulting in significant ramifications and limitations.   
In January 2009, the IMO convened a high level meeting between states 
from the Western Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, in 
order to establish a ‘Code of Conduct for the Repression of Piracy and 
Armed Robbery’ against ships in this specific region. The aim was to 
promote regional cooperation and enhance efficiency in preventing, 
interdicting and prosecuting perpetrators of the referred crimes. The 
                                                          
41 See UN Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1838, 1846, 1851, 1897, 1918, etc., all issued between 
2008 and 2010 concerning the situation in Somalia 
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‘Djibouti Code of Conduct’42 – as named since its adoption - defines armed 
robbery at sea as any of the following: 
(a) unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of 
depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of piracy, 
committed for private ends and directed against a ship or against 
persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal 
waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea;  
(b) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act 
described in subparagraph (a).  
(Djibouti Code of Conduct 2009: Art 1 (2), p.8) 
According to the above existing legal framework and by definition the only 
difference between the two forms of crime is that piracy can occur only in 
international waters, hence it is a crime of ‘universal jurisdiction. On the 
other hand, armed robbery against ships can be identified as such only 
when committed in the internal waters or territorial sea of a State. Hereof, 
it is perceived as a primary responsibility for law enforcement of coastal 
states.  
 
6.3 A Typology of Piracy 
This section provides a discussion of the various forms contemporary 
piracy takes. After opening with an in depth look at the recent and current 
situation in Somalia, it then discusses the origins and causal factors before 
giving a comparative overview of different forms piracy takes around the 
world. 
6.3.1. Piracy in Somalia   
The roots of Somali piracy go hand in hand with the political instability 
and state failure experienced back in the late ‘90s when the civil war 
erupted. Siad Barre’s regime was challenged by rebel groups, formed 
along clan lines, from all over the country, due to his many years of 
military campaigns, economic policies and clan-based discriminations. In 
response, in the early 1990s, a coalition of opposition groups descended 
on Mogadishu challenging Barre’s authority and power. This coalition 
comprised the Somali National Movement, drawn from the Isaaq clans of 
                                                          




Somaliland; the Darod-dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front, 
operating from present day Puntland; and the Hawiye United Somali 
Congress (USC) based in the South. His defeat left Mogadishu in chaos 
and the USC’s warlord Mohamed Aidid 
took over, triggering the US 
intervention, known worldwide as 
“Black Hawk Down”. Due to the 
unexpected and unprecedented 
casualties for the US Marines, this 
operation was such a political 
embarrassment that the term the 
“Mogadishu Line” was coined reflecting 
the subsequent US official statement 
and the reluctance to intervene in 
countries where the US has no vital 
interests at stake43. Following this, 
Somalia remained a largely ungoverned 
state and the current situation is 
reflected to a great extent in Figure 15. 
Amid all the calamities and suffering 
that its population experienced ashore due to extreme human insecurity, 
piracy emerged along the coasts. As the central ‘government’ collapsed, 
its ability to control the territorial waters declined even more, and various 
groups of militia, fishermen and former soldiers took advantage of this. 
Pirate attacks emerged all over the Somali coast, initially, as 
opportunistic, unsophisticated and sporadic forms of crime; gunmen using 
skiffs were attacking transiting vessels just a few kilometres from the 
coastline. Foreign fishing trawlers were their most popular target. These 
latter, which were often involved in illegal fishing, had to get closer to the 
coast in search of lobsters and bottom-dwelling fish. In the beginning this 
offered pirates the ‘legitimisation’ of protest against exploitation of Somali 
fisheries. The pirates boarded and stole money or other valuables that 
were easy to transport, or they ‘arrested’ the trawlers and crew for their 
                                                          
43 There were also thousands of Somali casualties but these did not appear to influence policy makers 
or the issues that led to the future reluctance to intervene. 
Figure 15: Who Runs Somalia? 
(Chothia 2013) 
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illegal activities and extorted ‘fines’ for their release. In early 1991, the 
first violent attack occurred off the Puntland coast against the cargo ship 
‘Naviluk’, where three seafarers from the Philippines were transferred 
ashore and executed. The rest of the crew jumped overboard to save their 
lives. In particular, in 1992, Boyah Garaad Mohammed, a pirate group 
leader from Eyl, Puntland, engaged his group in struggles with foreign 
fishing trawlers, claiming the protection of Somali waters against foreign 
exploitation as legitimatisation.  
 
Figure 16: Somali Pirate Attacks per Year & Hijackings per year (Source: Gomez 
& Navaro 2013: 225,229) 
However, from 1994 onward, ‘professional piracy’ emerged, with the 
complete metamorphosis taking place in 2003 as a result of the ‘vision’ of 
a former civil servant from Harardheere, Mohamed Abdi Hassan44.  
                                                          
44 Known as Afweyne (big mouth) 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this 
thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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He formed an organisation which he named ‘Somali Marines’ and 
transformed the ports of Harardheere and Hobyo into the epicentres of 
the pirate world. Hassan had foreseen the business potential that piracy 
had to offer and, by raising money from willing investors, he recruited 
instructors, consultants, negotiators, financial operators, etc., launching 
well organised, sophisticated and military-style professional pirate 
operations. More groups followed this paradigm in the southern port of 
Kismaayo and elsewhere, testing and gradually developing the business 
model of Somali piracy (Bahadur 2011:26-31), resulting in the continuous 
increase in the number of attacks, as shown in Figure 16. 
 
6.3.2. Root Causes and Causal Factors 
The nature and objectives of piracy have not changed throughout the 
ages. The causal factors remain the same: the vast and lawless space of 
the sea; favourable geography; weak or compliant states that provide 
safe havens and sanctuaries; corrupted elites that can protect and get 
benefits from piracy; and economic disruptions that open markets for 
plundered goods. All can enable the promise of reward from the sale of 
these goods, or from seafarers and coastal communities unable to defend 
themselves due to their isolation and/or weakness. Looking back through 
history, the reasons and factors that drove Mediterranean, Chinese or 
Atlantic piracy have only minor differences compared to the contemporary 
forms.  
 
In all forms, it depends on the states per se – both individually and 
collectively - to determine whether piracy will flourish or not (Murphy 
2009:21). Legal and jurisdictional weaknesses are in favour of the pirates. 
The limitations and existing gaps in the UNCLOS’s approach to piracy (as 
analysed in the ‘Law of the Seas’ session), as well as the state’s 
sovereignty issues, pose significant obstacles in the law enforcement 
agencies’ efforts to supress this high risk criminal activity.  
 
Piracy is only sustainable in places that offer the combination of rewarding 
‘hunting grounds’, moderate levels of risk and proximate safe havens; 
145 
 
these are the three criteria which define the favourable geography of 
piracy. As analysed above, from an historical perspective, piracy occurs 
close to coasts or in narrow seas (straits). It is clearly land-based, and 
concentrated in areas that fulfil the above criteria, such as the Caribbean, 
the Gulf of Aden (Somalia), the South China Sea, the Gulf of Bengal and 
the Gulf of Guinea (off Nigeria). In these areas, vessels are forced to 
move closer to the coast for both navigational and commercial reasons, 
offering the ideal prey for the pirates. Furthermore, they are more 
crowded, hence the resultant slower movement of the ships offers more 
targets that are easier to approach and board (Murphy 2009:29-30, 
Murphy and International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2007:14).  
 
State fragility results in disorder and inefficient law enforcement agencies, 
especially when a country is recovering from conflict. Inadequate funding 
and training exacerbate the situation and allow safe havens to be 
available to pirates. The availability to pirates of technologically advanced 
boats (equipped with radars, communications, etc.), shore-based 
command and control facilities of analogous capabilities, and the 
personnel skills and loyalty to their occupation and duties, complete the 
puzzle of preconditions needed for sustainable piracy to exist. The above 
conditions contribute also to the cultural acceptability of the crime since it 
provides income in developing societies, especially in those that are 
marginalised, suffering from post-conflict ramifications, famine, violence, 
etc. The family or clan-based model is most common in these 
circumstances, since the combined insecurity in the political, communal 
and human environments offers many opportunities for trading partners, 
both in terms of goods plundered or ransom payment conduits. 
 
The role of state fragility and effective governance has been officially 
recognised and the need to be addressed has been stressed by 
protagonists in the international community. From the US, Kelly states:  
 
The most durable long-term solution to piracy, the strategic solution, 
is the re-establishment of stability in Somalia. Once Somalia has a 
viable government capable of policing its own territory, piracy will 
fade away. We are encouraged that the end of Somalia's eight-year 
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political transition occurred in September, culminating in a new 
provisional constitution, parliament, and president. Supporting the 
emergence of more effective and responsible governance in Somalia 
will require continued, accountable assistance to build the new 
government's capacity to deal with the social, legal, economic, 
security, and operational challenges it faces. To that end, the United 
States continues to work with our international partners to build a 
durable and responsive central government in Mogadishu while also 
supporting other regional Somali authorities working toward these 
same goals, a “dual-track” policy we have pursued for the better part 
of two years now (Kelly 2012).  
 
In a similar tone, the EU’s statement at the UN Security Council stressed 
anew that the only ‘exit strategy’ is to enhance Somalia’s governance and 
law enforcement infrastructure/capabilities:  
 
Together with the political process, helping Somalis establish their 
own effective security forces is our best exit strategy. The EU is 
therefore training the National Security Forces of Somalia through its 
Training Mission in Uganda (EUTM). This mission includes education 
of trainers, who can then take over the training. To date, the EUTM 
has trained, together with partners, some 1,800 soldiers, specialists, 
trainers and junior leaders, who are now back in Mogadishu to form 
the core of Somalia's National Security Forces. We are currently 
training more trainers and officers to enable them to take command 
and control of the forces. The EU has also funded, through UNDP, the 
training and stipends of 7,000 Somali police forces. 
Since poverty and unemployment are among the drivers of 
piracy, EU development aid programs in areas such as education and 
livelihoods address some root causes on land. The idea is to offer 
young Somalis an alternative to criminal activities, and to ease the 
pressure of unskilled youth from the most underdeveloped regions of 
the country. 
Now is the time to redouble efforts to reach the ultimate goal: 
the transfer of political and security responsibilities to a Somali 
government with broad-based local support. We look forward to the 
UN and the AU exercising decisive leadership to promote peace in 
Somalia. The EU will contribute to attaining this goal with its 
comprehensive approach. At the same time, it is imperative that all 
Somali stakeholders, especially the Transitional Federal Institutions, 
act upon their promises to solve the tremendous political, economic 
and security challenges before them (Mayr-Harting 2012). 
 
 
Finally, the promise of reward is more than a strong motive for the 
perpetrators. Even in cases of opportunistic theft of cash or valuable items 
from the crews (as occurs in the case of Malacca Straits), a share of 
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$1,000 for each member is a great incentive, given that the average 
income in those countries is around $150 per month. Furthermore, taking 
into account that the average ransom for hijacked ships in Somalia is 
more than $5 million, or an oil cargo theft in Nigeria can be resold or 
bartered, the piracy crime is a lucrative perspective for societies living in 
poverty (Mayr-Harting 2012:29-45; 13-18).      
 
Piracy is primarily a threat to all seafarers transiting high risk areas. But 
in terms of human factors, local communities and villages around the 
pirate sanctuaries are also at risk, due to their coexistence with both 
perpetrators and ‘officials’ organising the crime. As a land-based activity 
its sustainability and ability to flourish depends on land-based support, 
infrastructure and freedom of movement. But another critical factor is the 
existence of corruption and links to organised crime networks. Being a 
branch of organised crime itself, it fulfils all the defined criteria established 
for labelling organised crime: organised to commit crime; links that enable 
the leaders to control it; use of violence, intimidation and corruption to 
earn profits or control territories or markets; the ability to launder its 
proceeds of illicit activities and the use of these to infiltrate the legitimate 
economy; its ability to expand into new activities and beyond its national 
borders; and its ability to cooperate with other organised crime groups.  
 
Given their mobility and flexibility, it is difficult to discriminate a skiff with 
pirates from another with fishermen. And the same boat or group can 
usually also be involved in drug, weapon or human smuggling, without the 
need of reconfiguring the boat or their operational model. Furthermore, 
the interaction between organised crime and pirate groups is essential to 
the exchange of ransom money for equipment, weapons and fuel. By 
definition, the motive and objective for all of these is financial profit 
(Murphy 2009:162-170).  
 
Potential links between piracy and terrorism have also been broadly 
discussed and analysed. Yet, there is no evidence that pirate groups 
cooperate with terrorist organisations or insurgent groups. Moreover, 
while the former have economic motivation, the latter aim at political 
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gains. There might however be an indirect link between terrorism and 
organised piracy, in terms of exchanging money for other goods, but not 
for cooperating in joint ventures (Murphy 2009:159-161). On the contrary 
there are reports about clashes between them for access to air-drops of 
ransom money, rather than of sharing it.    
 
 
6.3.3 Operational Models and Objectives 
The analysis of current piracy practices highlights the fact that piracy, in 
all but its most basic, subsistence form, has a business model to support 
its activities. In general, business models are based upon financial 
incentives, and personal gain is certainly a key driver for outbreaks of 
piracy. However, it is also evident that, in piracy, the motives (e.g. 
poverty, political grievance, etc.), structures (i.e. small and loose rather 
than large and rigid organisational structures), forms of support (e.g. 
government, community, etc.) and tactics (e.g. the use of children) often 
differ from mainstream criminality. Therefore, when considering the piracy 
business/operational model, these other factors also need to be 
recognised, and may lead some to prefer to develop a hybrid form of 
model which take these into account. 
Understanding this business model is therefore vital if operational 
responses are to be targeted in a way that will have most adverse impact 
on the pirates’ ability to operate. However, the exact form of the business 
model in use depends on a variety of factors, and it will vary in exact form 
from region to region, and even within different parts of a country. 
Operational responses that are successful in working to break the 
business model in one area may therefore not work in another area if the 
business model operates in a different way.  
Moreover, a specific business model must not constrain the sorts of 
approach that might be applied in the effort to counter it, since it must be 
recognised that different organisations responsible for planning and 
conducting operational responses will have a different perspective on the 
model. Pirates are also adaptive. As a result, applying pressure to the 
business model will cause the model to be adjusted, as can their own 
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desire to increase their revenue. Consequently, agencies and 
organisations involved in countering piracy must be at least as adaptive if 
they are to be able to react to changes in a timely manner or, ideally, to 
pre-empt those changes. 
 
6.3.3.1 Focusing on Somalia’s model 
The ‘modern pirates’ of Somalia are not interested in the ships or their 
cargoes per se, since the ports they use do not have port facilities where 
they could unload shipments. The lack of infrastructure for the transport 
and resale of plundered goods imposes another constraint as well as 
providing suitable conditions for the current piracy business model to 
thrive. 
 
Figure 17: Seafarers Attacked in 2010-2011 (Source: IMB 2012:6-7) 
 
The issue that sets the Somali business model apart is the practice of 
demanding a ransom for the crew and vessel. This explains to a great 
extent the high number of seafarers being attacked by Somali pirates in 
2010-11, as presented in Figure 17. Although this model does occur 
elsewhere, it is much less usual and such incidents are outnumbered by 
piracy for theft of material possessions, money, cargo or the vessel itself. 
Analysts argue that this is only possible in the Somali case because of the 
poor governance along much of Somalia’s coast. This in turn provides 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this 
thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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many options for safe havens in which to hold the captured vessels until 
they are released. It has also been suggested that this permissive 
environment exists because much of Somalia lies between a state of total 
anarchy and one of full and effective governance: there is sufficient 
stability to allow piracy and all of its supporting mechanisms to thrive, but 
not enough to provide a level of security that would prevent it. That is, 
the state has the infrastructure necessary to support the survival of a 
community but not to the extent that it is able to enforce internationally 
recognized laws (Sloan and Griffiths 2012:30).  
 
Percy and Shortland’s analysis (2011:13) supports this by suggesting that 
piracy benefits from sufficient stability to allow pirates to do business, 
since “pirates need an infrastructure and stable business environment: 
hostages need to be fed, to be provided with a certain level of care, and 
be under the pirates’ control so that they can be ransomed”. In most 
cases, this is achieved by keeping captives on board their hijacked 
vessels, but this could change (and already has on occasion) if pirate 
bases and anchorages come under increased pressure from security 
forces. In sum, the same authors state that Somalia “represents the 
perfect collision of means (extensive small arms), motive (poverty) and 
opportunity (lack of governmental authority and proximity to shipping) for 
effective pirate operations” (Percy and Shortland 2011:5).  
 
As a result, Somali pirates currently only foresee gaining ransom for 
releasing captured vessels and (living) crews. The amount for this can 
range from $2 to $5 million per ship. Hence, there is no logical or practical 
reason for killing hostages. On the contrary, this action deprives them of 
the profit from pirating operations, which is their primary objective and 
motivation (Middleton 2008). The above assertions are further fostered by 
the fact that in many other cases (such as in Sri Lanka where poor 
fishermen boats were seized, or in Bangladesh where crewmembers were 
captured from poor states), the captured people were released since the 





Pirate groups are mostly clan-oriented and their structure follows the 
military hierarchy standards. Each group is divided in subgroups with an 
‘operational leader’ for each one. Their operational capabilities were 
dramatically expanded by the use of ‘mother ships’, in terms of operating 
in rough seas during the monsoons’ period, as well as the expansion of 
their operations’ area. The expansion over the time period 2005 - 2011 is 
clearly presented in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18: Expansion of Pirate Attacks 2005-2011 (IntLawGrrls 2011) 
 
The use of mother ships enables skiffs to be loaded on board bigger 
fishing vessels with greater autonomy. Through this practice, attacking 
vessels transiting at greater distances from the Somali coast became 
feasible, thus offering many more potential targets. When these ships 
were registered as ‘wanted’ by the multinational forces operating in the 
area, hijacked ships were used as mother ships, so approaching targeted 
ships did not raise awareness or suspicions.  
 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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Financiers are responsible for funding the whole operation, including 
recruitment, investment in weapons, equipment, supplies and deposits for 
the pirates’ families before leaving for operations at sea. Better educated 
group members are assigned with logistics’ issues, such as responsibility 
for fuel supplies, vehicles and weapons through the established networks 
in the region. Those who are multi-lingual were assigned as negotiators; 
they are the only ones in contact with the shipping companies managing 
the hijacked ship. They negotiate the required ransom throughout the 
whole captivity period, the frequency and permission for the captured 
crew’s communication with their families and the company to ensure that 
they are known to be safe. At the final stage, they also negotiate the 
ransom air drop.  
 
Ransom is always delivered by air drops. Picture 3, below, shows this 
operation in the 2008 case of the Saudi-owned super tanker ‘Sirius Star’.45 
Foreign companies based in the neighbouring Djibouti are contracted for 
this purpose. After the ransom is agreed by both sides, the money 
transfer through bank(s) account(s) is finalised and a small plane 
departed from the adjacent country.  
 
 
Picture 3: Ransom drop (Bowden and Basnet 2012:13) 
                                                          
45 The Liberian-flagged tanker, owned by the Saudi Arabian based Saudi Aramco, and operated by 
Vela International was attacked more than 450 nautical miles off the African coast on November 15, 
2008. The crew of 25 Croatian, British, Philippine, Polish, and Saudi Arabian seafarers were held 
hostage. 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this 




After locating the ship in her exact position, it takes an aerial picture of 
the crew, which is gathered on the main deck, so that the shipping 
company can confirm that they were all safe and then authorise the 
‘payment’.  
After the plane delivers the ransom by airdrop to the ship (she could be 
either at anchor or underway), the heads of the pirate group count the 
money and if everything is according to the agreement, the ship is 
released. It is in the pirates’ ‘code of honour’ that the same ship is never 
attacked and hijacked twice. The final stage includes the ransom sharing. 
Part of this goes to the local community, through local elders, negotiators, 
logistics’ ‘managers’, and the pirates take their share accordingly. 
However, the lion’s share is siphoned to the major leaders of the group(s).  
 
This model led the EU to make the following statement:  
Efforts need to continue to pursue piracy network leaders, financiers 
and instigators and to tracking and disrupting financial flows. Their 
"risk/reward" ratio needs to increase, and the underlying business 
model needs to be broken. - The EU is actively supporting Interpol in 
its work to improve the evidence base and capacities of countries in 
the region to investigate crimes of piracy ... EU Member States, 
supported by EUROPOL, are also active in investigations and 
prosecution efforts” (Vrailas 2012). 
 
6.3.3.2 West Africa 
In the Gulf of Guinea, and especially off Nigeria, the situation is different; 
militancy and organised crime, including piracy and armed robbery, are 
long established facts of daily life across the region. The Niger Delta in 
particular, has a long history of politically and economically motivated 
militancy and violence on its waterways. This has been largely targeted at 
the oil industry, and oil theft (bunkering) is estimated to have cost Nigeria 
approximately US$90-100 billion between 2003 and 2008 (Coventry 
Cathedral 2009:193) and US$7Bn in 2011 (Alohan 2011).46  
                                                          
46 A comprehensive overview of bunkering within the Niger Delta is available in the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime’s report (2009), Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West 
Africa - A Threat Assessment, pp. 20-26. 
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For almost three and a half decades following the end of the Biafran War, 
the Nigerian coast was the hot spot of piracy in Africa. There were several 
reasons for this dubious distinction. First, Nigeria was the most developed 
country in sub-Saharan Africa. Its economic base, spurred by agricultural 
expansion and crude-oil exploration, propelled it into prosperity. This 
economic expansion opened up new trade avenues with the rest of the 
world. At the same time, Nigeria’s navigable waters and extensive 
coastline made maritime trade possible with other countries, particularly 
those in Europe. Moreover, the increasing economic expansion and trading 
possibilities were coupled with a rapidly increasing population. Nigeria’s 
population grew from 55 million in 1963 to 82 million in the early 1980s 
and in 2009 it was more than 150 million.  
 
      Picture 4: Niger Delta & Piracy (Spiegel 2010) 
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However, the economic expansion that the country experienced did not 
keep up with the geographic demographic expansion. Wealth was 
concentrated in a few hands while poverty became more pervasive and 
the booming maritime trade became a casualty to those trying to alleviate 
poverty by illicit means. Poverty-stricken populations embraced the quick 
finance provided by the activities of criminal cartels as the only viable 
option to alleviate their situation (Anyu and Moki 2009:97-8). 
Attacks are usually perpetrated by heavily-armed pirates in coastal waters 
and rivers (as shown in Picture 4) against vessels associated with the 
offshore oil and gas industry. The ‘revenue’ from their activities is also 
used for financing organised crime activities and they are much more 
violent than on the Somali coast. Loss of life and crew members’ 
kidnapping for ransom is frequent, while the ships themselves are not 
usually hijacked (Bateman 2010:16). 
 
The attacks off Nigeria, and Benin in particular, have included hijackings 
of tankers and offshore installations in order to offload the oil and product 
cargoes for subsequent disposal on the black market (Smith 2011). In an 
official statement to the UN Security Council, the EU stated: 
 
Although there are differences in methodology - pirates in the Gulf of 
Guinea focus more on cargo than hostage taking - the destabilizing 
and detrimental effects on the fishery, trade and development of the 
local population are similar. Through the Critical Maritime Routes 
programme, the EU is supporting countries in the Gulf of Guinea to 
establish regional maritime security mechanisms, share information 
and coordinate law enforcement” (Vrailas 2012).  
 
Figure 19, below, demonstrates the ten-year correlation between violence 
in the Niger Delta primary oil infrastructure, pirate attacks and Nigeria’s 
oil production; findings suggest that onshore violence is inversely related 
to the oil production, while pirate attacks appear to mirror onshore 
disorder and demonstrate an inverse relationship to production rates. But 
pirate activity is not restricted to the Delta region. It is increasingly a 
feature of territorial waters and beyond, where experience gained in the 
Delta region is used to seize relatively lootable offshore ships and 





Figure 19: Nexus between Niger Delta violence, pirate attacks and oil production 
(Abell, 2013)   
 
Off Lagos and South-West Nigeria, piracy has traditionally been of a 
subsistence (rural pirate) character, with relatively small groups preying 
on ships as they approach Lagos port. More recently, it appears that these 
groups have become increasingly organised and more violent, to some 
extent copying the tactics of Niger Delta piracy (Hansen T. H and Stephen, 
D.  2011), as well as continuing existing practices. Some analysts believe 
that the amnesty deal that was offered in the Niger Delta in 2009 actually 
drove the militants and gangsters offshore in pursuit of seaborne business 
opportunities. However, it is of note that the number of piracy incidents 
reported off Nigeria dropped by just over 25% in the year that the 
amnesty for militants was declared, although part of this reduction may 
have been the result of local elections, many of the root causes of piracy 
in this area being political. 
 
The co-coordination of attacks with the subsequent offloading of cargo 
and its resale on the commercial market indicates a high degree of 
organisation and enabling corruption, and that practices have been 
exported from the many years of similar activity within the Niger Delta 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis 
can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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area. This illustrates the ability of pirates to adopt practices from other 
forms of organised crime or terrorism/insurgency, and to use the same 
infrastructure. The practice of using mother ships to support pirate 
operations is a further example of pirates’ adaptability. It is apparent that, 
as vessels have moved away from the piracy hotspots off the coast of 
Lagos to conduct ship-to-ship transfer operations elsewhere, the pirates 
have followed further offshore where the practice of waiting in the region 
while awaiting orders, increases the time in which vessels are at risk. The 
pirate groups also moved along the coast to neighbouring Benin, 
particularly off the port of Cotonou (UK P&I Club 2011) and Togo.  
 
Reports suggest that the increased number of attacks off Benin and Togo 
in 2011 may have been the result of activities by organised gangs in 
Nigeria that have been forced to look for targets elsewhere because of 
increased Nigerian counter-piracy patrols and activity. The dominance of 
oil-product related attacks off West Africa indicates that the current 
business model is focused mainly on the capture, trans-shipment and 
subsequent resale of such products on the commercial market. Figures 20 
and 21 below, present the number of pirate attacks by location from 2007 
- 2012, according to UNODC statistics. The two diagrams show clearly 
that Nigeria has the highest number of attacks with 204 incidents reported 
and recorded. 
Consequently, piracy and armed robbery in the region increasingly 
attracts international attention, since 2012 marked the first time that the 
reported number of ships and seafarers attacked overtook that in the 
Western Indian Ocean. Hence, Lloyd’s further extended the West African 
high risk area in Nigeria’s and Benin’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs), 
Togo’s EEZ has been added too. Moreover, the IMB warns that on top of 
those already mentioned, Cote d’Ivoire broadens the list of piracy and 





 Figure 20: W. Africa Piracy Attacks by location (UNODC 2013:47) 
 




Nevertheless, there are also instances of other types of vessels being 
attacked, and of crews being held for ransom. The latter practice could be 
the result of pirates learning from the Somali business model, although 
such tactics have also been a feature of attacks by insurgents in the Niger 
Delta, so they could equally well be an extension of that business model.  
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis 
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6.3.3.3 South East Asia 
A striking feature of contemporary piracy in South East Asia, as also seen 
in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea, is the migration of “hot 
spots”, with changing circumstances.  
 
 
Approximately 50,000 ships, carrying one-third of the globe’s trade, 
annually transit the Malacca straits. Pirates in the area sometimes wear 
military uniforms to appear to be legitimate maritime security forces. After 
stripping fishing vessels of their equipment, typically pirates demand 
‘protection money’ that varies from $3000 to more than $12,000. These 
criminal acts are unfolding in one of the world’s busiest waterways, , as 
illustrated in Figure 21, making effective patrolling especially challenging 
(Wilson 2009:493).  
  
Piracy in South-East Asia occurs mainly against ships at anchor or in ports 
of Indonesia, the Philippines and Viet Nam and is a form of opportunistic 
theft. A second type of piracy occurs in the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore when ships are underway; armed pirates board vessels to steal 
cash and valuables, but they rarely use violence. The last type of piracy in 
the region is the theft or hijacking of an entire ship, aiming to turn it into 
Figure 22: SE Asia Piracy  (BBC 2002) 
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a “Phantom ship”.47 Commercial vessels targeted in South East Asia 
currently include a full range of vessel types, although there is a focus on 
vulnerable tugs, small tankers and other small craft. Most attacks occur to 
the east and south of the Malacca and Singapore Straits (ReCAAP 2011) 
outside the area on which maritime patrol activity concentrates. 
 
The perpetrators of marine piracy in South East Asia (and beyond) can be 
distinguished between two broad types: local opportunists and organised 
criminals. As Liss (2011:40-1) suggests, the “vast majority of pirate 
attacks today are simply hit-and-run robberies committed by what can 
best be described as sea robbers, [while the] second group of pirates are 
characterized by a much higher level of sophistication”. Localized piracy is 
usually, but not always, opportunistic and community-based, and is 
analogous to municipal petty crime and street gangs that operate without 
any notable supporting organisation. Organised piracy, on the other hand, 
is usually, but not always, transnational and analogous to large biker 
gangs, Mafiosi and other criminal syndicates. Even though the eventual 
choice of the specific target may be opportunistic, in this form the activity 
relies on a well-founded support structure that forms part of the business 
model. If the conditions allow, opportunist pirates may evolve to become 
organised, but in both cases there must be an enabling cultural and social 
environment that permits criminal groups or sub-cultures to flourish. 
Piracy is, after all, a group activity. Frécon (2011:384) suggested the 
evocative terms for piracy in South East Asia: ‘countryside pirate’ and 
‘town pirate’. The countryside pirates are normally born in the area in 
which they operate, and are less demanding than the town pirate. In 
contrast, the town pirates have generally migrated to the area in which 
they operate, and are braver and less scared by counter-piracy patrols. 
 
In the first quarter of 2011, nine incidents were reported off Malaysia 
(where vessels were boarded in seven incidents by robbers armed with 
guns and knives), which is in sharp contrast to the 38 attacks recorded for 
                                                          
47 Ships were hijacked with the objective of giving them a false identity and fraudulent registration 
documents. Measures taken such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code reduced the 
phenomenon, but smaller ships which do not have to meet these requirements are still occasionally 
hijacked in the region. See Bateman (2010:15-16). 
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2004. This is despite a series of proactive counter-piracy measures that 
the littoral states of the Straits — Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore — 
undertaken since 2004. These included surveillance and reconnaissance of 
the Straits through coordinated sea and air patrols; intelligence sharing 
and security enhancement; and the engagement of the US with the 
Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). Under this latter initiative, 
the US deployed Marines and Special Forces with high-speed boats to 
combat terrorism, piracy, gun-running and drug smuggling (Sakhuja 
2010:5).  
 
6.4 The Counter-Piracy Response 
[W]e may be dealing with a 17th century crime, but we need to bring 
21st century solutions to bear … The solution to Somali piracy 
includes improved Somali capacity to police their own territory. Our 
envoy will work with other partners to help the Somalis assist us in 
cracking down on pirate bases and in decreasing incentives for young 
Somali men to engage in piracy ... I’ve tasked a diplomatic team to 
engage with Somali Government officials from the Transitional 
Federal Government as well as regional leaders in Puntland. We will 
press these leaders to take action against pirates operating from 
bases within their territories (Clinton 2009). 
 
With these words, Hillary Clinton, US Secretary of State at that time 
stated the intentions of her government’s approach and counter-piracy 
initiatives. However, as the following sections demonstrate, military 
response is clearly not a panacea for suppressing piracy. Quoting Major 
General Howes, the Operation Commander of the European Union Naval 
Force Somalia, the naval operations “… are treating the symptom only. 
We are containing a problem that emanates directly as a consequence of 
instability in Somalia, so the only way this is going to be resolved is over a 
long period of time with a comprehensive approach that reduces the 
insecurity in that country” (The Foreign Affairs Commitee 2012:62). 
6.4.1 Regional Organisations’ and States’ Level 
Throughout the timeframe of this research, 2005-2013, international 
attention and efforts have been focused on the Horn of Africa. A 
multinational flotilla has been deployed in the region, assigned to counter 
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modern piracy and secure the sea-trade lanes by providing escort to 
merchant vessel convoys transiting the high risk area, as illustrated in 
Picture 5. However, in terms of a realist approach to security (as 
discussed in detail in Section 
2.2.1) this can also be seen as 
an opportunity that provides 
justification for naval 
expansion, projection of 
national power and promotion 
of national interests abroad - in 
accordance with the Mahanian 
theory48 referring to the use of 
naval forces (Chapsos 2013a:2-
3). Moreover, it presents a 
unique opportunity for promoting naval diplomacy, through cooperation 
with non-allied partners in ad hoc coalitions for suppressing piracy; and 
for demonstrating the humanitarian dimension of international maritime 
assistance by escorting ships of the UN sponsored ‘World Food 
Programme’ (WFP)49.  
 
At the level of international/regional organisations, and in addition to 
various individual states’ naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and the 
Indian Ocean, three different naval task forces/operations are currently 
active in the area, assigned to suppress Somali piracy, as shown in Table 
5, below. The Combined Task Force 15150 along with the 5th Fleet based in 
Bahrain, is the major US-led multinational maritime force, assigned to 
counter violent extremism and terrorist activities in the Arabian Gulf and 
Arabian Sea. Numerous nations contribute assets and advisors51 to the 
                                                          
48 Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), defined the three pillars of ‘sea dominance’ to be overseas 
commerce, naval and merchant fleets, and naval bases arrayed along the sea lanes to support the 
ships having the advantage of ‘global reach’. This way the navy should protect the state’s trade, which 
will in return offer part of the profits to support the navy, following the paradigm of Ancient Athens 
49 See World Food Programme, available from  http://www.wfp.org/ 
50 The CTF 151 Commander –a three star US Admiral - actually controls three different international 
combined task forces - 150,151 and 152 - which are assigned to deter maritime terrorism and 
enhance ‘good order at sea’ in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin.  
51 Besides the USA, contributing nations include Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Portugal, 
Picture 5: Warship Escorts Released Vessel 
(gCaptain 2011) 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. 
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Combined Maritime Forces to fulfil the difficult task of patrolling more than 
2.5 million square miles of ocean; including the Gulf of Oman, the western 
Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. 
 
Table 5: Naval Anti-Piracy Operations & Costs (Source: Bowden and Basnet 2012) 
 
It is noteworthy that the above vast area of operations includes the Suez 
Canal, the Strait of Bab el Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden and the straits of 
Hormuz, all of which are choke points of strategic importance (Kraska 
2011:92-97). 
 
In December 2008, the European Union launched its first ever naval 
operation within the framework of its Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP): a counter-piracy mission named ‘Operation Atalanta’,52 
under the UN Security Council Resolution 1846. Its mission is to provide 
protection to WFP ships delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia and 
conduct anti-piracy operations along its coastline and territorial waters. 
Besides prevention, this included boarding of suspected vessels, detention 
of suspected pirates and use of lethal force if necessary. The annual cost 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates.  Jordan, Qatar 
and Yemen are non-members, contributing only staff-members.  
52 See EUNAVFOR Somalia, available from http://www.eunavfor.eu/  
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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of this operation counts approximately €10 million annually, and includes 
deployment of both surveillance aircrafts and naval assets.53  
 
In March 2012, the Council of the European Union expanded the mandate, 
by extending the area of operations to include the Somali coastline.54 
Furthermore, again in the framework of CSDP, in December 2011 the 
European Council approved the concept and in July 2012 it launched the 
training ‘Operation Nestor’, aiming at strengthening the maritime 
capacities of eight countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian 
Ocean.55 In reference to the launch of this operation, the EU stated in the 
UN Security Council:  
 
The EU has launched EUCAP Nestor, a new regional maritime 
capacity building mission which aims to strengthen the capacity of 
States in Somalia and the Indian Ocean to govern their territorial 
waters effectively and to reinforce their ability to fight maritime 
crime. The mission complements other programmes in the region. 
We fully agree with the Secretary General's observations, and 
see the need to increase support to programmes and initiatives that 
will limit the ability of groups of pirates to operate from land, while 
maintaining the pressure at sea. Key to this will be the ability of the 
Somali Government to regain control of its territory, to which the EU 
is contributing in a variety of ways, including by providing training to 
the Somali defence forces (Vrailas 2012). 
 
Before this, in September 2009, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) had launched the ‘Operation Ocean Shield’ to combat piracy in the 
Horn of Africa (NATO 2009). Besides naval operations, the mission 
includes capacity building initiatives for regional developing states, while it 
can also be perceived as collateral to the Mediterranean’s anti-terrorism 
operation ‘Active Endeavour’ (NATO 2013). 
 
At states’ level, the US aims at a thousand-ship navy, while in its Maritime 
Strategic Concept it explicitly stresses the need for establishing a 
                                                          
53 Belgium, UK, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands and 
Sweden are contributing nations to the operation. War ships from non EU member states of Norway, 
Croatia, Montenegro and Ukraine have also participated in the mission. 
54 See http://www.eunavfor.eu/2012/03/eu-extends-counter-piracy-mission-off-coast-of-somalia/ 
[accessed 31 July 2012] 
55 See http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations/eucap-nestor [accessed 
31 July 2012] 
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persistent global presence whose distribution must extend beyond 
traditional deployment areas (USA 2007:10). According to the same 
maritime strategy doctrine, credible combat power will be continuously 
postured in the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to protect vital US 
interests and deter and dissuade potential adversaries and competitors. 
This combat power will be selectively and rapidly repositioned to fulfil the 
strategic imperatives of limiting regional conflict, deterring war between 
major powers and winning the nation’s wars. 
 
It is also indicative that during President George Bush’s visit to India in 
2006, Washington and New Delhi developed a new agreement that was 
designed to promote maritime security cooperation and coordination. 
Facing an unpredictable China in the East and troubled by instability in 
Pakistan and their own reliance on oceanic trade routes for economic 
security, the world’s two largest democracies are natural maritime allies. 
The agreement affirmed the commitment of the two states to address 
piracy and armed robbery at sea. The accord called for the two states to 
conduct bilateral maritime exercises, cooperate in search and rescue 
operations at sea, exchange information and enhance cooperative 
capabilities. In October 2008, 8,500 naval personnel from India and the 
United States participated in ‘Malabar’, a week-long naval exercise in the 
Arabian Gulf. The exercise was designed to help both naval forces better 
understand each other’s tactics, techniques and procedures, thereby 
promoting inter-operability (Wilson 2009:495). 
 
Meanwhile, China boosted the modernisation of its navy for ‘long-range’ 
missions (Till 2007a:575). The promotion of its energy-related national 
strategic interests in the Indian Ocean and its establishment of remote 
naval bases by implementing a ‘sea-denial strategy’56, created a new 
rivalry in the region, which inevitably engaged the emerging and 
ambitious India, and vice-versa (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008:368-373, 
Kraska 2009:15).  
 
                                                          
56 The term refers to a strategy applied from a state, similar to Mahan’s theory; when a state prevails 
in a specific region, with major naval bases and continuous presence, it denies other states’ 
dominance in the same ocean 
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Furthermore, China deployed three modern vessels on an anti-piracy 
mission (first deployment in December 2008), which constitutes its first 
‘long range’ mission since the 15th century (Ong-Webb 2011, Greenberg 
2010). Simultaneously, it considered the establishment of a permanent 
base in the Gulf of Aden (most likely in Yemen) (BBC News 2009a) with 
the justification of supporting its anti-piracy operations. In the framework 
of ‘naval diplomacy’, the Chinese frigate ‘Maanshan’, carrying a team of 
Special Forces troops, successfully completed her first escort of MV Amina 
(21 March 2011), carrying WFP aid along the lawless coast of Somalia. 
Since then, it is estimated that Chinese ships has escorted approximately 
3,968 merchant ships through the Gulf of Aden (as of July 2012) 
(Safety4Sea 2012), and rescued 40 ships from pirate attacks  (Lowe 
2011a). More such escorts are expected as European Union naval forces 
are overly stretched.57 
 
Russia, a potential strategic rival of China in the Indian Ocean, offered to 
help soon after the Chinese escort voyage, and completed a similar WFP 
escort in the middle of 2010.58 Moreover in July 2012, the Chief of the 
Russian Navy confirmed that talks and negotiations were in progress with 
Cuba, Vietnam and Seychelles, about setting up maintenance and supply 
facilities for hosting Russian war ships abroad – in addition to those 
already existing in Tartus, Syria. A strategy that stresses the sustained 
and growing interest of naval diplomacy for this energy rich country (The 
Guardian 2012). 
 
The Indian Navy has sustained anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden 
since October 2008 (MSR 2011b). Especially so after Lloyd’s, the London 
based world leading ship insurance market, included the west coast of 
India in the ‘war risky’ areas (MSR 2011c)59 - due to the numerous 
incidents in its proximity (as indicated for 2011 in Figure 22) - and India 
launched a remarkable offensive against pirates, recording many 
successful operations. But even India’s aggressive policy ended. The 
government has affected a policy shift in its anti-piracy operations, asking 
                                                          
57 NATO Daily News Summary, as of Thursday 31 March 2011 
58 Ibid 
59 Areas that entail ‘Hull War, Strikes, Terrorism and Related Perils’ (MSR 2011c) 
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the Navy not to arrest any more pirates, and 
also not to bring them to India’s mainland, 
fearing that its aggressive operations is having 
a negative impact (MSR 2011a). 
 
It is also notable that India, China and Japan 
recently agreed to coordinate their ships’ 
escorts in the high-risk area of the Gulf of Aden 
(Lowe 2012). So while the USA, India, China, 
Japan and Iran share intelligence and 
collaborate in counter-piracy operations there 
are issues resulting from their having few 
diplomatic bonds. As Richard Shaw, of 
Southampton University’s Institute of Maritime 
Law notes, many analysts fear that this may lead to a battle for naval 
supremacy in the region (Lowe 2011b). 
 
Despite there having been an international naval presence in the region 
for more than two years, piracy in the Horn of Africa reached its zenith 
point in 2010, with 174 attacks in total of which 47 were successful and 
resulted in vessel hijackings. As Kelly explains: 
On any given day, up to 30 vessels from as many as 22 nations are 
engaged in counter-piracy operations in the region. This includes 
countries that are relatively new to this kind of effort, like China and 
Japan ... We have worked together to create safer shipping lanes 
through the Gulf of Aden for commercial shipping vessels by 
establishing the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor or 
IRTC. This transit zone is heavily patrolled by naval forces and used 
by some countries for convoy operations … Pirates adapted to these 
efforts. The expanded use of mother-ships enabled pirates to expand 
their area of operations toward the west coast of India. Mother-ships 
have also made pirates more difficult to interdict and more effective 
at operating during the monsoon seasons. Somali pirates now 
operate in a total sea space of approximately 2.5 million square 
nautical miles – an area equivalent to the size of the continental 
United States. This makes it difficult for naval or law enforcement 
ships and other assets to reach the scene of a pirate attack quickly 
enough to disrupt an ongoing attack. There is just too much water to 
patrol. Naval patrols are a required component of an effective 
Figure 23: Piracy near India 
(Bowden and Basnet 
2012:34) 
This item has been removed due to 
third party copyright. The 
unabridged version of this thesis 




counter-piracy strategy but will not succeed alone. Military power, 
while necessary, is not sufficient. (Kelly 2012) 
 
Hence, the naval presence in the region was mostly focused on 
geopolitical rivalries and concerns rather than suppressing piracy in the 
region. For instance, the competition between China and India that 
prevails in the Indian Ocean and the strategic deployment of the Western 
states’ navies in proximity to the straits of Hormuz due to the disputes 
with Iran. But beyond the profound inefficiency of the applied measures, 
the lack of governance in Somalia, the weakness of the Somali security 
sector and the inability to prosecute and imprison the arrested pirates, 
resulted in the international naval forces operating a ‘catch-and-release’ 
strategy. According to this, most suspected pirates captured by 
international warships are released because other nations do not want to 
jail them, and most Somali prisons and courts are not up to international 
standards (Kontorovich 2010, Roach 2010, Chang 2010).  
It is extremely interesting and revealing to look at practitioners’ 
experience in relation to this issue, as reported officially in the House of 
Commons in the UK. Captain Reindorp RN, Head of Defence Crisis 
Management Centre at the UK Ministry of Defence, described the 
considerable practical challenges of detaining and transferring suspects 
who are captured in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, he highlighted 
the dilemma between allocating resources to pursuing prosecutions, 
rather than conducting deterrent operations:  
 
You could be doing this 1,800 miles out into the Indian Ocean; it 
would take you five or six days to get a pirate back if you had to 
steam him back, and you may not want to send your one and only 
helicopter off to do that, because that might be better used looking 
out for and trying to deter and interdict pirate operations. This is not 
simply an issue of jurisdiction; it is also an issue of practice, which 
comes from the unique maritime environment in which it is 
happening … whilst all this is going on, a ship is not performing its 
primary role which is deterring pirates, so you have to decide 
whether you are going to chase an ever-decreasing possibility of a 





Beyond the operational dimension, Major General Howes OBE, the 
Operation Commander of the European Union Naval Force Somalia, also 
explained the political restrictions and governance difficulties. He 
described in the same session, in illuminating detail, how once EU naval 
forces detain suspects they must undertake a negotiation with one or 
more states to obtain agreement to accept them for prosecution:  
First, they are taken. We [at EUNAVFOR HQ] ask the captain whether 
we will be able to produce an evidence pack, such that we have a 
chance of prosecution. It takes him time to make that judgment. The 
habeas corpus rules, whatever the nationality of the ship that is 
responsible for the disruption, will determine how long they can be 
held for. If it is a Spanish ship, you have 24 hours, so you have to 
decide within 24 hours whether you are going to release people or 
whether you can transfer them.  
We immediately start negotiating with, for example, Kenya. 
You have to unlock Kenyan bureaucracy—and it is invariably on a 
Friday—and say, ‘Will you take this prisoner?’ They will want to know 
what the evidence pack is. Before we do that, though, if it is, say, a 
British flagged ship, we will say, ‘Right. Do you have an interest in 
this? Are you prepared to take them?’ If it is a Dutch ship, we say, 
‘Are you prepared to take them?’ If the pirates have murdered a 
Dutch national, the answer will probably be yes. …  Sometimes the 
answer is, ‘Yes, we’ll take them’—bang! Done. Deal cut. Otherwise 
you are racing against the deadline of having to release people, 
because there are laws that say, ‘This is what you’ve got to do. You 
can’t hold them.’ I think the record of someone being held at sea 
without recourse to judgment or legal representation is 47 days. That 
infringes their human rights. (Foreign Affairs Committee 2011:52) 
  
Yet, based on EUNAVFOR’s statistics (Table 6), 2011 proved to be the 
culmination point for Somali piracy (so far). However, according to the 
statistics, albeit indicating the highest ever number of overall perpetrated 
attacks (176 recorded), only 25 were successful. Clearly, 25 vessels 
hijacked is not a number that offers relief, or which can be overlooked, 
but since nothing actually changed in the navies’ applied tactics, why did 
the rest of the perpetrated attacks fail? Most likely the answer lies in the 
shipping companies’ tactics and the private sector’s security response. 
These involved the deployment of armed guards on board ships to 
enhance their protection against pirate attacks during their transit in the 
HRAs, as explored in detail in the next section (Chapsos 2013a:7-8).  
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Table 6: Pirate events' statistics, facts and figures  (Source: EUNAVFOR 2013) 
 
 
6.4.2 The Private Sector’s Response 
6.4.2.1 Best Management Practices 
 
In an effort to counter piracy in the high risk area off the Horn of Africa, 
officially defined as the area indicated in the anti-piracy planning chart in 
Figure 23, the private sector introduced a booklet, including guidelines 
and best management practices for ship owners, operators, managers and 
masters transiting the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia.  
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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Figure 24: The HRA: Anti-piracy planning chart - Red Sea, Gulf of Aden & Arabian 
Sea (Source: NATO shipping Centre) 
 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can be viewed at the 
Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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The first issue of this was published in 2009 and the purpose was to assist 
ships to avoid, deter or delay piracy attacks.60 This booklet provides 
recommendations for non-lethal measures to be applied for this purpose.  
 
After defining the high risk area (focusing solely in Somali piracy), it 
devotes a section in risk assessment and the whole of the next section 
provides descriptions of typical piracy attacks, always following the Somali 
operational model. The rest of the BMP sections refer to the 
implementation of the suggested measures, from the perspective of the 
company and the master, prior and during the transit from the specific 
area. It even provides guidelines in case the measures fail and the ship is 
finally boarded by pirates. As well as for circumstances when, due to a 
transmitted distress signal, military action from the ships patrolling in the 
area is imminent.  
 
Although it is undoubtedly a remarkable effort and a useful tool both for 
companies and masters, the booklet did not prove to be quite as 
impressive in praxis. Razor wires, speed increases, citadels, dummy 
guards and water under pressure (see Figure 25) were not enough to 
deter or discourage determined pirates from boarding tens of ships that 
had implemented these according to the instructions.  
 
It is also indicative that, although the third version of the booklet, BMP3, 
clearly states that, “[t]he use of additional private security guards is at 
the discretion of the company, but the use of armed guards is not 
recommended…” (UKMTO, par. 6.11, p.14) [emphasis mine]. The next 
updated version, BMP4, has a whole paragraph on the specific issue.61 
Just one year after the previous edition, this latest issue suggests that the 
decision to use PMSCs is the responsibility solely on the individual ship 
operators, based on their own risk assessment and the flag state’s 
                                                          
60As of January 2013, the 4th version of BMP is in effect, available from https://homeport.uscg.mil/cgi-
bin/st/portal/uscg_docs/MyCG/Editorial/20110817/BMP4%20August%202011.pdf?idI assume you 
mean thisI assume you mean this71a122dd442f3eaa69d675de206c1d848f419a7b&user_idI assume 
you mean thisI assume you mean this2a47d4dbfd24ce2da39438e736cab2d6.  
61 See BMP4, par. 8.15, pg.39-40 
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approval and regulation. However, the IMO have produced relevant 
guidance on this practice for operators and master. 
 
Figure 25: BMP Measures (BMP4 2013:32) 
 
 
6.4.2.2 Private Maritime Security Companies 
The increased number of piracy attacks in hot spots around the world – 
although mostly in the Horn of Africa due to its specific ‘business model’, 
media attention publicity and popularity - inevitably introduced a boom in 
the private security provision in the maritime domain.  
Moreover, the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility 
Security Code (ISPS Code)62 embedded new mandatory security duties in 
the role of shipping companies and port authorities, such as the Ship 
                                                          
62 See IMO, ISPS Code, available online from 
http://www.imo.org/ourwork/security/instruments/pages/ispscode.aspx [accessed 20 June 2012] 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The 




Security Officer (SSO), the Company Security Officer (CSO), the Port 
Facility Security Officer (PFSO). States demonstrated their will to 
implement anew an indirect security governance technique, enlisting the 
private maritime security industry to provide the training, accreditation 
and certification of the future security officers. The companies assigned 
with these duties, also provide a variety of other security services, 
including armed and unarmed site security, operational support, tactical 
and operational training, security and risk consultancy, intelligence 
provision, etc. (Cullen 2012:26-29). 
Ship owners started contracting PMSCs – as part of the shipping industry’s 
best management practices for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy - 
due to the efficiency of the practice in real numbers: no ship carrying 
armed guards has been (officially) hijacked so far. Additionally to the 
armed and unarmed security escorts for ships transiting high risk areas, 
PMSCs also provide services in security intelligence, risk assessment and 
consulting, and crisis response and intervention.  
In his remarks to the Centre for American Progress, in Washington DC in 
2012, Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary at the US Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs stressed:  
[W]e must also recognize that even when fully implemented best 
management practices do not guarantee security from pirates. As a 
result, we have also supported the maritime industry’s use of 
additional measures to enhance their security – such as having armed 
security teams on board. To date, not a single ship with Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel aboard has been pirated. Not 
one. 
These teams serve as a potential game-changer in the effort to 
counter-piracy. While many expected these teams to be made up of 
undisciplined “cowboys” that would cause an increase in the violence 
at sea, from what we have seen so far this has not been the case. We 
have not seen cases of pitched battles at sea between pirates and 
armed security personnel. In fact, in most engagements, the situation 
ends as soon as pirates are aware an armed security team is on 
board. In most cases, as pirates approach a ship the armed security 
teams will use flares or loudspeakers to warn the pirates. If the 
pirates keep coming, they will fire warning shots. That is usually 
when the interaction ends. Pirates break off the attack and turn their 
skiffs around and wait for another less protected ship to come by. 
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These teams therefore have served as an effective deterrent. 
(Shapiro 2012) 
 
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)63 changed the hitherto 
declared policy and, as from the 15th February 2011 when the Reuters 
report stated that it accepted that “operators must be able to defend their 
ships against rising pirate attacks” (Reuters 2011), many individual states 
altered their legislation. Consequently, they allowed armed security 
escorts on board merchant vessels flying their flag, under various terms 
and conditions. This was a result of pressure from the shipping sector in 
response to the increasing numbers of ships been hijacked off Somalia 
and in the broader region of the Indian Ocean (Struwe 2012).  
 
Obviously, all the questions and issues raised at international level 
regarding PSCs are also relevant when researching the maritime domain. 
But if the PSCs issue is complicated, the vastness of the oceanic areas – 
the international waters, which under the principle of the freedom of the 
seas demonstrate ‘lawless’ areas beyond the jurisdiction of the state - 
form a ‘Gordian knot’ for the international community. 
Hence, there are numerous issues in addition to those mentioned earlier:  
the public relations problem, creating a general reluctance to employ 
private security contractors and the question of control, where every state 
and non-state entity questions the efficiency and adequacy of the 
established ‘International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers’ 
(ICoC).64 There is also the risk of escalating the violence in already 
problematic areas since there is no legally binding regulation in terms of 
the threshold of use of force; ‘collateral casualties’ have already been 
experienced in many incidents.65 Additionally to the above mentioned 
loyalty issues, the high cost of contracting prestigious and high quality 
services brings even more debate since it tends to transfer the problems 
to lower profile shipping companies which cannot afford the financial 
burden. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it might provide an 
                                                          
63 The ICS represents almost the 80% of the world’s merchant fleet. See http://www.ics-shipping.org/  
64 See www.icoc-psp.org  
65 Fishermen have been shot dead in many reported incidents, perceived to be pirates by mistake 
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effective (and in many cases preventive) protection measure, but by no 
means do PMSCs address the root causes of piracy in the long term. 
Hereof, Spearin (2010:66-8) advocates the traditional practice of security 
provision by the state, stressing that companies prefer it and feel safer 
when the guarantors of their security are the ‘grey-hull’ navies. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the detailed research on maritime piracy, focusing 
on the Horn of Africa. Since the vast majority of PMSCs’ contracts and 
deployments are focused on providing security against this specific 
maritime crime in the region, their regulatory framework was selected to 
be investigated through this case study.  
After providing the definitions of piracy and armed robbery at sea, its root 
causes and causal factors are analysed. Researching the case study of 
Somalia, these causes and factors reflect the continuity of the history and 
the perpetuation of the phenomenon in the Horn of Africa. Finally, the 
chapter provides an overall assessment of the international response to 
contemporary Somali piracy, both at the state and commercial sector’s 
levels. Thus, it provides a further contribution to the development of the 
analytical framework for the integration of maritime security and 
contemporary piracy into the contemporary paradigm of global security. 
Operational responses alone – especially if they have a limited scope and 
focus on the ulterior motivations cited by a realist approach - are unlikely 
to be sufficient to reduce the risk of piracy to an acceptable level because 
they address the symptoms and not the root causes. They must therefore 
be considered as but one part of a comprehensive approach. However, if it 
is not possible to implement measures on land that “discourage” by 
addressing the root causes of piracy, the necessary actions can support 
the “disrupt”, “deter” and “defeat” effects. 
In any form, piracy is a criminal activity; in its developed form, it is 
organised crime employing a business model, and is usually perpetrated 
by armed, non-state actors. However, piracy and terrorism are two 
different phenomena with different goals. Maritime piracy is preoccupied 
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with attacking vessels at sea with the goal of looting and demanding 
ransom from the vessel owners. It is focused on material and monetary 
gain for the pirates, while violence and killing are secondary. Terrorism, 
on the other hand, is preoccupied with terror, not monetary or material 
gain. It is defined as a means to propagate a political or religious ideology 
and fight against “hostile” ideologies. Terrorists traffic in gratuitous 
savagery and have little respect for human life. Nevertheless, although 
piracy and terrorism are different phenomena, they are not mutually 
exclusive. The success of maritime piracy is attracting the attention of 
terrorist groups around the world as a potential source of finance for their 
activities. Millions of dollars derived from ransom negotiations could go a 
long way towards supporting terrorist activities around the world. 
Although there is no solid evidence of a terrorist connection, there is an 
emerging and worrisome nexus between Somali pirates and terrorist 
groups. There is evidence that Somali pirates are partly financing the 
activities of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia, led by al-
Shabaab, which is fighting the internationally recognised Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia. The continued success of piracy may 
enhance this financial relationship and the relative ease and success of 
pirate attacks may encourage terrorists to work in concert with pirates; 
the combination of piracy and terrorism could be deadly (Anyu and Moki 
2009:116). Because the ideologies driving the two forms of criminality 
differ, if the two merge, or even if a link is made and terrorism becomes 
more closely aligned with piracy, it is very likely to have implications for 
the operational responses required. Therefore, this possibility is of real 
concern for world security and stability since any such interdependence 








As discussed in Chapter Four, the traditional perception of the state as the 
sole security provider is evident in the marine industry. Shipping 
companies, commercial associations and trade unions have been strictly 
loyal to this perception. This is not only because protecting the freedom of 
the seas and ensuring the openness, safety and security of sea trade 
lanes was the states’ exclusive task, but also because these organisations 
were reluctant to accept the additional cost of paying for their own 
security while at sea (Berube and Cullen 2012:4). Yet, the need to 
address the sharp rise of piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean (as discussed 
in detail in Chapter Six) introduced a drastic change in this practice. 
Statistics indicate that in 2012 more than 26% of merchant vessels 
transiting the high risk area, in particular the Gulf of Aden, officially 
contracted and deployed armed security guards on board,66 for their 
protection against potential attacks (Brown 2012:5). The following 
sections provide an in-depth analysis of the major key issues which define 
the structure and practices of PMSCs. Based on the conceptual framework 
developed in Section 2.4.3 and the concerns of the transferred 
privatisation trend in the maritime domain, as discussed in Sections 2.4.2 
and 4.4.2, this chapter provides an in depth analysis of the complex 
framework of the PMSCs’ business model. The insights generated indicate 
the legal, operational and ethical concerns that emerged in the global 
maritime security market and the states’ response.   
7.2 Recruitment, Evaluation and Training 
7.2.1 Recruitment and Vetting 
The hierarchical structure of the armed forces – no matter what their 
nationality - results in the early retirement of their personnel. They go 
through a demanding, high cost and high quality training following the 
                                                          
66 This official figure rose to 35% in the first quarter of 2013, while unofficially it is estimated to be up 
to 80%.   
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most demanding and updated international standards. However, they 
become unemployed at a very young and still productive age, either due 
to the armed forces’ leadership promotion system (where not all officers 
are promoted to the higher ranks and so are inevitably disbanded) or 
through their voluntary resignation. At this stage they have few new 
career options since their field of expertise does not provide many job 
opportunities and alternatives in the private and/or commercial sector. 
Consequently, they form the optimum and primary group for recruitment 
from private security companies of all kinds. A UK-based recruitment 
agency published a most indicative and obvious advertisement, entitled 
‘Private Security Industry Wants Former Forces Personnel’. Starting with 
the phrase ‘Congratulations – you are in demand,’ it identifies that former 
forces’ personnel are ideal candidates for security industry jobs: 
Nine out of ten members of the British Security Industry Association 
(BSIA) say that former-forces personnel are ideal candidates for 
security industry jobs, according to a recent BSIA survey. 
Asked about what they liked about former-forces personnel, six out 
of ten respondents said the discipline gained in a forces job made for 
great candidates, but they also liked the awareness of security 
threats, motivation, alertness and understanding of security 
specifications that former-forces lasses and lads bring with them. 
BSIA members know what they are talking about too – almost nine 
in ten of those who responded to the survey had former-forces 
personnel working in their organisations (Cross Deck 2013b). 
 
Hence, the vast majority of PMSCs are founded and manned by former 
military personnel, who have had many years’ service in the Special 
Forces or other branches of the armed forces (mostly Navy, Army and, in 
the case of states such as the US and the UK, the Marines). All of the 
managing directors and personnel interviewed in this research stated that 
they are working in this domain for financial reasons.  
Depending on the number of contracts and the kinds of services provided 
- from consultancy services for governmental bodies (Interview F, 2012) 
to armed escort teams for merchant vessels – PMSCs’ management has to 
recruit the necessary number of sub-contractors in order to fulfil the tasks 
undertaken. Each sub-contract is mission-oriented and, after this is 
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fulfilled, the subcontractors are usually not employed until the next 
contract is signed and the new client’s requirements are defined. 
Consequently, a human reservoir of eligible and suitable sub-contractors 
is created from each company and contracted anew each time, depending 
on their availability.  
The vast majority of sub-contractors are preferably also former military, 
since their training, familiarisation with weapons and hostile environments 
are given, while the state certification of their service and records are 
beyond doubt. Yet, the globalised market, increased demand and 
promising high revenue have affected the recruitment process in several 
ways.67 
Firstly, and obviously, companies now recruit from the global reserve of 
retired militaries, no matter their nationality. Some of them – like the 
Indian Commandos for example - have a better reputation (and relatively 
lower price) compared to other nationalities, but this is not the sole 
criterion for recruitment. Given the principles of the free market, the one 
who requests lower compensation per day deployed in the transit escort, 
will be preferred by the company due to the objective of minimisation of 
expenses versus the maximisation of profit. In one interview, a PMSC’s 
director highlighted the globalised market for recruitment:  
 
I have had cases [shipping companies] where they requested only 
for Chinese, Korean, Indian, European teams, etc. If they don’t have 
a special request, then I usually use Indian Marcos that had worked 
together before – which is very important … I mostly deploy Indian 
ex-commandos (Indian special forces); I had a client though who 
declined the presence of Indians on board the vessel because he 
thought that they were of lower standards from the Europeans. So I 
had to send him a recommendation certificate of one of the team 
leaders for bravery and distinguished action and after that he 
accepted them (Interview A, 2012).  
 
Second, the free market never denies jobs to those who are willing to 
work for the lowest possible daily compensation, with analogous results, 
of course, in quality of the services offered. There are high levels of 
                                                          
67 All interviewees stressed their preference in recruiting former Special Forces military as 
subcontractors with proven record in the Navy or Army/ Marines.  
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demand for subcontractors in an era in which the financial crisis created 
the highest unemployment rates coupled with the effects of Hollywood 
movies promising high levels of adrenaline in the pursuit of pirates in the 
Indian Ocean. This, inevitably, attracts members of other professions 
receiving a lower income or offering less excitement to occasionally apply 
to participate in armed escorts. A director of a single UK registered PMSC, 
with an existing ‘pool’ of 1,500 subcontractors, stressed at interview that: 
  
I had 6000 CVs from all around the world –around 150-200 per day- 
to choose from. I shortlisted them to 2.000 and that’s my ‘pool’. 
Most of them were from developing countries such as e.g. Nepal, 
India, Ukraine, Lithuania, some of them from the UK, Australia, USA, 
Greece (due to the high unemployment), Singapore ...There are 
though many non-qualified people applying for the job; I had CVs 
from plumbers, taxi drivers, pizza delivery boys, even bankers who 
applied for the adrenaline... Although it is very dangerous to have an 
untrained member in your team in armed escort missions, there are 
many companies who hire non-qualified people with the potential to 
be trained from their colleagues during the transit. I know accidents 
that have happened, people that had been taken from the vessel by 
helicopter for trying to rappel down from the Bridge ... It’s all about 
the money and everyone wants to beat the competitor by offering 
lower-price contracts. There are companies … that offer escort 
transits for $29.500 from Suez to Galle. When you start cutting 
corners, you have to lower the prices for the people you employ, so 
inevitably you have to hire lower quality people. Pizza delivery boys 
e.g. take €20 a day, but if they go and work on a vessel they will 
take €50 a day (Interview A, 2012). 
 
Third, in the case that all a company’s subcontractors are either deployed 
in a transit or unavailable for other reasons, and a contract opportunity 
emerges, the PMC has to urgently recruit additional guards. Therefore, 
they form teams of employees that have never met before or worked 
together, since rejecting a contract is not an option.  
The recruiting procedure typically goes as follows. The applicants have to 
firstly submit their full CV to the company, and should they be found 
eligible and shortlisted, are then invited to interview following the 
standard procedure. After the interview assessment, the candidate has to 
submit a series of additional documents and certificates that the company 
keeps confidential in its own records. These include clean a criminal record 
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certificate, medical, psychiatric and cardiologist records (including alcohol 
and drugs free certificate) and of course their Special Forces and previous 
military background records (including non-dishonourable discharge). The 
vetting process follows the ICoC established standards and afterwards the 
successful candidate is eligible to undertake tasks and contracts with the 
company (Interviews B, C, 2012).  
New companies that are supportive to the process have emerged in order 
to create databases with worldwide qualified personnel eligible to 
undertake anti-piracy armed escorts. ‘Armed Contractors Register’ for 
example, is an Abu Dhabi based company registered in Singapore,68 
where all qualified individuals can register and the company provides 
vetting for the personnel by examining and evaluating the required and 
submitted documents (Interviews G, I, 2012). 
7.2.2 Training 
As already mentioned, the quality of training of former military personnel 
is beyond any doubt, due to the provision of states following the highest 
international standards. Yet, in the case where an applicant had been 
retired from the armed forces many years before, or if during his many 
latest years at service he has not been re-evaluated/certified in terms of 
his operational capabilities, he has to demonstrate his eligibility for the 
post by other means. This case obviously also refers to civilian applicants, 
who wish to follow a new career path within the private maritime security 
industry. 
The global market also saw the opportunity in this training domain. There 
are private companies around the world that provide the required training, 
depending of course on each state’s legislation limitations since weapons’ 
training is obviously included.  
An indicative case for meeting the training requirements was described by 
a PMSC’s director at interview:  
                                                          
68 See https://www.acregister.org/  
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We run a training centre in Porto Allegro in … and this is where we do 
the training of candidates for the company or MarSecOps69 from 
other companies. The certification is provided by CTTE70 in Brazil; an 
ex-SWAT trainer runs it and we provide our maritime training there 
… after a 160-hours course of theory and practice (including weapons 
use and firing, close combat, personal defence, etc.), if they are 
successful in the final exam, they receive certification by [the specific 
PMSC] and CTTE/Brazil. The course is for 16 days and the 
participants pay their own fees (€4.300 - accommodation and meals 
included but not their flight costs from wherever they arrive). I know 
other companies which charge €11.000 for a close protection course. 
We also have an old vessel for on-board training in Brazil too. I don’t 
know any other companies doing this kind of training; Most European 
companies are not allowed to do such tactical training … since it’s 
considered as training for potential terrorist teams. There are others 
… that do this training in Serbia (Interview A, 2012). 
 
 
There are strict limitations imposed on European companies in terms of 
undertaking or providing similar tactical training, since it is considered to 
be training of potential terrorist teams. Yet, it seems that interested 
companies in the UK in particular have overcome this obstacle. Although it 
was illegal for pistol shooters to train in England, Scotland or Wales even 
for the Olympic Games, following the government’s authorisation for UK 
PMSCs to be armed on UK flagged vessels new companies have emerged 
and registered in the ICoC such as ‘Shooting Training Solutions’, which 
primarily provides maritime firearms training and of course certification.71 
The key issue is licensing the individual being 'trained'... The current 
licensing procedure involves: positive verification of identity, two 
referees of verifiable good character who have known the applicant 
for at least two years (and who may themselves be interviewed 
and/or investigated as part of the certification), approval of the 
application by the applicant's own family doctor, an inspection of the 
premises and cabinet where firearms will be kept and a face-to-face 
interview by a Firearms Enquiry Officer (FEO) also known as a 
Firearms Liaison Officer (FLO). 
A thorough background check of the applicant is then made by 
Special Branch on behalf of the firearms licensing department. Only 
when all these stages have been satisfactorily completed will a 
license be issued, which must be renewed every 5 years. 
                                                          
69 The acronym stands for Maritime Security Operations; it was not amended to retain the originality 
of the interviewee’s statement.  
70 See http://www.ctte.com.br/?idioma=eng  
71 See www.shootingtrainingsolutions.co.uk  
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It should be noted that it was illegal for pistol shooters to train 
in England, Scotland or Wales for the Olympic Games unless they 
could meet the above criteria (Correspondence A, 2012). 
 
Similarly, given that there is still no mechanism in place for live fire arms 
training in the UK for local PMSCs, the only appropriate live training that 
can take place is 0.22 calibre rifle training and plastic firing airsoft pistols. 
However, there are many different types of firearms being used in vessel 
protection, including up to five or six different semi-automatic rifles and 
two or three different semi-automatic pistols. To partly overcome this 
obstacle, another company made available the option of firearms 
competency training using deactivated firearms with lasers fitted in order 
to assess the accuracy and evaluate the performance of the firer, enabling 
objectives and assessment strategy: 
to ensure the safe handling of firearms the PMSC should - … in my 
opinion this wording needs to be changed to PMSC must. Why? 
Because should could mean it’s a good thing to do and not 
compulsory. If in the event of a post incident investigation the PMSC 
are questioned, their answer is – well we did all we could given the 
circumstances. Which isn’t good enough especially when many 
PMSCs are providing little to NO training for their PCASP. I know this 
because I’m still on the books of a leading company. 
Also, you will of course be aware that UK Govt provided 
authorisation for UK PCASP to be armed on UK Flag Vessels, this was 
in Oct/Nov 2011. Over 18 months have passed and still there is no 
mechanism in place for live fire training in the UK for Maritime 
PCASP. There was a letter presented to the UK Govt in Feb 2013 
through SCEG ... But still very little progress [or] no progress made 
on authorising Section 5 category firearms (semi auto rifles over 
0.22 calibre and semi auto pistols of 0.22 cartridge calibre or above) 
to be used in training within the UK. How much longer will it take, 
another 24, 36 months… Will it ever be permitted? The term specific 
is important. There are many different types of firearms being used 
in vessel protection, including up to 5 or 6 different semi auto rifles, 
2 or 3 different semi auto pistols. Number of options available that I 
see include training on the specific firearms outside of the UK, this 
will not be without problems, especially where tight timelines are 
concerned. Use of deactivated firearms which are specifically the 
ones to be used, this is the approach I have adopted. The use of 
deactivated firearms can completely facilitate firearms competency 
training, and it’s 100% safe. At present the only live fire that can 
take place is 0.22 calibre rifle training and plastic BB firing airsoft 
pistols! There is another option available which is the approach I 
have taken; this is firearms competency training using deactivated 
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firearms. This provides for safe training and is a sensible option. The 
course I provide is 1 day duration and has a fully accredited course 
learning design, complete with learning outcomes, enabling 
objectives and assessment strategy. I know of no other training 
provider who delivers an accredited course which has a recognised 
assessment strategy. All other training providers are quite simply 
making up their own standard for competency…  
Also, how is the competency assessed, there are no standards 
set. I’ve already mentioned that the course which I had designed 
does have a fully accredited assessment strategy. The how long prior 
question is also important because if it were immediately prior then it 
would be extremely difficult to conduct live fire with the specific 
firearms outside of the UK, due to flight timings, eg UK to Europe, 
Europe to Vessel Transit start point. An option could be use of a live 
fire range close to the start point location, but there are many start 
point locations. From my experience notification for a Vessel 
Protection transit can be as short as a few weeks and could involve 
armed transit through a number of different territorial waters. I have 
absolutely no confidence that the different country laws are being 
explained to members of armed security teams. In my opinion the 
rules for the use of force training in the newly designed ‘Maritime 
Security Operator’s’ course does NOT cover this type of training in 
enough detail, not nearly enough and falls way short 
(Correspondence B, 2013). 
 
At this point I would like to highlight another paradox within the security 
industry procedures: On one hand, the international standards (which are 
discussed further in the next section) endorsed both by governments or 
the security industry, identify the essential requirement and certification 
of armed guards in terms of firearms training. On the other hand, in most 
of the European countries there are significant limitations in terms of 
firearms training which can actually make the fulfilment of these 
requirements extremely difficult. However, the globalised environment 
and, even more so, the allowance of open access within European Union 
countries provide alternatives. France and Spain, for example, legitimised 
training in semi-automatic weapons used by Maritime Security guards. In 
this way they have managed not only to provide a solution to PMSCs 
registered under their flag, but also to offer business developing 
opportunities to the companies providing such training, by attracting 
‘clients’ from other countries who have to be certified (Correspondence B, 
2013).    
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Thus, this practice reflects two major issues: first, the business model is 
expanding, and no longer limiting itself solely to security services 
provision. ‘Side-products’ and supplementary companies are emerging, 
offering training, recruitment and vetting, targeting as potential clients 
the security companies which later provide security services. A manager 
of such a company explained in the interview: 
I thought I could help; I could help shippers, crew and hostages by 
doing what I do best: build an online system. An independent 
maritime security vetting system that will register credible security 
operators and monitor their qualifications. Like with the medical 
register, people who do not perform would be struck off” an 
interviewee stressed (Interviews G, 2012).  
  
Second, the private security industry itself certifies its employees, 
stressing even more the fragmentation of state control and management 
of these companies and their authorised employees. 
 
7.3 Regulation and Certification 
Building further on the concerns expressed in Chapter Four, Section 4.4.2 
with regard to the application of the private security model in the 
maritime domain, a broader and deeper research follows.  This focuses on 
the existing international bodies responsible for regulating PMSCs and the 
standards developed for the private security providers’ certification and 
accreditation.  
As already discussed in Section 4.4.2, the IMO outsourced the regulation 
of PMSCs to the flag states and issued Circular 1406 ‘Revised Interim 
recommendations for Flag States Regarding the Use of Privately 
Contracted Armed Security Personnel in the High Risk Area’ (IMO 2011b). 
In this framework, and given that we have already identified indications 
about states’ selective engagement with PMSCs’ regulatory issues in terms 
of hard law (see Section 4.4.2.1), one could argue that states are in 
favour of the soft law approach to regulate the private maritime security 
industry. According to Snyder (1993:36) soft law could be defined as rules 
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of conduct which in principle have no legal binding force but may have 
practical effects. Guzman and Meyer (2010): 172, 174) provide definitions 
from various perspectives; they insert a subsidiary category, defined in 
opposition to clearer established categories rather than on its own terms, 
commonly defined to include hortatory, rather than legal binding 
obligations (Guzman and Meyer 2010:172). They also define soft law as 
‘those nonbinding rules or instruments that interpret or inform our 
understanding of binding legal rules or represent promises that in turn 
create expectations about future conduct’ (Guzman and Meyer 2010:174). 
Like most of issues dealing with international security and international 
relations, soft law has its advocates and critics; the traditional debate 
asserting that, as Weil (1983) puts it, ‘these obligations are neither soft 
nor hard law; they are simply not law at all’. The debate develops further, 
focused mainly on the emerging questions: Is soft law really a law, or is it 
rather a ‘non-law’? Despite its non-legal binding character, is soft law able 
to produce norms and regulations of real effectiveness from a legal and, 
most importantly, a policy making perspective (Zerilli 2010:10-11)?  
Before attempting to provide answers to the above questions (which, 
although they are not included in the aims and objectives of this thesis, 
have a significant bearing on the argument), we could constructively 
conclude that soft law is not law in positive meaning of the term. 
However, it may be considered as other social normative instruments, the 
force of which is ensured not by sanctions but by the authority of enacting 
body and suitability of ready decisions for different situations. Hence, we 
should wonder how an instrument of social pressure, influence or 
persuasion can be considered efficient, sufficient and to possess universal 
validity, especially when considering soft law as an approach to regulating 
the private security industry? Furthermore, even if this approach could 
work for land based PMCs/ PSCs, how could it be applied to PMSCs, which 
operate in the middle of the oceans, out of social sight and reach? How 
can a soft law for example be endorsed in the UK and applied/followed by 
a UK registered PMSC, which is transferred to a Liberian flagged vessel, 
transiting the Indian Ocean in international waters, whose next port of call 
is in the United Arab Emirates? However, despite (or because of) the 
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distinctiveness of the maritime domain with regard to the applicability of 
soft law in regulating PMSCs, this could be a worthwhile area of further 
future research. 
 
7.3.1 International Bodies  
Thus, following the paradigm of the recruitment and training procedures, 
regulation and certification is clearly another major issue. Stressing anew 
that the principles of the free market dominate the private security 
industry, non-state actors are responsible for undertaking the essential 
issues of regulation and certification. More important, since there are no 
legal binding relationships between the regulating/certifying bodies and 
the companies, the whole process is based on two factors. 
First, the prestige of a company is increased when it is certified from as 
many bodies as possible. This offers to the potential clients the sense that 
its reputation is genuine, since it is certified by diverse institutions, 
associations, standards or even other private companies.  
Second, as long as the relationship with the regulators cannot possibly 
have legal implications, being based solely on a membership or paid 
assessment/vetting, should any wrong-doings become publicly known this 
will only impact on the company’s reputation in the market. Definitely, in 
this competitive environment this is quite important, since it is the 
primary criterion by which a client chooses among the hundreds of 
available companies offering the same services. However, they are not 
sufficient for regulating the companies in terms analogous to those that 
used to be imposed by states. A simple change in the company’s name for 
example, could overcome the effects of any potential recorded trespasses. 
In respect of this, the IMO established an inter-sessional working group 
and issued further interim guidance on the use of privately contracted 
armed security personnel on board ships, in order to counter Somali-
based piracy. These circulars give interim guidance concerning the use 
and conduct of private maritime security companies providing contracted 
armed security personnel on board ships in the high risk area (IMO 2012). 
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They are intended both for PMSCs themselves and for port and coastal 
states regarding their use  on board ships (IMO 2011a), for flag states 
(IMO 2011b) and the shipping industry (IMO 2011c) accordingly.  
Yet, all interviewees confirmed that there is no international body 
responsible for regulating and/or certifying PMSCs. Perhaps the only 
established mechanism for this purpose is the International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), which obviously 
refers to both maritime and land oriented companies. Quoting the 
initiative’s statement on the home page of its web-site, the ICoC is,  
a multi-stakeholder initiative convened by the Swiss government. It 
aims to set private security industry principles and standards based 
on international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as to 
improve accountability of the industry by establishing an external 
independent oversight mechanism. The Articles of Association seek 
to establish this mechanism which will include certification, auditing, 
monitoring and reporting. By signing the ICoC, signatory companies 
publicly commit to operate in accordance with the Code and to work 
with relevant stakeholder to establish this mechanism and related 
standards by the middle of 2012 (ICoC 2013).  
 
In 2013, the International Code of Conduct Association was also 
established,  
composed of private security companies, civil society organizations 
and governments. The ICoCA is governed by a multi-stakeholder 
Board with equal representation of the three stakeholder pillars.  The 
purpose of the ICoCA is to govern and oversee the implementation of 
the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers (ICoC), and to promote the responsible provision of private 
security services.  Its main functions are to provide and support 
certification, monitoring and complaints resolution (ICoCA 2013). 
 
Again, becoming a signatory of the ICoC is not mandatory, but only 
supportive to the company’s reputation. There are numerous such 
companies that have been operating for decades and became signatories 
long after 2010 when ICoC was established. Furthermore, introducing the 
code of contract, standards, mechanisms, etc., does not mean that the 
ICoC is simultaneously also monitoring the strict implementation of its 
terms by all the registered companies. 
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Another initiative which attempted to enforce some rules in the private 
security industry is the Montreux Document. In 2008, 17 states72 
participated in the finalisation of this document entitled “Pertinent 
International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States related to 
Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during Armed 
Conflict”. The Montreux Document is the first international document to 
describe international law as it applies to the activities of private military 
and security companies whenever these are present in the context of an 
armed conflict. It also contains a compilation of good practices designed 
to assist states in implementing their obligations under international law 
through a series of national measures.73 Although it is a remarkable effort, 
it is more applicable to companies operating ashore. In this respect, it 
refers to ‘legal obligations and good practices for states’, but private 
maritime security companies are primarily being contracted by shipping 
companies and not by states (at least thus far), as emphasised in the 
conceptual framework presented in section 2.4.3.   
The Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI)74 and the 
International Association of Maritime Security Professionals (IAMSP)75 are 
the two major bodies that focus in an advisory capacity on the effort to 
certify/accredit and regulate the PMSCs registered as their members. 
Obviously, they also provide a ‘code of conduct’ and their members are 
committed to follow their guidelines.  
SAMI was formally launched in April 2011 (and incorporated as a non-
profit making company in June 2011). Given the vast variance of quality 
amongst founded and operational PMSCs, the original SAMI concept was 
to formulate a list of reputable PMSCs that would be available to the 
clients (ship-owners, flag states and marine insurers) to enable an 
informed choice about which company to choose. The PMSCs on the list 
would then form a guild and collectively push standards up, thereby 
separating the good companies from the bad by defining quality, reliability 
                                                          
72 Afghanistan, Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, Iraq, Poland, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and the United States of 
America 
73 See http://www.eda.admin.ch/psc  
74 See http://www.seasecurity.org/  
75 See http://iamsponline.org/  
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and credibility. The association provided maritime security consultancy to 
the Marshall Islands registry. It also gained significant international 
recognition by representing this registry as a pro bono consultant for all 
relevant meetings at the IMO; as well as representing both the registry 
and the private maritime security industry at the Contact Group for Piracy 
off the Coast of Somalia.  
SAMI is a UK based international association that represents PMSCs and 
acts as the leading body within the maritime security industry. It provides 
a direct link to the commercial shipping industry, oil and gas sectors and 
works in partnership with flag states, regulatory bodies, insurance and 
legal professionals and shipping organisations and its main aim is to try 
and bridge the gap between security and shipping. As of May 2014, SAMI 
counts around 160 members from 40 different nations (Cook 2014). SAMI 
also encourages and promotes academic research relevant to the 
provision of private maritime security. In support of this, it is establishing 
an Academic Partnership Programme with Greenwich Maritime Institute of 
the University of Greenwich to provide a focal point for students studying 
the discipline (Cook 2014). 
The governance structure of SAMI allows the member companies to work 
with the Secretariat by way of the Industry Steering Group to continue the 
development of a robust and resourceful organisation that is 
internationally respected as the authoritative representative of the private 
maritime security industry. To gain membership76 a PMSC is required to 
complete a certification programme that was set up in February 2012. As 
SAMI states on the Association’s website, it   
provides reassurance, guidance, and minimum quality and 
standards in the delivery of maritime security where none has 
existed before. The SAMI Standard has been established as the 
international benchmark for standards within the industry… One 
major aspect of this is the creation of a clear, transparent, and 
robust standard that is applicable across the wide spectrum of the 
maritime security industry. (SAMI 2013)  
The programme encompasses a three-stage process; the standard was 
developed by its Standards Accreditation Working Group and based on the 
                                                          
76 The annual membership fee for an average sized PMSC – one that employs more than 10 
permanent employees internationally - is around £2,500. 
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IMO MSC Circulars 1405 and 1406 (IMO 2011c, 2011b); and National 
Security Inspectorate77 was selected as the third party certification body 
to act as auditor. 
To gain certification, a PMSC will initially approach SAMI to request 
membership and SAMI will carry out a due diligence check of the applicant 
company. This first stage is a documentation process and is conducted by 
an independent agency. The second stage for certification is an onsite 
audit, where the above mentioned external agency carries out 
examination of management and operational procedures during a two-day 
visit to the company’s headquarters. Finally, the third and final stage to 
achieve accreditation by SAMI is an operational site visit; this entails an 
on-site assessment of the PMSC’s operational procedures in deployment 
(either pre or post transit). This could actually ensure the company’s 
deployable teams’ compliance with international regulations, either when 
they are about to embark/disembark the vessel or about to be re-tasked 
or demobilised (SAMI 2013).  
However, this last stage is still under development (as of January 2014), 
which in practice means that the whole process established by SAMI’s 
developed standard is based on a documentation process and the audit 
conducted at the HQs. The reason behind this is that SAMI’s standard has 
to a great extent formed the basis for the document, ISO/PAS 28007, as 
will be discussed in detail in the next section in relation to the 
development of the ISO standards. Consequently, PMSCs undertaking the 
international certification process will not be required to also complete 
SAMI’s third stage of certification.  
The International Association of Maritime Security Professionals was 
founded in 2010 as the response to a perceived need by a number of 
private entities to raise the level of professional conduct within the 
maritime security industry. IAMSP is a not-for-profit, volunteer 
organisation, which seeks to address a broad range of issues associated 
with the maritime security industry, ranging from the protection of 
                                                          
77 National Security Inspectorate (NSI) is a UK based organisation that has a history of dealing with a 
range of new and different audit challenges. The NSI team were involved in the development of the 
SAMI Standard from an early stage and worked very closely with the SAWG and the SAMI Secretariat. 
See http://www.nsi.org.uk/ [accessed April 2014]  
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seaports and vessels and platforms operating at sea. The IAMSP is an 
inclusive organisation, seeking to build strong relationships between like-
minded entities and institutions, aiming at forming alliances which will 
build stronger voices and further the ability to build capacity within the 
industry. According to its mission statement, the IAMSP aims to establish 
itself as the pre-eminent Association of security professionals operating 
within the maritime environment. To accomplish this mission, the 
Association is focused on the fulfilment of the following objectives: 
 To develop the appropriate sound security standards, guidelines 
and practices; 
 To promote and advocate professional conduct in all aspects of the 
maritime security domain; 
 To soundly advise internal and external organizations with respect 
to maritime security issues; 
 To develop (or assist in the development of) sound education, 
training and professional advancement material; and 
 To provide a community of trusted professionals that can work 
collaboratively to address challenges within the maritime security 
domain (IAMSP 2014). 
In this effort to promote professionalism, academic research and 
academic qualifications, the IAMSP has established a long term strategic 
partnership with Coventry University since 2012. Through this, the IAMSP 
offers the motive and opportunity to its members who will successfully 
graduate from the University’s Master’s programme in maritime security 
to gain a dual award/qualification from IAMSP, recognising their continued 
professional development.78       
In this framework, it worth looking at the major differences between SAMI 
and IAMSP, given that many actors both from the shipping and private 
security industry see them as being in competition. Firstly, all IAMSP 
executive board members and committee chairs participate on a voluntary 
basis, there is no compensation for their contribution and they also have 
                                                          
78 See Coventry University Maritime Security MA (online) http://www.coventry.ac.uk/course-
structure/2014/faculty-of-business-environment-and-society/postgraduate/maritime-security-ma-
online/ [accessed April 2014] 
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to pay an annual membership fee, since their membership is a 
precondition for senior assignments.  
Furthermore, although both international associations have a very similar 
focus, SAMI welcomes only companies as registered members. However, 
the IAMSP, in trying to address the issues discussed above with regards to 
PCASPs’ performance while in deployment abroad, focuses on and 
welcomes individuals as members. Of course companies are welcome to 
register as well, but individual contractors – even from registered 
companies - are also eligible to register as members in their own right. 
For this purpose, IAMSP’s annual membership fee is only $100, which is 
very low and affordable compared to the average fee of £2,500 for PMSCs 
to register with SAMI.    
Still, there is little possibility of either organisation monitoring the member 
companies and even less of evaluating the guards’ performance while on 
duty; even the companies which sub-contract them have only loose 
remote control when they are deployed on a transit on the other side of 
the globe. Inevitably, the whole private security system relies finally on 
single individuals’ decisions, accountability, personality, training and 
performance. The confirmation of this came in March 2014, when two 
maritime consultants of the UK based company Port2Port,79 which was a 
member of SAMI and certified by ISO 28007, were arrested in Nigeria for 
illegal bunkering and bribery (Eziukwu 2014). 
Of equal importance for the main research question of this thesis, is the 
fact that all the international bodies discussed in this section, ICoC, IAMSP 
and SAMI were established from late 2010 onwards. Hence, for more than 
seven years (counting from 2003 when many PMSCs were already 
established and operational) there was no relevant international body to 
regulate, certify or even provide guidelines to PMSCs. This is clear 
evidence that the private maritime security industry, and consequently 
the companies themselves, were almost totally unregulated for the critical 
period of their development; and for the time that piracy incidents off 
                                                          
79 The company’s official announcement on the incident is available from 
https://www.port2portwestafrica.com/news?id=7 [accessed 31 March 2014]  
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Somalia were continuously and alarmingly increasing (see Figure 16, 
Section 6.3.2).     
Lloyd’s Register80 (and other similar bodies) also provides International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO)81 quality assurance certification but 
this is mostly business oriented and all that the applying company has to 
do (after, of course, paying the relevant fees) is box ticking and confirm 
that it fulfils all the required skills and demands.      
In 2011, The Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG) was 
founded and established in the UK,  
in order to define, develop and facilitate robust, internationally 
recognised professional standards for the UK Private Security Sector 
operating abroad. SCEG’s partnership with the UK Government is 
vital and provides a unique construct whereby an industry body has 
a sustained dialogue with government departments with 
opportunities to contribute to the debate, shape policies and 
influence international fora (SCEG 2013) 
  
Although this is a remarkable initiative in terms of an attempt at 
regulation and policy making, inevitably, it has a strictly localised and 
advisory character, focused solely on UK registered PMSCs. Not many 
other countries around the world (if any) have similar bodies established. 
Moreover, in practical and realistic terms, its efficiency and useful 
contribution is questioned from the basis of its own fundamental 
declaration and principle. The paradox in this case is that UK registered 
PMSCs are regulated and subject to the UK relevant laws and legislation. 
However, when operating abroad (as the SCEG declares), they have to be 
subject and comply with the vessel’s flag state legislation, which most 
likely differs from the UK’s. Accordingly, after this first differentiation is 
overcome, both the vessel and the contracted PMSC have to comply with 
the relevant (and most likely different) legislations of all the potential 
coastal states, in order to be allowed access to their scheduled ports of 
                                                          
80 See http://www.quality-register.co.uk/bodies/body64.htm  
81 ISO (International Organization for Standardization) is the world’s largest developer of voluntary 
International Standards. International Standards give state of the art specifications for products, 
services and good practice, helping to make industry more efficient and effective. Developed through 
global consensus, they help to break down barriers to international trade. For the subject’s standards, 
see http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=42146    
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call. Clearly, this initial and simplistic approach demonstrates that SCEG 
has a limited reach, jurisdiction and overall potential.  
7.3.2 International Standards with Regional Application  
Many flag states at the IMO were not prepared to accept a self-regulation 
process and consequently there were calls for the IMO to take the lead 
and establish a standard for PMSCs. In response, two standards were set 
up simultaneously, on either side of the Atlantic. In Europe, and following 
the usual practice, the IMO asked the International Organisation for 
Standards (ISO)82 to formulate the foundations of an ISO standard for the 
use of armed guards on board ships that could be audited by accredited 
third party certification bodies. The Baltic and International Marine Council 
(BIMCO) took the lead on working with the ISO on this. At the same time 
SAMI, as part of the Marshal Island’s registry delegation in the IMO – as 
discussed in the previous section - submitted its developed standard to 
the IMO as a working standard that could constructively contribute to the 
committee’s assignment. Consequently, the project leader responsible for 
developing the ISO standard formed a core drafting team from the 
International Chamber of Shipping, BIMCO, SAMI and SCEG (Cook 2014). 
However, the ISO Technical Committee consisted of 25 voting members 
from around the world who were concerned to ensure that the document, 
ISO Public Available Specification (PAS)/28007, which would form the 
basis of the new standard, would have an international character and that 
it could be adopted by PMSCs from any nation. Hence, PAS 28007 was 
prepared by the ISO Technical Committee on Ships and Marine 
Technology and entitled ‘Guidelines for Private Maritime Security 
Companies (PMSC) providing privately contracted armed security 
personnel on board ships (and pro forma contract)’. The first edition was 
published on 15 December 2012, and set out the guidelines for applying a 
risk based quality management system for the security of operations and 
                                                          
82 ISO (International Organization for Standardization) was founded in 1947 and is the world’s largest 
developer of voluntary International Standards. International Standards give state of the art 
specifications for products, services and good practice, helping to make industry more efficient and 
effective. Developed through global consensus, they help to break down barriers to international 
trade. See http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm  
197 
 
activities conducted by organisations, such as PMSCs, (who comply with 
ISO 28000) (ISO PAS/28007 2012:v).  
BIMCO’s Chief Maritime Security Officer, Giles Noakes, explains the 
purpose of this in a BIMCO Bulletin (Volume 108 #4): 
The document [ISO PAS 28007] addresses security management 
system elements such as: resilience, planning, resources, training 
and awareness, human rights, communication and documentation. It 
also outlines operational requirements for dealing with issues such 
as: scene and casualty management, incident reporting and 
investigation, health and safety and customer complaints […] ISO 
PAS 28007 also includes recommendations for performance 
evaluation such as monitoring, audits, management and continual 
improvement. Implementation will enable security companies to 
demonstrably evidence their competence in the provision of PCASP 
for anti-piracy operations on board ships. (Rider 2014) 
  
ISO/PAS 28007 also gives guidelines containing additional sector-specific 
recommendations, as highlighted by the ISO and PMSCs can implement 
these to demonstrate that they provide privately contracted armed 
security personnel on board ships. To claim compliance with these 
guidelines, all recommendations (stated as "shoulds" in the document) 
should be complied with. This compliance can be by first, second and third 
party certification.83 
Although the UK Government has an affiliate relationship and advisory 
role in SCEG, it had no direct engagement with the standard. The reason 
behind this, is that if it had, then all IMO members and flag states should 
have been requested to ratify and endorse the standard, with the 
inevitable delays and rejections resulting in the initiative’s failure. This 
both highlights, and partially explains, states’ reluctance to engage with 
PMSCs’ regulation issues, preferring to leaves it up to the market to self-
regulate the private security industry. 
                                                          




On the other side of the Atlantic, ASIS International84 issued the PSC 1 to 
4 series in April 2012.  The initiative was launched to develop an American 
quality assurance and security management national standard specifically 
for PMSCs as guidance in terms of applying the PSC-1 standard (or related 
ISO such as 28000) in the maritime environment. It was designed to 
ensure this was consistent with respect for human rights, contractual and 
legal obligations. ASIS distributed an invitation letter to potential 
committee members (either as voters or observers with respective 
obligations, rights and commitments), falling under the general interest, 
producer/service provider or user/manager category, and interested in 
contributing their expertise in this domain (ASIS 2012).  
The first meeting of the technical committee was held on May 17th 2012, 
and additionally to 18 ASIS members with diverse professional 
backgrounds (including Control Risks Security, UN, London Metropolitan 
University), 65 more committee members participated in the whole 
process under the status of voter or observer. Interestingly, committee 
members not only included US entities but ones from all over the world 
(for example, from Australia), including SCEG (which has jurisdiction and 
focus only on UK registered PMSCs, as discussed in Section 7.3.1), other 
UK based institutions (London Metropolitan University, CPRS/ Coventry 
University, IR Consilium, etc.). These members were also from varied 
professional backgrounds, indicatively including high profile academics 
(that is D. Avant, A. Wylde, A. Hunter, L. Thomas), PMSCs (for example 
Triton Risks, Sidewell Protection Risks, Marine Security Initiatives, 3rg 
Security, Argonaut Security, Sea Guardian and many others), the IAMSP, 
and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.  
The researcher and author of this thesis participated in the whole 
standard development process as a voting member of the technical 
committee, in his hat as a researcher in Coventry University. This is an 
indicative example of the advantage of the empirical research utilised in 
                                                          
84 ASIS International is the US based preeminent organisation for security professionals, with more 
than 38,000 members worldwide. Founded in 1955, ASIS is dedicated to increasing the effectiveness 
and productivity of security professionals by developing educational programs and materials that 
address broad security interests, such as the ASIS Annual Seminar and Exhibits, as well as specific 
security topics. ASIS also advocates the role and value of the security management profession to 




this thesis, as discussed in the methodology chapter – Section 3.3; the 
experience gained throughout this process would not have been otherwise 
accessible or easily transferred by other means.  
The consideration of the submitted comments during the voting process 
and the final amendments were finalised by the PSC4 working group in 
early January 2013; and its approval as a US national standard was 
officially announced on 31 January 2013 (ANSI 2013). The produced 
guidance standard is applicable for any type of PMSC providing security 
services and operating at sea. Its purpose is to improve the quality of 
their services, maintain the safety and security of their operations and 
clients. The legal framework supporting this aims to ensure compliance 
with applicable and relevant provisions of international law (including 
human rights law); international maritime law and the law of the sea; 
laws and regulations of national, coastal and flag states; and 
commitments under the ICoC to respect human rights (ANSI/ASIS PSC.4 
2013:xii). 
Definitely both published standards have strengths and weaknesses; one 
of the most obvious differences between the two, is PSC4’s broader focus 
on human rights. In fact, it dedicates its section 9.5.1 to this subject 
(ANSI/ASIS PSC.4 2013:27), something that ISO/PAS 28007 refers to in 
very limited terms. The aim of this research though is not to evaluate the 
standards and present the more effective and proper one. The major point 
- which is directly related to the identification of the main research 
question of this project, as discussed in Chapter One - is that PMSCs have 
been operating on worldwide basis since 2003 in broad terms, without any 
specific standards in place, since both the currently available guidelines 
were published in December 2012 and January 2013, respectively. Even 
within the developed conceptual framework of this research (see Section 
2.4.3), according to which the shipping and offshore oil and gas industry 
are the main drivers of the private maritime security sector, there were no 
internationally agreed criteria. Hence, there was nothing on which 
potential clients could be assured that the companies offering their 
services had specific guidelines to follow and requirements to meet in 
order to be certified.             
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Furthermore, and given the globalised nature of both demand and supply 
(the former obviously referring to clients from the shipping and offshore 
oil and gas industry and the latter to PMSCs offering their services 
globally), the very existence of two different standards has created 
another dilemma that both PMSCs and shipping companies have to 
overcome. The former have to choose between the two; since the auditing 
process is time, money and effort consuming very few companies will 
consider the possibility of applying for both.  
Even if the final criterion for their choice might be geographical, the 
globalised maritime security provision does not offer solutions to the 
shipping companies in terms of choosing the PMSC with the proper 
credentials and relevant certification. So, what certification should 
shipping companies ask for from the PMSCs in order to ensure that they 
will contract the most suitable and reliable one to provide security on 
board their ships? And if a PMSC has already been certified with Standard 
A but not with B, and/or vice versa, does this mean that it is not reliable 
or capable of accomplishing successfully its mission?  
One simple and obvious solution – although currently purely theoretical - 
would be the integration of the two in one truly international standard, 
produced jointly by both institutions. Beyond the potential of filling each 
other’s gaps, minimising (or even eliminating) the weaknesses and 
enhancing both documents’ identified strengths, this possible merging can 
provide the solution to the above dilemma. It will also overcome the 
current trend, where US based companies request PSC certification and 
Europeans request ISO, with the justification of conceptual and cultural 
differences in the use of force and the ‘post-Blackwater’ legacy of US 
private security providers. The first signs of the potential of this idea/ 
initiative have emerged through the introduction of a global standard that 
combines the standards of ASIS/ANSI and ISO. This has been advanced 
by the appointment of the ASIS commissioner in Global Standards, Dr 
Mark Siegel, as chairman of the ISO project committee PC 284,85 assigned 
to develop a global private security quality management standard based 
                                                          





on the ANSI/ASIS PSC.1-2012 (ASIS 2013). An optimistic approach could 
see the broadening of this specific initiative to include the maritime 
domain and so having a jointly developed global private maritime security 
quality management standard. However, both options are still pending.    
The body which was supposed to provide answers and guidelines in this 
case, including the development of auditable standards and ethical 
considerations, should be the Swiss-based International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Service Providers, already introduced above. As of 
May 1st, 2013, this currently counts 630 signatory companies. On the 
contrary, the association remains apathetic and its primary objective 
seems to be currently focused on its budget development and the 
establishment of a Board of Directors. This latter will – among other 
restrictions -  introduce membership fees to such an extent that small-
sized companies will not be able to afford them (Chapsos 2013b). 
There is also confusion at local level. In the UK for example, SCEG 
endorses, promotes and urges UK registered PMSCs to adopt and be 
certified following the ISO standards. Yet, in December 2012, the UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a written ministerial statement 
which actually officially endorsed the PSC ASIS standard for regulation of 
private security providers.86 Hence, the obvious question and dilemma 
which all UK registered companies currently face, is which of the two 
should they adopt? Since SCEG has an advisory character, should some 
companies follow the ISO standardisation and the rest look to the 
government’s endorsement for ASIS as authoritative? Clearly, there will 
be a variety of standards applied even within the UK and the SKEG’s 
regulation and standardisation potential will be futile by default. 
In the above framework, the clearest indication of the lack of control, 
regulation and compliance within the private security industry, comes 
from the potential regulators per se. For instance, the ISO certification 
process is overseen by SAMI, which has awarded a contract to the 
National Security Inspectorate (NSI), to audit its members under the 






existing SAMI standards, as discussed earlier in this section. Furthermore, 
the ISO standards are based upon the SAMI standards but have been 
further developed at the IMO with input from the aforementioned bodies 
(BIMCO, International Chamber of Shipping, SCEG) (Cook 2014). At the 
same time, RTI Forensics along with other certification and business 
assurance firms, MSS Global and Lloyd’s Register Quality Assurance 
(LRQA), are working with the UK Accreditation Services. This latter is 
looking to accredit the three companies as private security auditors that 
will formally be able to issue PMSCs with ISO28007 certificates (Van Marle 
2013). Thus a situation is being created whereby several different firms 
will then be working in competition with each other according to different 
standards. Hence, those who are supposed to enhance regulation and 
foster the control mechanisms in reality promote chaos and anarchy by 
investing in free market principles and competitiveness.    
Focusing on the situation in Greece, which provides a second focus of this 
study in terms of the status of registered PMSCs, no such entities 
equivalent to the UK based SCEG exist. The regulation of PMSCs and all 
certification issues are assigned to the Coast Guard. Besides the identified 
weakness of the Greek public sector, the irrelevance of the Coast Guard 
as a governmental body to the above issues and the private security 
sector per se, leaves Greek registered PMSCs uncontrolled and 
unregulated.  
7.4 Use and Storage of Weapons – Use of Force 
7.4.1 Weapons Hire and Procurement  
The most sensitive and complicated issue in all ways is that of weapons’ 
procurement, use and storage, since by definition armed guards are 
supposed to carry them and if necessary to use them. Given the plethora 
of different port states’ regulations referring to weapons allowance on 
board ships, it is not possible for vessels with armed escorts to enter 
many ports en route. On the other hand, the lawless nature of the high 
seas offers alternatives since the above regulations are only in effect up to 
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the 12 nautical miles from the states’ coastline, which defines the limits of 
their territorial waters. 
PMSCs may either hire or own their own weapons, which relies solely upon 
their business strategy and operational planning. During the interview 
process, at least three interviewees made comments to the effect that: 
“At the moment, our company hires weapons from authorised agents in 
various ports, but we are under procurement procedures to buy our own” 
(Interview B, 2012). 
However, according to the UN legislation for weapons and small arms 
proliferation,87 renting and hiring weapons is illegal; in simple words, 
hiring a country’s military weapons to civilians and unauthorised persons, 
in general, is illegal. Yet, almost 75% of the PMSCs – especially the 
smaller ones or those in their first ‘steps’ - follow the practice of hiring 
weapons, since the procedure of buying their own is time consuming and 
requires a lot of bureaucracy depending on their state of registration 
regulations.  
If a company wants to hire weapons, this can be done legally due to 
bilateral agreements signed with the Navies of some countries such 
as Djibouti and Sri Lanka; the arms are transferred from a Navy 
storage depot to the vessel … when we arrive at port, these arms are 
escorted back by the police (Interview B, 2012).  
 
This clearly indicates that companies contracted to deploy armed guards 
during a transit in the region can hire the required weapons while calling 
at a Djibouti port (or Sri Lankan depending on the ship’s route direction), 
and they may then use them while in international waters. Of course the 
quality and reliability of these weapons cannot be guaranteed. And 
problems emerge when the next port a ship calls at prohibits the weapons 
within the state’s territorial waters. Even within states’ exclusive economic 
zones, if there is no certificate from the company that is undertaking the 
contract and there is an ‘incident report’, the vessel could be arrested, 
impounded and heavily fined, while the person responsible for the 
weapons must be a representative (or employee) of the owner of the 
                                                          
87 See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/SALW/   
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weapons. In this case, the common practice is to dump the hired weapons 
at sea, before entering the territorial waters of the reference state. In an 
interviewee’s words ‘there are more AK47s off the coast of Egypt than 
anywhere else in the world’, because weapons are not allowed on board 
merchant vessels crossing the Suez Canal (Interview A, 2012).  
Another alternative is to unload under specific ‘terms and conditions’ 
possibly in ports in Mozambique, Kenya, or South Africa. In this case, it 
behoves the person who hired them to return them to the country and 
owner that they were rented from. If this is not possible, the company 
that hires them provides a guardian (an employee) who joins the armed 
team on board and theoretically s/he has all the responsibility and papers 
required for the weapons in her/his custody. Of course this is not realistic 
because s/he has to sleep at some time while at sea and the weapons 
should be permanently under her/his control. Theoretically, s/he also has 
to make sure that the weapons used by the other persons of the 
contracted team will only be used in a legal manner. In this case, when 
arriving at port, the owning company has the right to disembark them 
while escorted by its employee.  
One of the interviewees offered a clear picture of the concerns raised by 
the hiring of weapons:  
It is still possible to “rent” from Sri Lanka military weapons for armed 
security companies to carry out transits, this happens on a daily 
basis and not only in Sri Lanka but places such as Djibouti also issue 
licenses and rental weapons to “paying customers”… How can a 
country rent out military weapons even with a so called “Guardian” 
that accompanies the weapons? Obviously these countries have their 
own national laws that apply to their territorial waters & contiguous 
zone. The problem is that these weapons go further than that and 
often transit the whole of the Indian Ocean to end up in countries 
like Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, Oman, Egypt etc. From there it is 
the responsibility of the PMSC that “rented” them to return them to 
the home country where they came from. I know of PMSC’s that pay 
on a monthly basis thousands of $US just for a “license”, the rental 
fees & floating armouries are on top of that. If the weapons are 
stored in a navy or police armoury there are also charges but 
nowhere as near as what is being asked for by the floating armouries 
plus the fact if stored in governmental armouries they are legally 
held. The business of Anti-Piracy operations is an extremely 
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profitable one but I must ask myself sometimes who the real pirates 
are? (Interview A, 2012). 
 
Most of the smaller companies – especially those currently starting up - 
are hiring weapons (illegally); in fact almost 75% of them are hiring. For 
all those that buy weapons, their serial numbers are registered as 
belonging to this specific company. The other option for companies is the 
procurement of single shot semi-automatic weapons, because fully 
automatic weapons are not allowed in many port states, so they cannot 
be loaded on board vessels. The company that sells weapons has to be 
licensed and registered in its home country; weapons are mostly bought 
from various factories in USA, Russia (Izhmash) and/or Israel (IWI - 
Israeli Weapons Industry) (Interview D, 2012). As one of the interviewees 
described,  
the process is simple: I place the order in the factory; the factory 
applies on my behalf, using the papers that I have, stating that I am 
a registered security company and I have armed and unarmed 
missions to provide maritime security. These are enough for the [XX] 
authorities to issue an export certificate for the factory; the factory 
produces the arms, I get an ‘End User’s Certificate (EUC)’ with the 
registration of the arms’ serial numbers (SN) … This is what it makes 
the arms legal. If I want to sell them to a third party, I have to get 
permission from the department of export of the country that the 
weapons were manufactured. So far I buy weapons for my company, 
but also on behalf of others companies, which means that they order 
through me (doing the whole process on their behalf), making also 
sure that the legal process is followed this way (Interview A, 2012). 
 
The next complicated issue is safeguarding the weapons while in transit. 
According to the guidelines, when not in use they should be locked in a 
case on the bridge. If not possible, they should be placed in a weapons’ 
case under the bed – so that the box cannot be opened. Only the master 
and the team leader have a key for this lock. They should not be out of 
the case unless the ship is transiting high risk areas (Interviews B, H, 
2012). Anyone who carries a gun while at sea is not supposed to open fire 
unless authorised by the master and, of course, only during transit 
through high risk areas. Furthermore, the night watch must always have a 
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weapon him/herself. While not used on duty, the weapons must be back 
in their box. 
Weapons have to be declared by the shipping company’s agent and/or the 
security company at least 24 hours prior to the arrival at the next port 
that the ship will be calling at. On arriving in territorial waters, the 
weapons have to be locked in the safe; the customs board the vessel 
(before entering the port or upon docking - depending on the port state 
legislation) and the safe is then to be opened upon request. The required 
documentation, weapons and serial number is checked (and probably 
photographed), the safe must be locked again and bonded by the 
customs. The weapons may then be disembarked.      
7.4.2 Floating Armouries 
The practice of disembarking the armed security teams’ weapons in ports 
of convenience (due to geography, legislation and availability) offers the 
flexibility to PMSCs to operate throughout the whole high risk area. It also 
offered the potential for a generous income for national police, coast 
guard or navy services, since the allowance and safeguarding of PMSCs’ 
weapons is obviously not free of charge. As a result the issue of the so-
called ‘floating armouries’ emerged. As one interviewee explained: “We 
buy our weapons from licensed arm dealers … [and] they are safely 
guarded on board floating armouries or at police armouries” (Interview J, 
2013).     
The practice for their deployment started in Sri Lanka, which due to the 
allowance of weapons transfer in the country – as mentioned in relation to 
the hiring process - became a hub for PMSCs operating in the region (MSR 
2012d). However, the potential of local militia breaking into such 
warehouses where weapons might be stockpiled led the country to allow 
the deployment of vessels outside its territorial waters where PMSCs could 
store their weapons and avoid this risk. Furthermore, perhaps in more 
practical terms, this new operational initiative created an annual income 
of over Rs300 million annually for the Sri Lankan navy which was 
controlling the armouries. This practice has been implemented throughout 
the region up to the Gulf of Aden, where a vessel used by a Sri Lankan 
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company was briefly arrested by the authorities in the United Arab 
Emirates. ‘Sinbad’ the vessel, which was in the control of ‘Avant Garde 
Security’, was held whilst it was being refuelled off the coast of Fujairah. 
The company was approved by authorities in Sri Lanka to operate a 
maritime security company in the troubled Gulf of Aden which has become 
a high risk-zone with frequent pirate attacks (MSR 2012b). 
Hence, for countries that do not allow arms in their territorial waters, 
business companies deploy 250-300 tonne vessels in international waters 
to take and store the weapons on board on behalf of the merchant vessel. 
The escort team is then able to disembark at the port of call and fly back 
home. This is a highly dubious legal method of operating as the floating 
armoury has actually no connection to the company that uses or deposits 
the arms on board. In late 2012, more than 18 private ships were 
operating in the region’s international waters, in the locations indicated in 
Figure 25, demonstrating not only the profitable nature of the concept, 
but also the desire of PMSCs to bypass the port states’ regulations 
regarding the arms aboard vessels (Brown 2012:5).  
Figure 26: Locations of Floating Armouries (Oceanus Live 2012) 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this 
thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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Obviously the floating armouries are on the fringes of legality because 
they take on arms that belong to another company with no connection 
between them, which is in breach of their ‘End User Certificate’, if they 
have one. Furthermore, the registration of some of these vessels is of a 
highly suspicious nature: they are often registered as fishing vessels, tugs 
or pleasure crafts and are not simply being used for another purpose but 
for the purpose of storing weapons at sea (Interview A, 2012). 
Beyond these legal issues, if we examine the scenario of a floating 
armoury being hijacked by pirates or a terrorist organisation, there is 
great cause for concern (MSR 2012a). The vessel will have a stockpile of 
weapons and ammunition in their weaponry, ready to be used in all kinds 
of illicit and terrorist activities, and the weapons will have the PMSCs as 
officially registered ‘end users’.  For example, Picture 6 shows the floating 
armoury ‘Aladin’ operating off Fujairah; she does not seem to be very well 
protected against such a potential scenario, with cases of weapons visibly 
stockpiled even on the decks of the vessel.        
Picture 6: Floating Armoury 'Aladin' off Fujairah  (Source: Author's archive, 2013) 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this 
thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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In operational (and business) terms, this provides the flexibility to PMSCs 
to embark and disembark in ports where port states’ legislation does not 
allow weapons. By using the floating armouries, they can pick up their 
weapons as soon as they exit the territorial waters of one and disembark 
them before entering the waters of the next (Interview J, 2013). Again, 
another ‘side-service’ business company is invented, exploiting both the 
‘freedom of the seas’ and lawlessness of the international waters for 
developing market opportunities in support of the main actors: the 
PMSCs.  
7.4.3 Use of Force 
The overall concept of deploying armed guards that may use force in case 
of pirate attacks on board merchant vessels is justified under the right to 
self-defence since the guards are perceived as crew-members during the 
attacks. Although, in military terms, there are specific and strict 
limitations and required authorisation for the use of force provided 
through the release of Rules of Engagement by governmental bodies, the 
free market has no such mandatory mechanisms in place.  
A general manager of a big and prestigious company in the global market, 
attempted to describe his teams’ experiences in moderate terms:  
To date, [the company] has conducted over 600 transits of the High 
Risk Area (HRA) and we have encountered pirates on 25 occasions. 
[The company’s] teams have encountered pirates on 25 transits of 
the High Risk Area. Just recently, a [company’s] team encountered 7 
pirate skiffs operating at the southern end of the Red Sea. The Team 
Leader reported that the pirates had heaving machine guns and 
RPGs and they closed the vessel in a coordinated fashion in order to 
probe the security team. The [company’s] Team Leader received 
permission from the Master to employ warning shots and disabling 
fire as necessary while the ship performed evasive manoeuvres. The 
team maintained their presence on the bridge while the ship opened 
the distance with the pirate action group. No shots were fired and 
the presence of the professional security team was enough to deter 




The notion of a ‘threshold of use of force’ has been broadly debated at all 
levels of engaged entities. Yet, no specific solution has emerged so far, 
despite the shooting between PMSCs and pirates that is frequently 
reported (with many more unreported) from the region. Given the 
difficulty to distinguish the pirate from the common fisherman in this 
specific region, armed guards and vessel protection military detachments 
have shot and killed both pirates and fishermen (Katz 2012). The most 
indicative and broadly discussed case, is that of the Italian marines on 
board the Italian merchant ship, Enrica Lexie, who shot and killed two 
fishermen mistaking them for pirates off the coast of Kerala, on 15 
February 2012, as discussed above (MSR 2012c).   
IAMSP was one of the first organisations to issue and distribute relevant 
standards on the threshold of use of force to its members, including forms 
for reporting such incidents at sea and also making them available from 
its website.88 Yet, as clearly stressed within the manual, these standards 
have first to be adopted by the company in order to come into effect; 
furthermore, they need to be implemented by the individual guards, 
depending on their decision-making skills, training and experience, etc.  
Similarly, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)89 issued 
the “Guidance on Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) by Privately Contracted 
Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) in Defence of a Merchant Vessel 
(MV)”90 in accordance with IMO’s circulars. This document attempts to 
offer a ‘manual’ to engaged and interested parties. 
It is obvious and commonly accepted that it is in the master’s authority to 
‘order’ the firing against upcoming pirates. But is he experienced enough 
to retain his self-control in such an incident? When it comes to personal 
survival of the experienced guards, how long should they wait for the 
master’s authorisation? Is the high-speed approach of a skiff enough to 
                                                          
88 See http://iamsponline.org/tag/use-of-force/  
89 BIMCO is an NGO/shipping association providing a wide range of services to its global membership 
which has vested interests in the shipping industry. This includes ship owners, operators, managers, 
brokers and agents. The association’s main objective is to facilitate the commercial operations of its 
membership by developing standard contracts and clauses, and providing quality information, advice, 
and education. See https://www.bimco.org/About/About_BIMCO.aspx [accessed 1 June 2013] 
90 Available online from 
https://www.bimco.org/Chartering/Documents/Security/~/media/Chartering/Document_Samples/Sun




justify opening fire for self-defence? Is the force that will be used by the 
armed guards equivalent to that of the pirates’ or might it be used in 
excess in response to the imminent threat? How subjective can self-
defence be? All these questions depend on personal characteristics and 
proper training for similar conditions, on the level of familiarisation with 
emergency and under fire conditions, in order to be answered. Thus, the 
debate referring to state and private training and security emerges once 
again.       
In late May 2013, the publication ‘The 100 Series Rules – An International 
Model Set of Maritime Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)’91 was officially 
issued, after being reviewed more than twenty times due to lack of 
consent or required amendments from the contributors. Its objective is, 
on one hand, to provide the PMSCs, the ship’s master and the crew with 
guidance “on lawful graduated response measures and lawful use of force 
in accordance with the right of self-defence when subjected to either 
perceived or actual acts of maritime piracy, armed robbery or hijacking”. 
On the other hand, it aims at reducing the risk of civil liability claims, 
and/or potential criminal or other charges against the master, crew, 
PMSCs and the shipping industry in general. 
As already highlighted in other similar issues, this is just to provide 
guidance to the interested parties and by no means has a compulsory 
character. Even if it did, there is no assigned and responsible international 
body to ensure and enforce its proper adoption and application. 
 
7.5 Quality Assessment and Ethical Concerns 
7.5.1 Quality Assessment 
Clients depend on references for PMSCs in order to approach them and 
offer them a contract for an armed escort. In this context, BIMCO issued a 
standardised contract for the employment of security guards on vessels 
                                                          
91 See http://www.100seriesrules.com/ [accessed 1 June 2013]  
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(GUARDCON),92 which also provides a ‘checklist’ for shipping companies in 
order to take all the required aspects, measures and precautions into 
consideration before contracting a PMSC.  
However, the PMSC’s experience and references from previous contracts 
are the main additional credentials, as well as the insurance (for about 
US$5million) for accident, kidnap ransom, etc.. It is in the shipping 
company’s remit to accept or reject the PMSC’s suggested team members 
for the armed escort.  
Given the same certification process for all companies from the same 
institutions - as described earlier - the credentials that the clients finally 
request refer to the subcontractors who will actually form the escort team 
and participate in the mission. Their CVs constitute the basic documents, 
proving that they were in the military and also in the service of the 
respective company for a certain amount of time. Although they do not 
have the capacity to check the accuracy of the content of this document, 
the company has to ensure that the prospective employee’s background is 
appropriate. And, again this depends on each company’s reliability and 
ethos. Even in this way, due to the confidentiality of the candidate’s 
previous military service, it is not possible to have exact data about the 
specific military assignments that each individual member of each team 
had been through. The generic CV that is provided to clients includes 
some personal details (name, date of birth, passport number, military 
service and time that each member has worked for the company) and 
evidence that they have had the necessary training on the particular 
defence platform in order to demonstrate and confirm their relevant 
experience for the mission. However, a potential team member does not 
solely operate on armed protection of vessels. One of the interviewees’ 
latest missions was the protection of an international diamonds’ dealer in 
South Africa, ensuring the safe transfer of himself and his valuable 
commodities (Interview H, 2012).  
Definitely, the quality assessment of the personnel needs to be directly 
related to the level of the risk that the escort teams have to face during 
                                                          
92 Available online from https://www.bimco.org/Chartering/Documents/Security/GUARDCON.aspx 
[accessed 20 May 2013] 
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their transits, and for all companies and teams this risk stems primarily 
from pirate attacks in the HRA. As described in one of the interviews, in 
one reported case, a security consultant who was a member of an 
unarmed escort team was taken hostage along with the rest of the crew, 
and held in captivity for approximately nine months (Interview H, 2012).  
Another PMSC’s director, who mostly offers consultancy for the protection 
of critical infrastructure, stated in an interview that for his company, the 
major risks include “kidnap and physical violence; generally … activities 
[that] occur on shore. This has included instances where we received 
tactical intelligence that our team (in situ) was being looked at by certain 
groups” (Interview F, 2012). 
All interviewees identified the event of having an untrained member in a 
mission as the major danger for the armed escort teams: 
The non-qualified personnel that don’t know what to do and has 
never been under fire before, is a major danger. They don’t know 
how to react, and under pressure they even shoot at fishermen 
perceived as suspected pirates (as it happened with the Italian 
military team and in many other cases). I don’t know how many 
fishermen have been overall shot by PMSCs’ personnel and die and 
never been reported.  
Of course they face also the danger to be shot, kidnapped if the 
vessel gets taken (which means that the team wasn’t up to the job 
properly and you didn’t do the recruitment properly or you did it and 
you had substandard personnel). 
There was an incident where one of my teams was swamped and 
attacked by 20 skiffs in the Babb el Mandeb straits. That is a danger; 
and another vessel with one of our teams on board was attacked 3 
times within a space of half an hour by 5 different skiffs. Warning 
shots were fired and they turned away (Interview A, 2012).  
Companies, who hire non-qualified people, with the expectation that they 
will be trained by their colleagues during the transit, do not usually 
provide the option to the team leader to choose the specific synthesis of 
his own team. An operator’s statement in his interview was revealing: 
[T]he selection of the teams’ composition is a great issue in maritime 
security companies; you cannot deploy the very last minute four 
team members which have never even met before just because they 
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were selected by the management and their only common ground is 
the operation’s briefing. The company has to re-assess periodically 
the available sub-contractors and deploy only the best; during the 
transit there are human lives at stake, as well as the vessel and its 
cargo, so there is no space for apologies due to human errors. 
Risks actually start even while at port and boarding the vessel which 
asked for protection; there are many pirates’ informers paid to 
provide details for the number of team members onboard, their 
weapons, ammunition, etc.” (Interview H, 2012).      
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7.5.2 Ethical Concerns 
There are companies that offer escort transits for US$29,500 from Suez to 
Galle, compared with an average price for this specific transit of between 
US$48-50,000. In this competitive environment, companies have to lower 
the prices for contracts, so subsequently it effects the daily compensation 
of the subcontractors and inevitably their quality. As explained by one 
interviewee, 
Non-qualified personnel will take €50 a day for working on a vessel, 
while the average price for qualified personnel is €200. Another 
company is hiring Yemeni personnel for $50 per day they give them 
a rifle and ask them to shoot anything that approaches within 800 
yards from the ship. It’s all about the money and everyone wants to 
beat the competitor by offering lower-price contracts (Interview A, 
2012). 
 
It is indicative to hear the views of an experienced operator on this same 
issue:  
When I first started offering maritime security services, my 
compensation was $300 per day, counting from the day I was 
boarding on the vessel. However, relatively soon after it was reduced 
to $250 per day and finally I was almost not even paid at all; they 
were refusing to pay me (and the rest of the team) for several days 
of the transit, using ridiculous excuses. Finally I was paid for all the 
days; later on I found out that it was a common practice of this 
specific company and apparently I never worked with them again.  
Bad businessmen spoil the industry’s reputation; I realise that their 
primary objective is financial profit, but shouldn’t be made against 
the employees’. You cannot cut corners in terms of proper equipment 
and the team-members’ security in general, or the selection and 
vetting procedures. Of course this does not mean that all companies 
operate the same way; yet, due to the sudden booming of the 
industry and the increased demand, many of them appeared and 
became ‘companies’ in one night, and the quality was significantly 
downgraded (Interview H, 2012).  
 
These conditions do not allow tolerance in the quality of the 
subcontractors that are employed, but under the current circumstances it 




7.6 Conclusion  
Chapter Seven provides a substantial contribution to the fulfilment of the 
third identified objective: to analyse the complex framework of the PMSCs’ 
business model, in legal, operational and ethical terms. It uncovers the 
dynamics underlying the PMSCs’ regulatory framework in the context of 
the privatisation of international security, through an in-depth 
investigation of the actors’ regulation and applied practices. On the one 
hand, these private maritime service providers clearly challenge the 
states’ monopoly in terms of maritime security provision. On the other 
hand though, they emerged as the most popular and effectively applied 
anti-piracy measure, and were broadly recognised as such. This chapter 
gives a detailed description of the methods and practices used regarding 
their recruitment, evaluation and training procedures, their international 
certification and regulation process in force, their controversial approaches 
in buying, hiring and safekeeping weapons and, even more importantly, in 
using them for projecting force. Finally, the chapter provides an analysis 
of the significant issues relating to their regulation at international level. 
This includes the use and carrying of weapons on board commercial 
vessels and the debateable process of assessing their quality and 
performance within the free market - which actually controls the whole 
provision of private security by default due to the reluctance of the states 
to actively control the outsourcing. These are examined in parallel with 
the ethical concerns stemming from their deployment.   
PMSCs introduced a whole new business model into the field of security, 
which transformed security provision services into a lucrative activity. To 
a great extent, this has disengaged the state from providing security to 
the shipping industry, while simultaneously offering many employment 
opportunities to well-trained former military personnel, who were already 
retired at a very young age. It is indicative, for example that the UK 
government officially stated that:  
The Government does not currently recognise an accreditation 
process for PSCs operating in the maritime security sector. Shipping 
companies must, therefore, be extra vigilant in selecting an 
appropriate PSC to provide armed security on board their ships. The 
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Guidance goes on to provide a number of recommendations as to the 
selection, size and training of a private security team (Foreign Affairs 
Committee 2011:27). 
Moreover, new peripheral companies have emerged – following free 
market principles - to support and enhance the already established and 
flourishing private maritime security services. Particularly, in areas where 
states were either reluctant to develop their own security services, or 
were developing them in parallel with the private sector but with less 
interest and active engagement, this ‘supportive industry’ demonstrated 
another perspective for market opportunities.  
The deployment of PMSCs is justified to a great extent by the extremely 
high increase in insurance premiums that ship-owners have to pay to 
giant insurers. For example, as soon as piracy incidents increased in the 
Gulf of Aden, Lloyd’s, the London based world’s leading ship insurance 
market, included the west coast of India in its list of ‘war risk’ areas (MSR 
2011c). This practice had severe financial implications and in 2011 alone, 
it resulted in the increase of insurance companies’ income by $600 million, 
(six times higher than pirates made from ransom money in the same 
year) (Singh 2013). However, insurance companies somehow encourage 
and promote the private security practice by offering significant discounts 
to those ship-owners who decide to contract such providers in any form. 
This highlights the ‘business model loop’ involving both the private 
security industry and the shipping industry, since the insurance discount is 
more or less balanced by the cost of contracting private security 
companies. Thus, in practical terms, the only differentiation for shipping 
companies is a robust security provision on board the vessels, given that 
the overall cost remains approximately the same.    
Finally, many states have taken advantage of the booming private 
security industry, whether through indirect taxation, or even direct 
taxation, and by renting infrastructure and facilities for such services as 
weapons safeguarding and stockpiling, which are essential for PMSCs 




Chapter Eight:  Privatisation of Security - Implications and 
Future    Trends  
 
8.1 Introduction 
Consideration of the implications of the privatisation of security in the 
global context in relation to the international community’s efforts to 
address contemporary piracy off Somalia provides revealing findings and 
insights. Currently, three United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
resolutions provide the legal basis and the mandates for the multinational 
flotillas to patrol and operate in the region. However, as Brown (2012:4-
5) comments, “the world navies’ efforts have been akin to a police car 
patrolling an area the size of France”. Moreover, although more than 
1,000 pirates have been brought to prosecution in approximately 20 
different countries, there has been a profound reluctance to take action 
ashore; not only in terms of military operations but also in terms of 
improving governance, human security and infrastructure. At an 
international level, the UN rejected six requests to impose a blockade on 
specific Somali ports, fishing villages and identified pirate safe havens, 
although this is the most obvious way to deny them access to open seas - 
instead of hunting them across the oceans (Brown 2012:5). 
This final chapter reviews the developments underway in the international 
private security industry, looking for justifications in terms of market 
expansion and new emerging initiatives, and considering their implications 
in international maritime security. Combining the findings of Chapter 
Seven concerning the PMSCs’ existing regulatory framework and business 
model with the analysis of the international maritime security environment 
in the context of the privatisation of global maritime security trend, 
developed in Section 2.4 and Chapters 4 and 5, it addresses the final 
identified objective of the thesis. In effect, it provides an assessment of 
the extent to which these issues will affect international security in 





8.2 Vessel Protection and Military Detachments 
As discussed in Chapter Four (Section 4.4.2), the blurred distinction 
between state and private maritime security becomes even murkier as a 
consequence of the common practice of deploying the so-called Vessel 
Protection Detachments. Through this, what was hitherto perceived as the 
state’s obligation has become a private endeavour as well since states are 
privately hiring armed military teams to shipping companies for protection 
of commercial vessels. On the one hand, the private sector’s high demand 
for armed escorts at competitive prices and, on the other, the guaranteed 
high level training of military personnel, as well as the reduction of states’ 
armed forces budget, offers great potential for both parties to do 
business. The service is available to ships registered and flying the flag of 
the respective state, or even to companies controlled by the state’s 
nationals. Given also the flexibility and legal status of military personnel in 
terms of carrying weapons through transit ports and their consequent 
better protection in case of prosecutions, many companies are in favour of 
contracting them (Brown 2012:9).  
It is estimated that currently almost 2,000 military personnel are 
deployed in the Indian Ocean, all hired as members of VPD teams to 
provide protection for commercial interests. The Russian Navy has 
deployed VPDs since 2009 and the Netherlands, France, Spain, Belgium 
and Italy have fully adopted this practice, making their VPDs available to 
private shipping companies. Indonesia, which counts more than 76,000 
nationals employed as seafarers, is also seriously considering the 
implementation of this practice. Dutch shipping companies have been 
banned from contracting PMSCs, due to the government’s concerns 
regarding the challenge to the state’s monopoly in the use of force. 
Consequently, more than 26 Dutch VPD missions with 10 members each 
were deployed in 2012; half of their cost was paid by shipping companies, 
even so, it is questionable if this is a cheaper option than contracting a 
PMSC (Brown 2012:9-10). In 2012, India also announced its intention to 
establish the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), with the 
responsibility to protect merchant vessels. The force will be manned 
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initially with 100 Indian commandos, trained especially for this purpose 
(SaveOurSeafarers 2012).  
Perhaps the practice of deploying VPDs is the strongest evidence of the 
contemporary perception of security, which completely aligns national 
military power and force projection with private commercial interests. 
Hence, it could be interpreted as an attempt to integrate the neo-liberal 
model of security privatisation (see Sections 2.2.2 and 4.3), into the 
state-centric traditional mechanisms of security provision, as interpreted 
through the realist approach (see Sections 2.2.1 and 6.4.1).  
The implications of this deviation from the traditional practice -of 
patrolling high risk areas to ensure the ‘freedom of the seas’ and secure 
the ‘common goods’- are profound. It is a clear statement from states that 
they deploy their military in order to protect only their nationals’ ships 
and/or companies, who in turn are willing to (at least) share the 
attributed cost of security provision. Simultaneously, the practice of 
carrying military on board merchant vessels questions the neutrality and 
civilian character of commercial shipping, as defined in international law 
(Brown 2012:10). However, deploying a VPD on board a merchant vessel 
is incomparably cheaper than deploying a frigate to patrol the Indian 
Ocean: the annual cost of one frigate’s deployment, is equivalent to 
employing 100,000 law enforcement officers in Somalia for one year 
(Singh 2013). The final choice is up to the states themselves but the 
outcome is obviously business oriented rather than having any intention 
to address root causes or fighting piracy ashore.      
The limited demands on the state’s defence budget entailed in employing 
VPDs compared to the deployment of naval assets on the other side of the 
globe clearly provide a convincing justification for adopting these tactics. 
The figures provided in Table 7, which present the average cost for 
various types of counter piracy vessels, is strong evidence of this shift in 
approach. 
The debate that emerged regarding this practice was that states were 
desperately trying not to completely abolish and outsource their monopoly 
in security provision, while more business oriented analysts suggest that 
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states are just trying to take their share from the security provision pie, 
within the contemporary anti-piracy business model.    
Source: Bowden and Basnet 2012 
 
Table 7: Cost of Counter-Piracy Military Vessels (Bowden and Basnet 2012) 
From the shipping companies’ perspective, there are theoretically even 
more advantages. The guaranteed high level of military training, reduced 
price for contracting VPDs compared to PMSCs, their flexibility and their 
legal status as state entities in terms of carrying weapons through transit 
ports and their protection from the state in case of wrongdoings has 
persuaded many companies to contract them. 
Yet, the reality is slightly different and this has been demonstrated in the 
cruellest way possible. That is, through the incident involving the two 
Italian marines deployed on board ‘Enrica Lexie’ (Banerji and Jose 2013). 
The death of the two Indian fishermen, who were shot by the marines 
after being mistaken for pirates, highlighted the complexity of maritime 
security issues and the murky framework of its provision.  
One single sentence can reflect the paradox of the overall situation: A 
state’s military detachment, protecting private commercial interests in 
international waters was charged with the death of another country’s 
nationals and therefore should be prosecuted. However, firstly, there are 
no bilateral agreements or treaties between Italy and India to dictate (as 
is usual in these cases) that the investigation of the case and the 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can be 
viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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prosecution of the perpetrators is a matter for military jurisdiction. Hence, 
it rests with the international and local law to resolve the issue. 
Consequently, the mainstream media headlines publicised the escalating 
diplomatic tensions between the two countries for a long time; stemming 
from the prosecution process of the Italian marines in Indian courtrooms. 
The culmination point was Italy’s refusal to return the marines to India, 
after their visit to their home country for the national elections. India in 
return withdrew the immunity of the Italian ambassador and banned him 
from leaving the country, unless the marines returned to complete their 
trial (Chapsos 2013c).  
In 1999, US Marine General Charles Krulak coined the term ‘Strategic 
Corporal’ to stress the need for low ranked, tactical level commanders to 
understand the strategic effects and implications of their decisions 
(Barcott 2010, Shanahan 2011). This gained further significance in the 
context of General Krulak’s approach for contemporary conflicts’ complex 
environments and the ‘three block war’ concept whereby military forces 
conduct humanitarian, peacekeeping/stabilization, and combat operations 
simultaneously on three separate city blocks (Dorn and Varey 2009). In 
light of this, analysts and strategists concerned with the Iraq war, adopted 
the term, alluding to the significance of the deeds of armed street patrols 
in a foreign country. However, the decision making abilities of the 
patrolling military personnel failed to have analogous implications in 
winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of local populations, reflecting their low-
rank level. The term has also applied effectively in the maritime domain, 
in the case of the ‘Enrica Lexie’, where a tactical mistake by two ‘Strategic 
Marines’ resulted in the diplomatic tension between two countries. 
Through the above incident, the globalisation of international security 
becomes profound, along with the justifications for its privatisation. 
Although there are indications that during the last five years many similar 
incidents have taken place in the Indian Ocean, with innocent fishermen 
being shot by armed guards after being mistaken for pirates, the 
consequences were not proportionate, since no state entities were 
engaged. This can partly explain states’ reluctance to keep the monopoly 
of security provision, both ashore and offshore, since its expeditionary 
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forces have to operate in complex and hostile environments. On the other 
hand, private security providers enable governments to avoid supervision, 
external (and internal) legislative requirements, parliamentary inquiries or 
political cost when using force and conducting controversial operations 
abroad, especially if the outcome looks likely to result in embarrassing 
failure. Thus, especially in the maritime domain, the responsibility is 
transferred to the shipping companies and vessel masters, both for the 
choice and contract of the private security provider, as well as for 
covering the cost of their own security. The state retains only the right of 
regulation and control of the private security providers; however, practice 
indicates that even these are following free market principles and the 
states’ engagement remains rhetoric (Chapsos 2013c).  
Figure 27: European Maritime States' policy on vessel protection (Van Ginkel et 
al. 2013:22) 
An indicative study was released in February 2013, analysing the status of 
VPDs in Europe and addressing the critical question: should state or 
private protection be used against maritime piracy (Van Ginkel et al. 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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2013)? The report clearly reflects the EU states’ preference in contracting 
PMSCs for the vessels flying their flag, instead of deploying VPDs, as 
Figure 26 clearly indicates. However, although the report provides only 
the Dutch perspective, given that the Netherlands is the sole state that 
adopts the deployment of VPDs as the backbone of its policy (and 
considers the use of PMSCs illegal), its assessment concludes with three 
possible scenarios as policy recommendations. These include the potential 
of using PMSCs either as a government taskforce or privately contracted, 
under strict criteria and supervisory mechanisms (Van Ginkel et al. 
2013:35).   
The current situation puts the VPDs’ practice and future under question. 
Even India itself has not as yet deployed the CISF (mentioned above) nor 
officially declared its operational availability. And, perhaps more 
importantly, the security of seafarers lives and vessels becomes an 
increasingly private concern, relying solely upon the shipping company’s 
wealth, and the ship-owners’ discretion and will to allocate funds for 
contracting the company with the optimum service to cost ratio.  
8.3 Private Navies 
A practice that is a natural evolution of private maritime security services, 
and simultaneously an even broader expansion of the private security 
business model, is the deployment of private armed ships for the 
protection of merchant vessels. 
From 2001 up to 2003, the private UK firm ‘Hart Nimrod’ operated a 65 
metre long vessel – MV Celtic Horizon - with three RHIBs93 on board, 
contracted by Puntland’s authorities to enforce fisheries’ protection. This 
was another clear example of substitution for the state’s functions, since 
the lack of law enforcement agencies – both at state and international 
level - allowed the exploitation of Somali fisheries from foreign fishing 
fleets, which is one of the root causes of modern piracy (Berube 
2012:78). 
                                                          
93 The acronym stands for Rigid-Hulled Inflatable  Boats  
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In 2006, Blackwater, arguably the most notorious private security 
company in the world, attempted to expand into the maritime domain. To 
this end, it purchased McArthur, a 40-year old Oceanographic ship (her 
cost was approximately $400,000). Her renovation cost another $3.5 
million and three RHIBs another $1 million, and she was also modified so 
as to be capable of carrying two helicopters on board. Her crew counted 
thirteen members minimum, but had the capacity to carry an additional 
30 members of armed security teams (Berube 2012:79). 
McArthur sailed from Norfolk, Virginia, on the day of President Obama’s 
inauguration, 20 January 2009, heading towards the Gulf of Aden to 
provide armed anti-piracy escort to potential clients (Berube and Cullen 
2012:3). Yet, although Blackwater approached several clients 
representing more than 1.000 ships, none were very enthusiastic about 
buying its services due to two major issues. First, the company’s 
reputation was broadly spoiled in the ‘market’ due to publicity given to its 
controversial activities in Iraq. Second, the cost of hiring an armed vessel 
for escort through the high risk area was not cost effective: whilst 
Blackwater had to receive the return from the money invested to renovate 
and equip the ship, the ship owners could find cheaper solutions by 
contracting PMSCs to deploy armed teams on their vessels. Soon enough, 
even more logistics’ problems emerged that demonstrated the complexity 
of the international maritime environment due to different flag and port 
states’ legislations. Oman did not allow the ship to even re-supply in its 
ports; political issues excluded Yemen from any potential consideration of 
logistics contracts; Djibouti appeared to be the solution and suitable to 
function as the ship’s base, but a third party had gained exclusive rights 
to vet any private security forces within the country. Thus, the final cost 
for Blackwater was very high. The ship, finally, ended up in Aqaba, 
Jordan, actually out of the operational area. The whole initiative was 
doomed to failure and the ship was finally sold silently in Spain for just 
US$4.5 million (Berube 2012:79-80). 
In his study of maritime piracy, after a historical overview of the well-
known ‘privateers’ during the 17th century, Bellamy (2011:81-2) stresses 
the risk of PMSCs turning to pirates themselves due to the lack of secure, 
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legitimate bases and legal protection. He points out that private security 
teams have already been arrested in Eritrea for these reasons. As he 
makes clear, these incidents demonstrate the significance of creating safe 
and legitimate bases – even through regional maritime security regimes - 
with robust regulation and maintenance standards should the international 
community wish to use PMSCs as an anti-piracy means. Furthermore, his 
research reflects anew that, whilst these issues have been addressed 
throughout the perpetual existence of the phenomenon, (albeit with 
different factors being taken into account by policy makers and strategy 
planners - such as human rights), the primary concerns and major 
difficulties remain very similar even in the contemporary struggle against 
piracy. And as discussed in previous sections regarding the ‘typology of 
piracy’, even though there are differentiations in terms of geographic 
locations, operational models and pirate groups’ objectives, there are still 
strategic issues which apply in all cases. Such issues need to be taken into 
consideration, aiming at the development of a common, joint, 
international and effective anti-piracy response on a worldwide basis.           
8.3.1 Contemporary trends 
The blurred distinction between state and private initiatives, jurisdictions 
and security provision becomes further emphasised if we consider the 
Yemen Coast Guard’s activities during the same period. Given the high 
demands for security and anti-piracy escorts in its area of jurisdiction, the 
Yemen Coast Guard provided its services to private shipping companies, 
which generated quite a high income. Although the Yemeni Government 
expected a ‘bottom-up’ revenue from this lucrative service provision, it 
never reached the governmental treasury (at least not to its full extent). 
This resulted not only in tension between the government and the Coast 
Guard leadership, but also in the cancelation of the latter’s budget funding 
(O’Byrne 2013).  
As of late 2012, approximately forty private armed patrol boats were 
operating in the region, offering a ‘security zone’ around clients’ ships by 
challenging suspicious boats approaching them. This method is attractive 
to shipping companies, since their ships do not have to carry armed 
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personnel on board; hence they do not compromise their right to 
‘innocent passage’ through foreign coastal states’ territorial waters. 
Moreover, the master and her crew do not have to be engaged in decision 
making or the potential consequences of weapons firing against pirates, 
since the whole operation is assigned to the patrol boat and her crew. 
However, the private patrol boats’ status is extremely unclear, and could 
in fact be included in the category of piracy itself, since according to 
international law the use of aggressive force on the high seas without 
government authority constitutes piracy. Furthermore, the use of force by 
armed escort teams’ on board vessels under attack may be legitimised 
through the principle and right for self-defence. However, in the case of 
private armed patrol boats, the interception, shouting and perhaps 
boarding of another civilian vessel obviously raises significant legal issues. 
It could also result in creating chaos, anarchy and further loss of human 
lives. There are also serious ethical issues to consider stemming from the 
scenario of the patrol boat witnessing a pirate attack against a vessel 
other than the client’s without taking any action since she is not paid to 
protect ships other than the contractor’s (Brown 2012:8-11). 
Given that a ship can be registered as a military vessel only by a state or 
similar entity with official armed forces, this is not an available option for 
private security companies (Correspondence D 2013). The companies 
offering this service usually buy decommissioned military vessels, convert 
them to civilian use in the area and register them as security crafts 
(Correspondences C, D 2013). At this stage, the situation becomes 
complicated, since the modification of their previous armoury has to 
comply with the restrictions and limitations of the flag state’s legislation. 
However, and given the variations of states’ legislation in this specific 
issue, it does not necessarily mean that compliance with the flag state’s 
regulation will also be in accordance with the port state’s equivalent, 
where the vessel will potentially be contracted and deployed in the future. 
Hence, in the case of operations for combating piracy in the Malacca 
Straits, the heavily armed private boats that were contracted for this 
purpose were deployed from two or three ports. Thus, their base, in terms 
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of logistics provision, replenishment, departure for patrolling and calling 
after the patrol was complete, was limited to these specific ports.  
Similarly, in the offshore oil industry, where the use of private vessels 
have been a practice in terms of security provision to the oil rigs for many 
years, there are specific arrangements with local authorities and 
governments in order to licence their operational deployment. Even in this 
case, they are only allowed to depart from a specific port, execute a 
specific mission around the oil rig and only within the state’s territorial 
waters and afterwards return to the same port. This practice was 
explained by a member of an international law firm, with expertise in 
maritime issues: 
[A] ship can only be registered as a military vessel if you are a state 
or similar entity having official armed forces. Personally or as a 
company you cannot register a military vessel (maybe you can 
register a “security craft” or something like this, but it will never be 
“military”. The arms depend on the flag and port state but personally 
I don’t know a single state granting permissions for heavy guns to 
any private person (except maybe museums with quite a lot of 
bylaws – not likely in this case). 
 Registering a “security craft” should be quite easy as long as you 
keep to a standard routine. What I mean: when we had the situation 
with piracy in the Malacca Straits quite heavily armed boats were 
used from two or three ports, leaving from there, doing the escort 
and returning to one of these ports (in the some country). Therefore 
you could arrange something with the competent authorities and you 
did just domestic trade. You have a similar situation with offshore 
platform protection (one port, going for a mission, returning to the 
same port).  
 It gets a lot more problematic if you do this across boarders [sic] 
and it gets near to impossible if you do this as “tramp shipping”. 
A former military crew means actually it is not military and can 
therefore be only civilian. As a consequence it is a civilian vessel with 
a civilian crew, even when looking military and maybe behaving 
officially. The only chameleon being partly military and partly civilian 
I could imagine is something like MARAD with maritime 
prepositioning ships or coast guard, but definitely not a private 
security provider. 
By the way – if it would be easy to own such a boat, I would 




It is obvious that when the operational concept entails a form of convoy 
protection, things become even more complicated, since the “security 
craft” will inevitably have to cross multiple coastal states’ territorial 
waters; hence obtaining a relevant agreement and the resultant 
authorisation from all of them is unrealistic. And even if the route planning 
is such that it avoids all states’ territorial waters, the minimum 
requirements will still, normally, engage at least three states (and 
authorisations): the port of departure, the port of call after completing the 
convoy escort and another port of call for replenishment (even just as an 
emergency plan since there is a whole ocean to cross). The above 
requirements, which are the minimum legal commitments that have to be 
considered by such companies, highlight and to some extent explain the 
failure of Blackwater’s attempt with MacArthur, as described above.    
Despite the failures of the past, in early January 2013, the initiative of a 
British businessman to fund and launch a private navy in anti-piracy 
operations was in the headlines of the global mainstream media. The 
armed vessels were to be led by an ex-Royal Navy commodore, also 
responsible for recruiting 240 former marines and sailors for the unit. 
Their task was to escort oil tankers, bulk carriers and yachts around the 
east coast of Africa. Involving military-like planning and principles, their 
project was focused on a decommissioned ex-military 10,000 tonne 
‘mother ship’, positioned in the ‘main body’ of the convoy being escorted 
and modified so as to be capable of carrying three to five smaller fast 
patrol boats. These smaller boats would be deployed ahead of the convoy 
in a ‘shift – mode’ in order to provide early warning, deterrence and 
thwart pirate attacks with the use of force if necessary.94 Thus, by these 
means they would keep pirate skiffs away from the ‘high value units’, that 
is, the ‘clients’ who contracted the company for this purpose. The 
company was set up because the Royal Navy, NATO and the EU Naval 
Force lack the vessels to patrol the vast area; the company’s chief 
executive (CEO) stressed in the media that, "[t]hey can't do the job 
because they haven't got the budget …”. Deploying a billion-pound 
                                                          
94 Subject of course to the weather, sea-state and fuel self-efficiency  
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warship against six … [pirates] with $500 of kit is not a very good use of 
the asset” (Keating 2013). 
The CEO of the company reflected on the whole concept in an interview 
conducted and released by Bloomberg (2012): he explained that the aim 
of the billionaire who invested in this initiative,95 was to be focused on 
offering anti-piracy escorts all around the globe and wherever they might 
be needed and contracted for this service. The concept involved investing 
in and building on the low insurance premiums that shipping companies 
would pay while contracting the security providers and spreading the cost 
of the convoy escort by getting together as many as possible for each 
transit (Bloomberg 2012).  
Still, for all the reasons and difficulties analysed above, and an in-person 
‘debate’ about the weaknesses of the venture and the high risk of failure 
(Correspondence G, 2012), the publicised operational model, investment 
and launch of this new form of private security provision at sea remain 
rhetoric.      
8.3.2 The ‘Defender’ 
Following this, the venture of the British gunboat ‘Defender’, shown in 
Picture 7 below, initially looks like a repetition of the cases already 
researched in this section. However, it does highlight the distinctiveness 
of the maritime domain in terms of the variety of states’ legislation 
involved, the lack of regulation and the applied practices encouraging 
entrepreneurship in the security industry market. It also highlights the 
risks and future trends.  
A former Royal Navy officer bought the decommissioned boat from the 
Navy of Oman,96 according to his claims, he converted her into a civilian 
craft and registered her as a ‘pleasure boat’, flying the British flag. The 
two mounted cannons visible on deck are supposedly decommissioned and 
                                                          
95 The mastermind of the investment and business opportunity was identified at Bloomberg’s interview 
as Simon Murray, who joined the French Foreign Legion as a teenager. The 55-year-old millionaire is 
also chairman of Glencore, one of the world's largest commodities traders 
96 Chris Enmarch bought the vessel, which is 127ft long and weighs 135 tons; she was built in 
Lowestoft, Suffolk, in the mid-Seventies, as a fast attack craft for the Sultan of Oman’s navy in the 
Gulf and decommissioned in 2002. 
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out of service as well. However, they do give her a somewhat provocative 
and questionable appearance. She was afterwards manned with five ex-
Royal Marine Commandos, and prepared to sail for new adventures. 
Picture 7: The British gunboat 'Defender', while held in Tenerife (Couzens 2013) 
Although she was registered as a ‘pleasure boat’, it was reported in a local 
Essex’s newspapers in November 2011 that the owner “intended to arm 
her for shipping and oil rig protection … [and her] … task will be to deter 
any pirates intent on boarding the many ships that pass the East African 
coastline. One look at her should be enough to send them looking for 
easier targets” (Couzens 2013). She finally sailed from Cornwall UK on 
April 16, 2013 and the owner stated that his ‘pleasure boat’ was going on 
an anti-piracy mission. 
A mechanical failure forced the ship to deviate from her planned course 
and head for an unplanned stopover for repairs in Tenerife. In sight of the 
port, she was boarded by Spanish Civil Guard officers, refused permission 
to stay there and escorted to a berth 50 miles away in Santa Cruz port by 
a Spanish navy warship. However, due to the gaps in international 
legislation, the Spanish authorities had to deal with the vessel’s 
registration as a ‘pleasure boat’ despite her suspicious and formidable 
appearance. To this end, they conducted five detailed inspections for a 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of 
this thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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whole week, focused on finding evidence of private security activities and 
other wrongdoings. Finally, the Spanish ministry of defence announced 
that an inspection revealed “irregularities in the paperwork of the boat 
and its crew, as well as deficiencies in safety equipment” (Couzens 2013). 
Consequently, the owner was fined €40,000 because the vessel’s waste 
systems and the fire extinguishers did not meet the standards of ‘pleasure 
crafts’. Despite his previous statements, the ship owner now stressed 
that,  
the reports of us heading to Somalia are nonsense. We would not 
have come down this way if our destination was the Horn of Africa. 
There are quicker routes to get there. We are on our way from 
England to Senegal to discuss with the authorities there the possible 
use of the Defender as a deterrent against illegal fishing boats. The 
idea is that one look at us and anyone who should not be fishing 
there will think twice about staying … the presence of a formidable 
looking vessel would be enough to deter illegal fishing (Couzens 
2013). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, just five days after her release and departure 
from Tenerife, the boat was intercepted off Senegal and detained again by 
the Senegalese authorities this time, on ‘suspicion of illegal activities’. The 
spokesman for the Senegal Army said the ship was being held in Dakar 
and four British former members of the armed forces had been arrested, 
but he refused to disclose further details. The arrested ship owner for his 
part stated that he and his crew were not mercenaries and their venture is 
strictly business oriented, “similar to other British private protection firms 
which operate in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Daily Mail 2013). 
The controversies provoked by the ship owner’s statements highlight on 
the one hand the weaknesses of the international regulations. His ship had 
already been removed from the UK registry, but the practice of registering 
‘security crafts’, as discussed above, still needs many improvements, 
should they intend to operate in multinational environments and cross-
country territorial waters. 
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Perhaps even more importantly, and given the continuously increasing 
number of PMSCs offering anti-piracy escorts, protection and services in 
general, new areas are under investigation in order to create new 
business opportunities which are still under-researched and unexplored. 
In this specific case, while underway, the crew decided to head to the Gulf 
of Guinea instead of the Horn of Africa, which was already crowded in 
terms of private security providers. They consequently offered their 
services to the Senegalese government to combat illegal fishing, which is 
indeed a major issue in the region.    
PMSCs already provide security services to the offshore oil industry, 
consultancies to governmental bodies and commercial companies; as 
discussed in detail in the conceptual framework of private security in 
Section 2.4.3, the vast majority are contracted by private, commercial 
companies to provide security services, However, ‘Defender’s’ case is one 
of the very few attempts to achieve and gain a contract directly with a 
government which does not have the means to secure and promote its 
interests. Hence, what becomes evident and which we can expect to see 
in the near future is the extent of PMSCs engagement in other maritime 
security challenges. These will include illegal fishing and trafficking related 
crimes at sea, in particular, as well as offering their services to and 
signing contracts with governments, following the paradigm of their land-
based colleagues.  
 
8.4 The Hellenic Case Study  
Hellas is traditionally a maritime nation and the sea is inseparable from 
the Hellenic culture, history, society and its existence per se. More than 
50% of the global merchant fleet belongs to Hellenic shipping companies, 
although the vast majority is registered in states under ‘flags of 
convenience’.  
As already discussed in Chapter Six (Section 6.4.1), in December 2008 
the European Union launched its first ever joint Maritime Operation under 
the European Common Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). ‘Operation 
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Atalanta’ was the EU’s counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia, 
“as response to the rising levels of piracy and armed robbery off the Horn 
of Africa in the Western Indian Ocean” (EEAS 2012) and in accordance 
with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolution. The 
assignment of a Greek Commodore (on board a Hellenic frigate) as the 
first operational commander of the joint Naval Force added a mythic 
parameter to the whole operation, particularly as, during this specific 
period, the Secretary General of the IMO was also Greek97. Yet, almost 
one year later and after the completion of his assignment he resigned 
from the Hellenic Navy and in 2010 he founded (and to date is still 
directing) a Hellenic PMSC registered in Cyprus but based in Piraeus 
(Interview B, 2012).    
While the above events reflect the interest and the continuous bonds of 
Greece with the maritime domain in general and its security in particular, 
the levels of economic depression were increasing at dangerous levels in 
the country. As a result, since defence budgets do not refer solely to 
armament procurements but also to salaries, training, health care, 
maintenance, funding of military operations etc., as from March 2012, the 
Hellenic government withdrew any assets operating in the high risk area. 
Furthermore, it is very unlikely that in the near future any Hellenic frigate 
will be re-deployed in the region. Hence the paradox here is that a 
country which prides itself on leading global shipping, has become 
dependent on other countries’ navies to secure the trade routes and 
ensure the ‘freedom of the seas’.          
Another paradox associated with this is that, despite the extent to which 
national economy has shrunk, Hellas remains in the top positions among 
NATO member states in terms of defence spending. Obviously maritime 
security is not among the top priorities to be funded, since the personnel 
costs alone account for approximately 57% of the overall budget 
(ekathimerini.com 2013).   
In the environment of the most supressed economy within the EU, where 
thousands of Hellenic businesses have been bankrupted within the last 
                                                          
97 See footnote No 2  
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three years, private maritime security services is one of the very few 
businesses that flourish. In March 2012, the Hellenic government issued 
the relevant legislation, authorising the contracting of private armed 
security guards and their deployment on board Hellenic vessels (Hellenic 
Parliament 2012). The date that this law came into force coincides with 
the date that the Hellenic frigate was withdrawn from the EUNAVFOR 
Somalia. Maybe it is only a coincidence, but it is also interesting to have a 
closer look at Article 4 of the relevant law, which defines the cost and 
duration of the required licence. It is indicative that a shipping company 
that is interested in contracting private security services has to pay 
€2,000 for a six month licence or €3,500 for an annual licence. This is of 
course a significant income for the state in terms of taxation. However, it 
also provides another incentive for the Greek ship-owners who still have a 
few ships left flying the Hellenic flag to switch to a ‘flag of convenience’ 
registration so as to avoid the license fee. 
 
8.5 Implications in International Security and Future Trends 
When the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers was 
founded and launched in 2010, as analysed in detail in the previous 
chapter (Section 7.3), there were only 56 registered PMSCs. Of course, 
this does not mean that there were not more than this in existence, but 
initially companies were sceptical in publicising their existence and 
especially so in governmental bodies. When later on, the ICoC was 
promoted as an inspiring ethical regulatory body, which would provide 
compliance assurance, respect and prestige in the global market, the 
registrations kept increasing with geometrical progress: 206 companies 
were registered in 2011 alone and another 200 in 2012.  
As of June 2013, out of 659 private security providers registered by the 
ICoC overall, 462 provide purely maritime security related services, be 
they armed escorts, training, consultancy, risk assessment, etc. These 
462 companies are registered in 65 different countries worldwide, a fact 
which clearly demonstrates the globalised nature, character and 
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requirements of private security provision. Yet, it is impressive that 172 of 
them are registered in the UK, 36 in the US and 23 in Cyprus. 
Table 8: PMSCs Registered per Country as of June 2013 (Source: ICoC) 
 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of this thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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There are also 22 registered in Greece, with another 24 companies 
managed and operated by Greek nationals registered with ‘flags of 
convenience’, such as Liberia, Bulgaria, Malta, Marshall Islands, Belize, 
etc. Table 8 lists the number of PMSCs registered per country as of June 
2013, given that the respective numbers provided in ICoC’s webpage 
reflect the overall number of private security providers (including PMCs 
and PSCs) per country.  
There are two points worth noting in relation to this; firstly, although 
Greece and Cyprus are both experiencing a long term economic recession, 
perhaps with the highest unemployment rates in the Eurozone, the private 
maritime security sector not only flourishes, but Greece is also classified 
at the top of the list of the countries offering such services. 
Secondly, it is not accidental that the UK, Greece and Cyprus host the 
majority of the PMSCs worldwide. London is the global hub and 
policy/decision making centre of the global shipping industry, while 
Greece and Cyprus manage the vast majority of the global merchant fleet. 
Hence, the quality, quantity and concentration of clients provide the ideal 
and most fertile ground for the private maritime security industry to 
flourish. 
The following sections provide an assessment in terms of implications in 
international security and future trends from governance, social, strategic 
and commercial perspectives.    
8.5.1 Governance and Policy 
The governance practices and the traditional state’s structure of security 
provision, which follow the neoliberal model, as analysed in detail in 
Chapter Four (Section 4.3), have been transformed due to the extent of 
the privatisation of security provision ashore.  
As Avant (2008:449-51) stresses, the opportunities to finance and deliver 
private security services, have been enhanced by an amalgamation of 
worldwide forces, new ideas and political choices. Consequently, the 
private security industry now exists in parallel and operates along with 
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state military and police forces. Yet, there has to be a proper mechanism 
within the state in order to control, regulate and assess the industry’s 
performance. She highlights, saying: 
the privatisation of security and force projection has undoubtedly 
loosened the ties between states and force and undermined 
states’ collective monopoly on authorised violence in the 
international system. This has not made states less important, 
but it has opened the way for changes in the roles that states and 
other actors play in controlling force on the world stage.” (Avant 
2008:449) 
This development poses significant implications both for international 
security and the control of force. At the level of individual states, although 
they may sometimes be able to enhance their military capabilities, the 
market undermines their collective monopoly over violence in the 
international arena. Hence, the obvious dilemmas are focussed on the 
services per se and their overall regulation. Furthermore, the variety of 
alternative services and options that the market can provide has 
implications in their foreign and security policies, in terms of involving the 
private sector in decision-making. Additionally, and specifically in the 
framework of foreign policies, it becomes more likely that states take 
action that otherwise would not have been taken due to lack of internal 
support and legitimisation. This highlights the fact that beyond 
outsourcing the monopoly over violence, states also outsource power over 
violence outside their own mechanisms. At the non-state actors’ level, 
influence over security decisions becomes more possible and available to 
actors both outside government and the state’s physical boundaries. 
Finally, transnational financing could diffuse power over the control of 
force, which from a broader perspective could allow a greater variety of 
actors to have influence over the use of force. It also foreshadows a 
furthering of competing institutions with overlapping and conflicting 
jurisdictions over force (Avant 2008:449-51) 
However, the integration of the maritime domain in the security provision 
structure offers a more comprehensive aspect, in this way adding a 
dimension that was overlooked and missing from the contemporary 
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security jigsaw. The state transformed maritime security from a costly and 
defence budget consuming obligation into a revenue opportunity. No 
matter if it called Vessel Protection Detachment team (like the Dutch and 
the Indian cases); floating or land based armouries renting (like Sri Lanka 
and Djibouti accordingly); state patrol boats’ escort (like Yemen); 
weapons renting and selling (like Djibouti and Russia accordingly); or 
taxation of the PMSC’s contracts (like Greece), it reflects the states’ 
achievement in reducing the cost of providing security to commercial 
companies and its citizens. And, in the process, it raises a significant 
income from privatising it through controversial and perhaps murky 
practices. 
One of maritime insecurity’s primary causal factors is state fragility; 
inevitably, although weak states have the human resources, they do not 
have the means and assets to safeguard and enforce law and order in 
their littoral areas, territorial waters and exclusive economic zones, hence 
maritime security challenges flourish. Further conclusions can be drawn on 
this issue, when we take a closer look at the official announcement of the 
UK government, referring to the financial aid to support the work against 
piracy:  
The Government is committed to continuing the fight against piracy 
and maritime insecurity wherever it may occur… To this end, I am 
pleased to announce a new a package of support worth £2.25m for 
the work of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, with 
whom we are working in close partnership to deliver capacity 
building assistance. This includes: 
-    $1.135m of additional funding to the UNODC’s Post Trial Transfer 
Programme, to complete the construction of a new prison in 
Garowe, Puntland, to hold convicted pirates in facilities that meet 
international standards. Prison capacity remains one of the 
biggest challenges we face in bringing pirates to justice and it is 
essential that we provide a targeted, long term solution. 
-    A $100,000 project to tackle corruption in the Somali penal 
system. As UNODC continue the process of transferring pirates 
back to Somalia, we face the risk that convicted pirates may seek 
to secure early release by the paying bribes to prison staff. The 
project will extend existing anti-corruption awareness training 




-    A $240,000 project to develop the Somali coast guard. 
Supporting UNODC work with the maritime authorities in 
Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland to begin the process of 




Yet, the future trend and option of contracting PMSCs for this purpose, 
and specifically to replace and perform the tasks that their non-existing 
navy and/or coast guard should perform, is approaching with a fast pace. 
However, there are still a few problems that have to be addressed.   
The financial requirements are a major factor as well; although it is 
definitely cheaper to hire a PMSC instead of building a navy or coast guard 
and sustaining it, the cost is still high, especially for the specific countries. 
The solution here will obviously be the external funding from the 
international community and regional organisations. Instead of allocating 
funds from their national defence budget, and deploying vessels in 
faraway seas, states will very likely endorse and fund the contract with a 
PMSC to do the job and their financial burden (and internal legitimisation 
for deploying military assets abroad) will be incomparably and significantly 
lower. Following the paradigm of UN peacekeeping operations ashore, 
where none of the contemporary ones has been launched without the 
participation and inclusion of private security contractors to fill essential 
gaps, the maritime domain will inevitably follow. In both ashore and 
offshore operations, for all the above reasons and given that UN relies 
upon states’ contributions, states are and will be very keen on 
contributing their financial share towards contracting PMSCs for 
expeditionary missions - instead of deploying their own troops and assets 
and undertaking both the risk and financial cost which would be added to 
their portfolio. 
Finally, there is an evident tendency from developed countries (so far) to 
offer contracts and business opportunities only for PMSCs abroad. The 
equivalent land based companies, conquered a big space of the security 
sector both in homeland security posts and law enforcement, as well as by 
joining the expeditionary military forces abroad. Private guards can be 
seen in banks, public buildings and premises and in the subway, 
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supplementing or partially replacing state’s police forces, but also in 
hostile environments abroad such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, the 
outsourcing of states’ monopoly in maritime security provision has not 
expanded to that extent yet. Hereof, there is not even partial 
redistribution of, for example, the coast guards’ tasks and missions to 
PMSCs in their homeland, although there would be a plethora of mission 
types that could be assigned to them. Following the paradigm established 
for contracting PSCs for port security (mostly due to privatisation of 
ports), the potential of a private coast guard has been broadly discussed 
and debated over recent years. However, even the practice during major 
international sport events such as the Olympic Games for example, 
demonstrate the States’ reluctance to contract PMSCs in homeland 
operations. Although PSCs have a major role in these events, the 
maritime events’ security remains under the states’ forces jurisdiction. 
Despite its current status, and when the proper arrangements are agreed 
in the governmental structures, it is very likely that at least part of the 
coast guards will be privatised.       
8.5.2 Strategic 
Many analysts argue that the multi-national naval forces deployed in the 
region have a predominantly symbolic character of the traditional naval 
force projection doctrines, reflecting contemporary naval diplomacy while 
simultaneously serving the protection and promotion of each state’s 
national interests in the region. Although if it can be interpreted as having 
the intention of securing the sea lanes for energy supplies or for 
furthering the geopolitical rivalries in the Indian Ocean, it is also a unique 
opportunity for navies coming from states with tense diplomatic relations 
(e.g. United States, China, Iran) to co-operate, conduct joint operations 
and training and even share valuable intelligence that would otherwise not 
be possible.  
For many years now, analysts and policy makers have stressed that the 
solutions for countering piracy lie ashore, as the human security approach 
asserts (see Section 2.2.4). Yet, this is a long term process and both 
global public opinion and the commercial sector need action to ensure the 
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safety of seafarers, ships, cargoes and to enhance economic, food and 
energy security in general. The solution has been found in the 
privatisation of short term security provision, as described above. This 
trend provides both alternatives and revenues to all actors, state and 
private.  
All developed countries are already downsizing their armed forces 
structure due to the financial crisis and defence budget restraints.  There 
is a clear attempt to minimise permanent staff to those in critical posts 
only, and only in numbers that are essential. They cover the additional 
requirements by signing project based contracts with PMSCs on an ad hoc 
basis, both for consultancy work and operational tasks, confident that 
their personnel and sub-contractors have been educated and well trained 
by the state per se. Regional organisations already contract private 
entities following the same concept, even in the hitherto sensitive and 
restricted field of intelligence. EUNAVFOR for example, the EU maritime 
security force, contracted a private company to provide intelligence 
concerning high risk areas and identify hot spots of piracy at a global 
level. The provider, through a developed mobile phone application, 
distributes live intelligence feeds to designated and authorised staff 
personnel at the headquarters’ level, in order to be evaluated and utilised 
accordingly (Correspondence F 2013). Hence, the expanded option of 
PMSCs contracted by the states instead of solely commercial companies 
seems to be approaching very fast, as it also overcomes the legal issues 
and restrictions/limitations relating to authorisation by governmental 
bodies. 
These legal issues bring us to the second major point: local, regional 
jurisdictions and nation states’ sovereignty. Should a state contract a 
PMSC as security provider, it simultaneously outsources and allocates its 
sovereignty rights of force projection, law enforcement and security 
provision in its territorial waters and exclusive economic zone to a private 
actor/company, which additionally and most likely will be registered, 
managed and operated by citizens of another foreign country. 
Furthermore, given that the PMSC will not be an asset of any foreign 
state’s armed forces, it will make the internal legitimisation easier for the 
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hosting state to outsource this security provision, since it will by no means 
give the impression of international or external intervention in territorial 
sovereignty and internal affairs.                
One could argue, that this is not a big issue for a fragile state, which 
anyway does not have the means to ensure law enforcement on its own 
account, nor to exercise its sovereignty rights and eliminate (or at least 
minimise) the ungoverned areas within its territory, be it sea or land. Yet, 
a private entity, contracted and authorised by the state to perform these 
tasks on its behalf, will have this right only within its sovereign territory. 
At this point, both legal and ethical issues emerge: What if this PMSC 
witnesses a pirate attack or illegal fishing activities at just a few hundred 
yards distance, but could/should not intervene due to contractual 
obligations and territorial/legal issues?  
Perhaps the above question brings to mind Srebrenica’s peacekeepers. 
However there is a potential answer to this dilemma as well; the regional 
focus, dimensions and ramifications of maritime crime, all point towards 
the solution of regional organisations contracting PMSCs for similar 
purposes (such as ECOWAS, AU, EU). And why not also the UN with a 
regional mandate? Given that EU/NAVFOR’s mandate for anti-piracy 
operations off Somalia expires in 2014, it would not be surprising if a 
PMSC is then contracted with a similar mission, task and contractual 
obligations. The example of the deployment of FRONTEX by the EU, to 
patrol the Greek–Turkish borders in order to combat human 
trafficking/smuggling and illegal immigration is not very far from the 
above concept (FRONTEX 2012). The ‘regional mandate’ will give the 
flexibility and the international legitimisation to the private contractor(s) 
to act accordingly in all territorial waters and exclusive economic zones of 
the region’s states that are included in and have accepted this private 
security provision through international funding and sponsorship. 
In the context of researching the potential of contracting private security 
companies to conduct EU operations, White and MacLeod stress that 
endowing non-state actors with legal status – especially in the security 
services industry - demonstrates a lack of political will rather than any 
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actual or conceptual restrictions to recognising them as subjects of 
international law. Hence, adopting these practices would require one, or 
both, of two developments. On the one hand, the accountability and 
responsibility for their acts (and perhaps wrongdoings) would need to be 
transferred to the organisation that contracted them. This would require 
adopting stricter and more careful clauses and mechanisms ensuring their 
accountability in their contractual obligations. Alternatively, there would 
need to be a radical change in the status of PSCs as legal entities subject 
to the international law, as the cited research suggests (White and 
MacLeod 2008:976, 988). 
In any terms, the vital need for an international body/authority which will 
be responsible for the regulation, vetting and accreditation of PMSCs, is 
one of the profound findings of this research. Even if a state has the ideal 
mechanisms in place to perform the above critical tasks, its jurisdiction is 
limited to those PMSCs registered under its flag, and its laws apply only to 
those companies accordingly. Yet, the globalised market offers the 
potential to shipping companies to contract PMSCs from the country of 
their choice, and consequently, the alternative will not necessarily have 
the same quality and compliance standards. Even from the industry’s 
perspective, the potential that strict regulations enforced upon PMSCs in 
one country may result in higher prices for their services and so reduce 
their competitiveness compared to other companies from other countries. 
Hence, an international body authorised to perform this task will ensure, 
on the one hand, that the same standards and regulations apply to all 
PMSCs on a worldwide basis. On the other hand, their vetting process will 
also assure all ship-owners that no wrongdoings are overlooked nor 
double standards applied.   
8.5.3 Social 
The social dimensions of the privatisation of security are directly linked 
with the PMSCs’ recruitment process, which was analysed in detail in 
Section 7.2.1. The ‘Cross Deck’  recruitment agency perfectly reflects the 
social implications and career metamorphosis that the near future 
officially offers to the former military personnel (Cross Deck 2013a). The 
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most recent advert, entitled ‘Ex-Forces Personnel & the Transition into 
Private Security’ (13 Sep. 2013), presents the results of a British Security 
Industry Association’s (SIA) survey of its members to demonstrate the 
background, qualifications and experience they look for in their potential 
employees. On the one hand, the results of the survey were revealing: 
88.2% of the already existing employees are ex-forces personnel; 90% 
advocate that the most suitable candidates for private security roles are 
ex-forces men and women due to their transferrable skills, as well as their 
training and experience which are a perfect match to the private sector’s 
requirements.  
On the other hand though, they highlighted several issues which would 
motivate military personnel currently in service to switch careers and join 
the private sector. The first point in the survey relates to the announced 
cuts for the armed forces, which made many servicemen redundant: 
With the announcement in June 2013 of more cuts, many soldiers 
are now opting for redundancy. With so much uncertainty over the 
future, and drops in morale, service men and women are choosing to 
take control of their own decision to leave  (Cross Deck 2013a). 
 
The second refers to the intensity of tours of duty in hostile environments 
abroad, which results in great stress on families due to long term 
absences. Hence, the job in the private sector triggers the emotional 
sensitivity of the ideal candidates: 
With the intensity of recent tours of duty, the stress on families can 
also be great. Taking a job in the private security industry can allow 
you to spend more time with your family, and avoid constant 
resettlement as your children attend school. Being able to stay in one 
spot also gives your spouse the opportunity to develop their own 
career (Cross Deck 2013a).  
 
Finally, they touch upon the risk of injury or stress, stressing that the 
private security sector does not entail the same dangers: 
A number of service men and women leave due to injury or stress. 
Some of the roles in the security sector offer the familiarity of routine 
without the danger. Becoming involved in organisation and non-
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frontline jobs allow you to use your skills without any of the triggers 
another tour may induce (Cross Deck 2013a). 
 
The above publication reflects the recruitment issues analysed in the 
previous chapter, and the dual benefits – both for the state and the 
retired members of the Armed Forces - in terms of unemployment rates 
and career change for those who retire, respectively. However, there are 
other elements, which encourage and to some extent motivate members 
in active service to switch to the private sector, with much better salaries, 
less danger and better working conditions and environments both for the 
candidates and their families. And the common practice, as the research 
findings of this study also highlight, is that growing numbers of active 
service members of the Armed Forces join the private security industry 
with the promise of better reward and much better working conditions.  
But even for those who do not have a military background, training and 
experience, the established market and business model of the security 
industry has opportunities to offer. The companies that provide training 
and certification can prepare individuals with the minimum requirements 
to follow the private security’s career path without the need to enlist in 
the Armed Forces. Yet, from the author’s perspective, the question in the 
long term is to what extent will states’ Armed Forces be able to recruit the 
required personnel in order to accomplish their mission, since youth will 
have far more lucrative and promising possibilities should they follow the 
private security industry’s career?   
8.5.4 Commercial 
The private sector has established a peripheral commercial network 
around the node of the state, which is booming for many reasons. This 
provides the opportunity to manage its own security, provide the required 
short term solutions and identify new business opportunities with the 
states’ tolerance and encouragement. It can help to reduce 
unemployment rates with the creation of new security provision 
companies (training, vetting, logistics, etc.) which support the main core 
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of security operations, following the paradigm of equivalent companies 
ashore. What remains to be realised is the extent to which the state will 
achieve the goal of managing and regulating this network, and whether it 
will retain the jurisdiction and control over security and force projection.  
So far, states have demonstrated a selective approach towards this trend, 
attempting to intervene only in identified issues which are on the 
threshold between legal and illegal activity and raise serious security 
concerns in the international maritime community. An indicative example 
is the stance of the UK government towards the controversial issue of 
floating armouries, analysed in detail in the previous chapter (Section 
7.4.2). Although there is a major issue and debate around their 
deployment, acceptable/legitimate standards and use, the UK Department 
of Business Innovation and Skills has issued 50 licences for such vessels, 
operating in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden (McMahon 2013). Hence, 
the state prefers a tolerant approach, choosing to legitimise issues which 
are still under research instead of interrupting the business model with a 
more robust intervention in the global market.      
In late 2010, Hellenic ship owners were discussing and investigating the 
option of funding armed convoy escorts to provide security for their vast 
merchant fleet through the Indian Ocean’s high risk area (Correspondence 
E, 2013). The idea was finally rejected due to the high cost and the 
available option of contracting armed guards on board every individual 
vessel as more cost-effective. However, this potential at international 
level cannot be overlooked. A possible future request by the UN to 
international shipping bodies to sponsor and fund similar ventures and 
activities in terms of security provision for their vessels and share the cost 
of their own security and profit, would introduce a completely new era in 
international security.  
Furthermore, it is very important not to overlook the commercial 
dimension and the business opportunities that PMSCs offer both to the 
industry and the state. Interestingly, although the Netherlands, and other 
states, have banned the use of PMSCs on board vessels flying their flag 
(Van Ginkel et al. 2013), there are 13 Dutch PMSCs registered in their 
248 
 
homeland (as of June 2013 - See Table 8, Section 8.5), which offer their 
services in vessels flying foreign flags (although they may be managed by 
Dutch owners).     
Another option which is very likely to be adopted in the very near future is 
the creation of a ‘Security Department’ in every individual shipping 
company. This will definitely save a lot of expenses for companies who 
contract PMSCs for security provision on board their vessels. The 
‘Company Security Officer’ is already a land-based mandatory post in all 
shipping companies, eligible to manage, operationally monitor and deploy 
security teams. What is missing, as yet, is the employment of security 
operators directly from the companies, who will be deployed aboard the 
employer’s vessels whenever required and obviously whenever a ship is 
transiting a high risk area. This will definitely introduce not only a shift 
away from what is known as ‘Commercial Shipping’ but also significantly 
alter the international security domain. Yet, in the free market nothing 
seems impossible.     
In terms of implications for the commercial sector, and within the 
framework discussed above, we could also include the effects of 
technological advancement. Satellite imagery for example, has become 
increasingly popular and of significant importance to the maritime security 
industry. Broadband connection is available via satellite for seagoing 
vessels all around the world, which makes communications with the 
shipping company’s headquarters possible 24/7. Consequently, future 
studies about the collation and dissemination of piracy related 
information, could perhaps also alter the applied tactics, policies and 
strategies to suppress modern piracy.    
 
8.6 Conclusion 
Based on the conceptual framework of private security developed in 
Section 2.4.3, and using the findings of previous chapters (4, 5 and 7, in 
particular), this chapter contributes to the fulfilment of the last identified 
objective of the thesis. To this end, it provides an assessment of the 
extent to which the existing regulatory framework and PMSCs’ practices 
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and business model are liable to affect international security in 
governance and policy, strategic, social and commercial terms.  
Clearly, a relationship of mutual benefit between the state and the private 
sector can be identified. The state reduces the defence expenditure 
budget for providing security in the globalised environment while 
simultaneously minimising the political cost from potential human 
casualties, or even engagement in ambiguous operations in the territories 
of foreign sovereign states. The private sector offers jobs to former well 
trained military personnel, and the profitable contracts generate an 
attractive income both for the companies and the state in terms of 
taxation. 
However, there are significant implications identified that are expected to 
transform the international offshore security concept and provision. 
Following the extensive contemporary trend of replacing human 
participation and engagement in high risk environments by unmanned 
vehicles, (aiming obviously at eliminating potential armed forces 
personnel casualties), the contract and deployment of PMSCs will, to a 
great extent, replace expeditionary state and multinational maritime 
operations. Additionally to sharing the financial cost between participating 
and interested actors – be they regional organisations or commercial 
companies - this will also provide internal and external legitimisation to 
fragile states to outsource sovereign rights to private security providers to 
perform the tasks that they lack the assets, infrastructure, training and 
‘know how’ to apply.     
Most likely, in the near future, UN mandates for local and/or regional 
maritime operations will be replaced by contracts with national or 
multinational PMSCs assigning tasks for them to fulfil, while state entities 
and military navies are left to supervise their coordination, compliance, 
regulation and efficiency. What needs to be done though is to overcome 
and resolve all the identified weaknesses and controversial practices, 
including those identified in this research, that currently impact the global 




Chapter Nine: Summary and Conclusion 
 
The present research focused on the contemporary trend of privatisation 
of international security which is apparent ashore and which has recently 
also expanded offshore. In light of the deployment of land based PMCs 
and PSCs in numerous wars, especially in Africa, and the contractual 
missions still in evidence in Afghanistan, the sharp rise of pirate attacks 
off the Horn of Africa offered fertile ground for PMSCs to flourish and even 
overwhelm (in quantitative terms) their predecessors in the private 
security industry. Hence, the main research question of this project 
emerged, as explicitly posed in the Introduction and the Methodology, 
Chapter One and Chapter Three – Section 3.1, respectively: How are 
private maritime security companies regulated in the context of the 
international security privatisation trend?    
Throughout the preceding chapters, I have highlighted the fact that the 
existing literature in the theoretical approach to the privatisation of 
international security is relatively limited, both in relation to land based 
and maritime practices. Furthermore, I have provided the reader with an 
analytical framework through which to focus on maritime security and the 
individual challenges it entails in the context of international security. In 
relation to the perpetual phenomenon of sea piracy, I researched the 
performance of major actors deployed both by states and commercial 
companies off Somalia, as my case study in order to reach the conclusions 
about their role, future trends and implications in international security.  
 9.1 Summary  
Τhe aim of the research, as set out in the introduction and methodology 
chapters (Chapters 1 and 3, respectively), was the analytical investigation 
of the private maritime security companies’ regulation in the context of 
the international security privatisation trend, and the extent to which this 
trend affects international security, in general, and maritime security, in 
particular. Thus, the research should provide insight into the 
contemporary situation and so further the academic debate about the 
conceptualisation of security privatisation. In order to achieve these aims, 
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specific objectives had to be achieved; these were defined as follows 
(Chapter One, Section 1.1): 
 To analyse the conceptual framework of private security, and 
particularly maritime security, in the context of contemporary 
academic literature and professional practice. 
 To develop an analytical framework for the integration of maritime 
security and contemporary piracy in particular, into the contemporary 
paradigm of global security. 
 To analyse the complex framework of the PMSCs’ business model, in 
legal, operational and ethical terms. 
 To assess the extent to which the existing regulatory framework and 
PMSCs’ practices affect international security in governance and 
policy, strategic, social and commercial terms. 
 
In order to uncover the dynamics underlying the PMSCs’ regulatory 
framework in the above context, this research project identified and used 
appropriate qualitative research methods. These were strongly supported 
by empirical data collection that was made possible by extensive 
professional experience and personal engagement with the private 
maritime security industry. Using the case study of PMSCs’ operations off 
Somalia from 2005-2013, and a plethora of selected data from primary 
sources and semi-structured interviews, the study accomplished in depth 
research into the functioning and regulation of PMSCs and establishment 
of international standards. Through this it amassed a substantial amount 
of evidence that supports the argument for the need for more effective 
regulations. 
I used a plethora of secondary sources and the synthesis of the findings 
assisted both in overcoming the obstacle of the relatively limited available 
literature and in contributing to the broadening of knowledge in this 
specific domain. Perhaps more importantly, I used primary sources, 
including semi-structured interviews and correspondence with 
professionals from the private security industry. This can definitely be 
labelled as a significant achievement given the commercial confidentiality 
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of the subject, the sensitive issues researched (on the borderline between 
legality and questioned legitimacy) and the profound ‘air-tightness’ of the 
industry. Of equal importance is my contribution to the empirical data that 
stems from my professional background, not only in terms of familiarity 
with the marine domain, but also my interactions with PMSCs within the 
structure and activities of the International Association of Maritime 
Security Professionals. This broad experience enabled me to strongly 
support my selected qualitative research strategy in a variety of ways. 
The predominant of these involved the following: evaluating and 
validating the collected data; providing empirical data from my 
participation on professional committees; commenting on specific issues 
from a professional perspective, with confidence and without need for 
assumptions, risks of exaggerations or generalisations; analysing the 
collective data based on a deep knowledge of the realities and practices in 
the ‘real world’ without bias in favour or against the PMSCs.  Hence, I 
would like to pride myself on completing a research which might seem to 
be unachievable to outsiders in this domain and this adds more 
significance and potential impact to the outputs. Therefore, the aim of this 
final chapter is to highlight the key points of these research outputs, 
which to a great extent fulfil the identified objectives, and also to provide 
suggestions for potential future research. 
Beyond the identification of the conceptual gap existing in this area 
(Section 2.5), the review of the selected literature in Chapter Two 
produced two major outputs in terms of the conceptualisation of privatised 
maritime security in the context of international security,  
Firstly, it provided the links and implementation of existing international 
security approaches and theories with the maritime security approach. 
The realist approach (Section 2.2.1) reflects to a great extent the 
international response to Somali piracy in the Indian Ocean at the state 
level. At the other end of the spectrum, international political sociology 
(Section 2.2.6) reflects the rise in security relations across an increasingly 
globalised terrain between security professionals, governmental and non-
governmental institutions, the police, military and private companies. The 
neoliberal approach (Section 2.2.2) actually sets the basis, principles and 
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conceptualisation of privatisation. Similarly, constructivism (Section 2.2.3) 
– which supports the shift away from identifying the state with security - 
can offer a useful insight in the trend to privatise security, while 
simultaneously forming the fertile ground and theoretical basis for the 
concept of ‘human security’ to emerge. Human security (Section 2.2.4) is 
perhaps the only approach that can offer a longer term solution to 
maritime crime-torn countries. Securitisation theory (Section 2.2.5) acts 
as a useful tool to analyse how maritime security in general, and piracy in 
particular, were brought into the security agenda and successfully 
‘securitised’. Although all of these theories focus on the role of the state, 
none of them actually conceptualise private entities that replace the state 
per se in its hitherto fundamental obligations and primary characteristic as 
the security provider. Despite this, the project’s in depth research 
identifies that contemporary states’ approach to maritime security could 
be interpreted as an attempt to integrate the neo-liberal model of security 
privatisation into the state-centric traditional mechanisms of security 
provision, as interpreted through a realist approach (see Section 8.2).  
Secondly, it established a conceptual framework of privatisation of 
maritime security (Section 2.4.5), hence providing the basis for the 
investigation of the PMSCs’ regulatory framework and the fulfilment of the 
first objective of the thesis. This framework highlights the major 
differences (and very slight overlaps) between land based and maritime 
companies, the major one being the main driver for their existence and 
clientele: PMCs/PSCs are so far contracted mainly by governments, while 
PMSCs offer their services mostly to the shipping and offshore oil industry.   
After a thorough description of the methodological strategy in Chapter 
Three, Chapter Four further broadened and deepened the analysis of the 
conceptual framework of privatisation of security, in the context of the 
international security academic literature and professional practice. It 
identified the causal factors of the trend, examined the major concerns 
and issues that were raised ashore and transferred them to the maritime 
domain. The data and arguments of this research to a great extent 
addressed these issues and illustrated how the dividing line between state 
and private security is even murkier in the maritime domain that it is 
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ashore. Although the projection of naval power, use of force and security 
provision in the maritime domain was states’ traditional and undeniable 
sovereign right and hitherto obligation, its outsourcing and fragmentation 
are a fact and a process that is still in progress.  
In practical terms, the private maritime security sector takes advantage of 
the unemployed, retired and well-trained military personnel to develop an 
already booming and well established business model. 
On the other hand, states take a dual award for the defence budget 
expenditure invested in their training. Not only does it minimise the 
allocation of funding required for the deployment of assets on the other 
side of the globe, but also generates income in terms of taxation from the 
private sector activities. 
Finally, irrespective of whether global public opinion is in favour of, or 
against, the deployment of PMSCs on board merchant vessels – given the 
numerous ethical, operational and legal concerns stemming from their 
applied practices (analysed in Chapter Seven) - the shipping industry 
inevitably considers them as the sole means of security provision in high 
risk areas. As such these have come to be considered the only available 
guarantee of the safety and security of both the seafarers and their cargo. 
Following on from this, Chapter Five developed an analytical framework 
and integrated maritime security into the contemporary paradigm of 
global security, both from the traditional state-centric and the UN human 
centric approach. It further focused specifically on contemporary piracy, 
as a diachronic maritime crime and securitised contemporary threat (in 
the context of the securitisation approach discussed in Section 2.2.5). 
Hence, this chapter contributed to the fulfilment of the second defined aim 
and objective.  
The historical overview of the phenomenon demonstrated both the ancient 
character of the maritime crime as well the diachronic character of the 
causal factors for its genesis, sustainability and suppression, and the 
responses to these. Consequently, Chapter Six was dedicated to the 
detailed research and presentation of modern maritime piracy, focusing on 
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the Horn of Africa. The vast majority of PMSCs’ contracts and deployment 
are focused on providing security against this specific maritime crime in 
this region, hence their regulatory framework was selected to be 
investigated through this case study. Again, researching the case study of 
Somalia, these causes and factors reflect the continuity of the history and 
the perpetuation of the phenomenon in the Horn of Africa.  
Another major output of this chapter is the development of a typology of 
modern piracy (Section 6.4). This offers a thorough understanding of the 
regional distinctiveness of the phenomenon, essential for acquiring a 
holistic picture of the operational environment in which PMSCs are 
deployed. This is discussed in detail in the following Section 9.2: Major 
outcomes and impact of the research. At this point I have to stress again 
that, since they address tactical and operational issues and symptoms of 
the phenomenon rather than the root causes, PMSCs can only be viewed 
as a short term anti-piracy measure and not as the means to address 
piracy in general. Furthermore, relating this typology and the private 
maritime security response to the issues of regulation outlined in the main 
research question suggests that this is not a transferable response. For 
instance, the existing framework developed for addressing Somali piracy 
would have to be significantly reconsidered and reconfigured if the 
industry wished to transfer the provided services and existing business 
model to another region, especially (and most likely) the Gulf of Guinea.     
Chapter Seven uncovers the actual dynamics underlying the PMSCs’ 
regulatory framework in the context of the privatisation of international 
security. All the in-depth investigations of the actors’ regulation and 
applied practices, point towards the same answers to the main research 
question. Although the IMO outsourced the PMSCs’ regulation to flag 
states, the latter are either reluctant or inadequate in this regard. No 
matter if the question refers to recruitment, training, regulation and 
certification, use of weapons or quality assessment, the research findings 
clearly demonstrate that they are all outsourced to the industry itself, with 
little/indirect or no state involvement at all. Focusing on the regulation 
and certification domain, the years between 2003 and 2012 saw a 
transition from the non-existence of international standards for PMSCs to 
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the development of two competing standards whilst deployment kept 
growing significantly, resulting in the problems discussed in section 7.3. 
Currently, the very existence of two different standards with different 
geographical focuses (US vs Europe) has created another dilemma that 
both PMSCs and shipping companies have to overcome: the former have 
to choose between the two and the latter have to assess which offers 
better credentials for the certified PMSC. However, significant initiatives 
and encouraging steps have been taken by the two international 
associations specifically towards the development and improvement of 
existing standards (since 2012). These are aimed at the promotion of 
professionalism, transparency and oversight in the private security 
industry. Still, the findings of the research and several incidents described 
in Chapters 7 and 8 suggest that the international community should 
focus on establishing an international organisation with the global 
jurisdiction to regulate, vet and certify private security providers. This will 
perhaps apply different requirements and standards between land based 
and maritime operators, due to the distinctiveness of the maritime 
domain, as will be highlighted in Section 9.3 below.              
Finally, Chapter Eight contributes to the fulfilment of the last identified 
objective of the thesis, by providing an assessment of the extent to which 
the existing regulatory framework and PMSCs’ practices and business 
model is liable to affect international security in governance and policy, 
strategic, social and commercial terms.  
In this framework, fragile states without the necessary means to enforce 
maritime law and order within their territorial waters and exclusive 
economic zones will turn to contracting PMSCs to perform and safeguard 
their sovereign rights, following the paradigm of land based practices. But 
even more importantly, developed states and regional/international 
organisations, will very soon mandate private contractors to replace 
multinational naval forces in maritime security operations. Although the 
presence of private security providers is evident in all contemporary 
peacekeeping operations, the expansion of this practice and tactics in the 
maritime domain will transform the current perception of international 
security in general and maritime security in particular.  
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Given the current international economic restraints, it will be more cost 
effective for states and regional organisations (such as e.g. NATO and EU) 
to contribute and share the financial burden of contracting PMSCs to do 
the job, with a local or regional mandate. This practice will alleviate the 
demand to allocate funds from the already tight defence budget to deploy 
naval assets on the other side of the globe in order to enhance maritime 
security on behalf of fragile states. Even further, this rapidly increasing 
strategy will also provide the internal and external legitimisation to fragile 
states to outsource sovereign rights to private security providers to 
perform the tasks that they are incapable of executing. Consequently, 
developed states will not have to go through the internal struggle of 
persuading public opinion in this present financial crisis that tax revenues 
should be allocated to deployed assets in faraway seas rather than 
meeting social demands at home.  
In addition, whilst PMSCs already provide security services to the offshore 
oil industry, consultancies to governmental bodies and commercial 
companies, what we can expect to see is a rapid increase in the extent of 
their engagement in maritime security challenges other than modern 
piracy, such as IUU fishing and trafficking related crimes at sea.  
Yet, if we want to enhance maritime security, a longer term strategy that 
involves common standards, regulation and policies has to be applied at 
international level. The planning process has to bring together all the 
stakeholders – government, military, private sector and academia – in 
order to implement policies and practices of mutual benefit that go far 
beyond short term profit (Chapsos 2013a:56-7). 
However, there is evidence to support the notion that states are still 
reluctant to intervene and pose restraints on this rapidly growing, already 
booming and highly profitable industry. On the contrary, they are also 
integrating PMSCs in their security provision structure; they are 
expanding the privatisation trend in the maritime domain and also 
gradually outsourcing monopolies to them. Even in states such as the 
Netherlands, which are still reserved on this issue and ban the use of 
PMSCs on board vessels flying their flag, there are 13 Dutch PMSCs 
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registered in their homeland98 (as of August 2013), which offer their 
services in vessels flying foreign flags (although they may be managed by 
Dutch owners).  
Private security is undoubtedly a contemporary phenomenon that is 
accepted, adopted and being rapidly developed with mutual benefits for 
both states and the private sector. Yet, as this research revealed, there 
are still a plethora of issues to be addressed in order to regulate and 
standardise the private maritime security provision at global level. 
As a closing point of this evaluation, the following ‘Table 9’ provides a 
summary of the achievements of this research and the extent of the 
fulfilment of the objectives from the author’s perspective:   
 
Objectives Summary of Analysis 
Chapter Four: 
 
To analyse the conceptual 
framework of private 
security, and particularly 
maritime security, in the 
context of contemporary 









The research demonstrated the 
integration of private maritime security 
services in the already existing 
controversial, debatable and under-
researched framework of privatisation of 
security. It also provided an analysis of 
the legal, ethical and operational 
concerns of land-based practices, which 
are inevitably transferred, applied and 
further expanded in the maritime 
domain. 
                                                          





To develop an analytical 
framework for the 
integration of maritime 
security and contemporary 
piracy in particular, into the 





















The examination of primary and 
secondary data demonstrated that 
international security and development 
is affected to a great extent by 
maritime insecurity and threats such 
as piracy, maritime terrorism, IUU 
fishing and illegal trafficking of drugs, 
weapons and humans. Furthermore, all 
of these challenge economic, energy, 
food and human security at a global 
level.    
 
The chapter focused then specifically on 
maritime piracy, and a historical 
overview confirmed and provided 
further evidence for the argument that 
the perpetuation of this ancient crime 
stems from the same root causes and 





To develop an analytical 
framework for the 
integration of maritime 
security and contemporary 
piracy into the 
contemporary paradigm of 
global security. To use the 
case study of Somalia to 
substantiate this. 
 
After defining the crimes of piracy and 
armed robbery at sea, the analysis of 
primary and secondary data provided a 
typology of piracy and an in depth 
analysis of the root causes and causal 
factors of the phenomenon. It 
highlighted the different operational 
models and objectives in relation to 
the geography of the three current 
major global hot spots.  
Furthermore, the analysis 
demonstrated that various short to 
medium term responses that have 
been applied off Somalia primarily 
address the symptoms and not the 
root causes of this land-based 
phenomenon. It also reflected the fact 
that the states’ response, (along with 
all its significant obstacles, operational 
difficulties and the extremely high cost 
for the already economically depressed 
international community), has not 
proven to be as efficient as the armed 
guards’ deployment on board merchant 
vessels. The collected data suggests 
that the deployment of multinational 
naval forces in the region was, in fact, 
mostly focused on geopolitical rivalries 
and promotion of individual states’ 
national interests rather than 





To analyse the complex 
framework of the PMSCs’ 
business model, in legal, 
operational and ethical 
terms. 
 
The in depth research of PMSCs’ 
recruitment, evaluation, training, 
regulation, certification, use of force 
and weapons, and quality assessment 
was mostly conducted through 
consideration of the primary data.  
Their analysis and synthesis 
demonstrated that although states are 
responsible for the regulation of 
PMSCs, which are integrated into the 
states’ security provision structure by 
outsourcing monopolies and exporting 
security services, there is no 
international mechanism in place to 
standardise all the above requirements 
on a common worldwide basis.  
Similarly, the “push – pull” factors 
affecting PMSCs in the global market 
and security environment, put in 
question the reliability of the 
procedures and established 
mechanisms for their certification and 
quality assurance. 
On the other hand, the variety of 
states’ regulations and their 
careful/limited interference in the 
procedures, reflect their tolerance and 
promotion of the privatisation trend, 
for the sake of minimisation of defence 
budget expenditure, unemployment 
rates and increase of taxation income, 
business opportunities and ventures 
around the core of service provision in 
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the security industry.  
Chapter Eight: 
To assess the extent to 
which the existing 
regulatory framework and 
PMSCs’ practices affect 
international security in 
governance and policy, 
strategic, social and 
commercial terms. 
 
The analysis of the primary and 
secondary data led to the identification 
of implications, stemming from the 
privatisation trend, for international 
security, in governance and policy, 
strategic, social and commercial terms. 
In this chapter, the author highlights 
and foresees a metamorphosis of 
international security in the maritime 
domain, due to the forthcoming use of 
PMSCs from developed countries, 
deployed by state entities, 
international/ regional organisations 
such as the UN, NATO, EU, etc.  
 
Identified future trends relating to the 
deployment of private navies and coast 
guards, even for tasks in developed 
countries’ homelands. The motivations 
identified for this include further 
reductions and cuts in states’ armed 
forces and law enforcement agencies, 
following the paradigm of land based 
companies in the same industry. 
 
Table 9: Summary of Research Achievements 
 
As can be seen from the summary provided in this section and the brief 
summary in the table above, my main research question, and identified 
aims and objectives have been successfully and efficiently addressed. 
Through this analytical investigation of the PMSCs’ regulation and the 
uncovered dynamics underlying their regulatory framework in the context 
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of the international security privatisation trend, I assessed the extent to 
which this privatisation trend affects international security in general and 
maritime security in particular. While this assessment indicated a 
significant lack in terms of regulation and its effectiveness, it also 
furthered the academic debate about the conceptualisation of security 
privatisation.  
 
9.2 Major Outcomes and Impact of the Research            
There are three major outcomes of this research, which can add to the 
existing international security literature and research, and which may also 
benefit future research in the maritime security domain. 
The privatisation of international security in general and maritime security 
in particular, is relatively under-researched as a contemporary theoretical 
approach, highlighted accordingly in the literature review. Furthermore, all 
the existing theories and approaches identify the state as a key actor; no 
matter exactly what the role of these approaches might be in the 
contemporary international security environment, the state is identified by 
all of them as the security provider, regulator, projector of violence, etc. 
Some of the analysed approaches or individual academic’s views include 
or foresee the private sector as an emerging or increasingly influential 
actor in international security. However, none of them actually 
conceptualise private entities as the security providers, replacing the state 
per se in its hitherto fundamental obligation and primary characteristic. 
Based on the conceptual framework of private security developed in 
Section 2.4.3, this research shows that private industry (both land based 
and maritime) has emerged as a ‘third sector’ of security provision, 
stressing the shift from government to security governance, where the 
state is the central node of security, and operates as a potential manager 
of the established networks. Yet, although the interests of those who 
participate in the network differ, the final objective of security provision 
and governance remains the goal. Still, the state retains the legal, 
symbolic and material capacities, critical for its achievement. This nodal 
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model can also be transnational, especially in cases where the states are 
reluctant to undertake specific tasks, instead assigning them to the well-
established and continuously growing global security market (Chapter 
Four, Section 4.3). 
The Typology of Piracy offers a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the 
root causes and causal factors of this specific maritime crime (Chapter 6, 
Section 6.3). On the one hand, the comparative study of the three major 
piracy hot spots on a worldwide basis demonstrates that every geographic 
location where it flourishes has to be dealt with as a distinctive and unique 
case. Hence, the lessons learned from a region A, cannot be transferred 
and applied to a region B, since the business model, the objective and 
characteristics differ, depending on local issues.  
Yet, through the historical overview and the study of modern piracy we 
realise that the root causes and causal factors remain the same 
throughout the history of mankind, despite varying geographic locations, 
continents or centuries. This typology could be utilised to develop a 
mechanism which could perhaps enable researchers, strategy planners 
and policy makers to safely predict potential piracy hot spots that are 
likely to emerge in the future. Thus, it would enable them to take into 
account the choke points of international shipping, geopolitical and human 
security factors around each one of them. 
Finally, the analysis of the private maritime security companies’ modus 
operandi (Chapter 7) identifies the ‘weak points’ regarding both the 
industry’s and the market’s regulations, methods and practices. 
Combining these findings with the future trends and implications 
described in Chapter Eight, we can see the major issues that have to be 
addressed at international level in order to enhance maritime security so 
as to make the vast oceans safer, as well as the concomitant promise of 
reward. They could also trigger the international community in founding 
and establishing an international organisation with the global jurisdiction 
to regulate, vet and certify private security providers. This will perhaps 
apply different requirements and standards between land based and 
maritime operators, due to the distinctiveness of the maritime domain. 
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Down at the state level, individual countries could improve their regulation 
and supervision of PMSCs. This, in turn, may enable them to use these 
services in enhancing homeland maritime security in the near future and 
also address maritime threats other than piracy accordingly. 
9.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
The role of PSCs and PMCs has been broadly discussed and debated in 
relation to their participation and role in humanitarian and peacebuilding 
operations (Lilly 2000). Similarly, this research makes extensive reference 
to the potential mandate from international organisations to PMSCs to 
conduct operations under their supervision and on their behalf in the 
maritime security domain. Hence, this could be another avenue for 
potential future research, in terms of the requirements and benefits of 
such a practice, in local, regional and international terms. Definitely, this 
would have to take into account sovereignty and territorial issues, and 
examine even the potential of outsourcing such jurisdictions to PMSCs 
under the ‘Responsibility to Protect’99 doctrine through UN mandates. 
Another issue which emerged from the findings of this research is the lack 
of contracting of PMSCs (so far) from developed states to conduct 
operations in their interior and so contribute to homeland security tasks. 
The potential of private coast guards has also been mentioned and the 
research proposal which might stem from this combination would be the 
extent to which PMSCs could be contracted to conduct operations against 
maritime security threats other than piracy. That said, countries facing 
major issues with IUU fishing, irregular migration and/or trafficking and 
smuggling of weapons, drugs and human beings in their territorial waters 
could perhaps be the case studies of the proposed research. 
  
                                                          
99 The doctrine was released in 2001, transforming international community’s hitherto “right to 
intervene” into the “responsibility to protect” (R2P). It was adopted in the 2005 UN General 
Assembly’s World Summit that declared the “responsibility of the state to protect its own populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity…” [Resolution A/RES/60/1, 
paragraphs 138-140, pages 30/38, available from  
<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement>, 
(accessed January 15, 2010)]. It is indicative that the recent intervention in Libya was authorised 
under the provisions and principles of this doctrine.  
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Appendix 1   PARTICIPANT INFORMATION LEAFLET 
 
Overall purpose of the research 
The purpose and objectives of this research in general terms, are: 
1. To analyse the conceptualisation of ‘maritime security' and the 
current trend of 'privatization of security'  
2. To identify the need for regulating private maritime security 
companies (PMSCs) and the role that free market principles can play in 
this domain  
3. To assess the existing international standards for regulating, 
recruiting, training and certifying PMSC personnel. 
 
Why have I been contacted?  
You have been contacted because it was felt that this area of research 
might be of interest to you, as well as because your personal experience 
and expertise can contribute significantly to the expected outcome.  
 
Do I have to take part?  
No - taking part in this research is entirely a matter of choice. There is no 
obligation to take part and if you choose not to do so, then this will be 
treated in the strictest confidence.  
 
If you choose to take part, all information gathered will be treated 
confidentially and reported in an anonymous way where you will not be 
able to be identified (further details are provided below). 
 
Furthermore cash payments or any other kind of inducements or 







What do I have to do? 
1. If you agree to take part, I will arrange a time with you for an 
interview to take place. This will, of course, take place at a time and 
location that suits you. The interview will last approximately one and a 
half hours. However, if it is more convenient for you, this could take part 
in two 45-minute sessions. 
 
2. Before the interview takes place, you will be asked to sign a form 
giving your consent to take part in the research and, if it is okay with you, 
provide consent for an audio recording of the interview to be made. If you 
do not agree to this, I will ask your permission to make a written record of 
the interview. After the interview, you will be provided with the interview 
transcript and asked to check for factual accuracy. 
 
3. During the interview, we will discuss about the role of private 
maritime security companies in enhancing maritime security in 
international level, as well as the procedures and International standards 
in effect for regulating, recruiting, training and certifying them. 
 
Can I stop the interview? 
Yes, you can stop or pause the interview at any time you wish.  
 
Do I have to answer all of the questions? 
No, you do not have to answer questions if you do not want to.  
 
What are the risks associated with the research? 
Sometimes when people talk about previous stressful and dangerous 
experiences, or about difficult events, they may experience some feelings 
that are related to the past. This is normal, so please don’t worry. If you 
feel that you would like to speak to a health professional that is used to 
helping with these kinds of feelings for free, then I can provide you with 
their details. Although this is not the intention of the research, in case you 
have previous experience of unpleasant situations at sea or due to the 




What are the benefits of taking part? 
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By taking part in this research you will have the opportunity to contribute 
to the development of the research and to knowledge that seeks to 
improve the international framework related to the regulation of private 
maritime security companies and enhance their contribution in coping with 
contemporary maritime security challenges.  
 
Withdrawal Options 
You are free to withdraw from this research whilst it is being carried out. 
You have a right to withdraw up until the completion of the analysis of the 
interview transcripts.  
 
Data Protection and Confidentiality  
• No personal information, in compliance with the Data Protection Act 
(1998) will be collected or stored. Participants are not required to disclose 
protected information that could hinder their personal or their company’s 
security.  
• Information obtained from the interviews will only be used for 
research purposes and will not be shared with any other 
individual/organisation. The identity of all who participate will remain 
anonymous. 
• All information gathered during the interviews will be kept in a 
secure, locked cabinet, away from participant’s contact details.  
• All information gathered will be destroyed one year after the 
completion of the final report.  
 
Should you need to complain: 
If you have any concerns regarding my conduct then please feel free to 
discuss these with me as soon as possible. Alternatively, you are welcome 
to contact my Director of Studies. 
Name: Professor Alan Hunter 
Address:  
Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies (CPRS) 
Coventry University 








What will happen with the Results of the Research? 
The results will form part of the final research report, which will contribute 
towards my PhD degree. The findings may also be used for the purposes 
of academic journal articles and conference papers.  
 
Who Oversees the Research? 
I am a part-time PhD candidate at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation 
Studies - Coventry University. Therefore, the appropriate authorities 
within the University have carefully examined the proposed research and 
have ensured that correct ethical protocol has been maintained. 
 
Please Feel Free to Contact Me 
If you would like any further information, or would like to discuss your 
involvement in this project, then please feel free to contact me,  




Appendix 2   INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
INFORMATION ABOUT THE COMPANY & THE OPERATOR 
Country and Date of Registration, Offering Services, Background, Previous 
Experience 
 
THE STARTING POINTS 
How and why did you decide to found/ work in a Maritime Security 
Company? 
 
TOPICS OR AREAS TO BE EXPLORED 
Recruiting Process and training 
Certification process; which international bodies are responsible and what 
certification did you receive so far?  
What kind of assignments are you contracted for so far? What is the 
average cost and frequency for each one of them? 
What kind of credentials do your clients request for? 
Could you describe the process of buying/ hiring weapons for your 
assignments? How to you manage their safeguarding while at sea and 
when arriving at a port? 
How do you decide the composition of the teams assigned in each 
mission? 
What are the dangers that your teams are subject to? Could you describe 
any relevant incident? 
Are there any international regulatory bodies evaluating periodically your 
performance or request reporting after each mission?  
Do you have any kind of cooperation with state entities or code of 
conduct/ communication/ restrictions? 
Do you have any internal procedures for re-evaluating or training your 
personnel? 
 
QUESTION TO END ALL INTERVIEWS 
Are there any other comments about the role of private maritime security 
companies that you would like to make? 
 
 
